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ABSTRACT 
A confluence of factors has sparked a sustained, public preoccupation with 
conversation. Brewing since the fifteenth century and overtly public since the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the explosion of public models of conversation that emerged in 
the European and American rhetorical traditions is significant—without precedent—in 
the history of rhetoric. This interest in conversation is so pronounced as to penetrate not 
just public speaking practices, but subtler interpretations of law, philosophy, commerce, 
and government. I identify this as the conversational turn. The extent to which this 
saturation was truly conversational is the subject of much debate. However, the contours 
of this debate are little understood. This is both a historical and theoretical problem. 
While the art of face-to-face conversation is said to be either irrevocably in decline or in 
desperate need of reclaiming, practically every modern communication invention has 
conspired to make the rhetorical metaphor and structure of conversation not just possible 
in public life, but desired and expected. In an effort to understand how and why the 
public conversational dynamic rose to prominence in the way that it did, this study brings 
together underlying social and political dynamics that animate the conversational turn, 
particularly as they developed in the United States. By doing so, this project recasts the 
dominant narrative about the public shift away from oratory and toward conversation in 
contemporary, democratic societies.  
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CHAPTER 1  
THE CONVERSATIONAL TURN  
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 
 
 “In America during these same years conversation could never be contained in the salons of one 
class…it proliferated through many levels of society in a democratic diversity of forms…the 
public seemed especially keen to see the character of important personalities expressed ‘live’ in 
the give-and-take of supposedly spontaneous conversation.” 
 
-Peter Gibian, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Culture of Conversation, 2001 
“Not all discussions —or conversations—lead to wisdom: but wisdom is more likely to come from 
people who engage in true conversation than those who do not.”  
 
-Egbert S. Oliver, “Who’s For Conversation?” 1958 
“Reading and Public Address are but modified forms of Conversation and are so closely allied to 
it that excellence in Conversation will secure excellence in Reading and Public Address.” 
 
-Jacob Shoemaker, Practical Elocution, 1883 
 
A confluence of factors has sparked a sustained, public preoccupation with 
conversation. Brewing since the fifteenth century and overtly public since the middle of 
the nineteenth century, the explosion of public models of conversation that emerged in 
the European and American rhetorical traditions is significant—without precedent—in 
the history of rhetoric. This interest in conversation is so pronounced as to penetrate not 
just public speaking practices, but subtler interpretations of law, philosophy, commerce, 
and government. I identify this as the conversational turn.  
The extent to which this saturation was truly conversational is the subject of much 
debate. However, the contours of this debate are little understood. This is both a historical 
	2	
and theoretical problem. As a matter of historical method, conversational models and 
dialogues have variously been rejected, extolled, and overlooked as relevant to 
contemporary public communication. While some sort of divergence is to be expected, 
what has been lacking in contemporary views of rhetoric is a general theory for including 
one interpretation of conversation alongside (or to exclusion of) another. Where for some 
the traditionally private genre of conversation is antithetical to the more agonistic rhetoric 
necessitated by a democratic public, for others, in particular proponents of deliberative 
democracy and the humanistic metaphor of conversation, the selfsame “branch of 
rhetoric” (i.e., conversation) is upheld as “the preferred model of political 
communication,” and, indeed, for all of rhetoric.1  
Meanwhile, what Peter Burke and Peter Gibian theorize in their separate studies 
as the “poles” of conversation have almost completely disappeared from contemporary 
analyses of the genre.2  In his expansive social history of language and conversation, 
Burke explains that tensions in conversational dynamics and performance, though 
necessary for developing a general theory, are continually ignored. He writes: “a truly 
general theory of conversation should discuss the tension and the balance between the 
competitive and cooperative principles, between equality and hierarchy, between 
inclusion and exclusion, and between spontaneity and study, rather than placing all the 
																																								 																					
1 Cicero refers to conversation as branch of rhetoric in Book I of De Officiis (On Duties) (1913). In 
“Political Oratory and Conversation: Cicero versus Deliberative Democracy,” Political Theory 27 (1999): 
39-64, Peter Remer summarizes the literature on deliberative democracy as “the preferred model of 
political communication” (39). For more on how the conversational style is antithetical to eloquence see 
Lee Cerling, “The Fate of Eloquence in American Higher Education, 1892-1925” PhD diss., (University of 
Iowa, 1995), 31.  
 
2 For more on the landscape of conversation in American literary and cultural history and the “poles” of 
conversation see especially Peter Gibian, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Culture of Conversation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1 and 215-289.  
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weight on the first item in each of these pairs.” 3 However, despite featuring prominently 
in Classical dialogues and Renaissance courtesy manuals, and despite their promise to 
enrich our views of what contemporary conversational dynamics can “do,” the poles of 
conversation continue to receive scant attention.  
This unevenness in historical approaches to conversation is compounded by the 
fact that the period that first codified conversation as an important rhetorical genre—the 
Renaissance—is rarely considered alongside contemporary, democratic iterations of 
conversation. In particular, feminist histories and theories of rhetoric, once sequestered 
by design, are still mostly studied, not just independently of rhetoric in general, but in 
opposition to it. The result is that conversational dynamics, while continually being 
adapted to the meet the problems of the day, have suffered from an even more polarized 
relationship to history than oratory. So many “multiple and separate rhetorics” have been 
developed and splintered within the fifteenth and twenty-first centuries that any 
continuity that does exist between them goes mostly undetected.4 Historians covering the 
more recent nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries, meanwhile, often do 
observe but then quickly reject newer varieties of public conversational iterations, since 
they are so clearly a deviation from “true” conversation.5  
																																								 																					
3 Peter Burke, The Art of Conversation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 92. 
 
4 James Berlin, “Revisionary History: The Dialectical Method” in Rethinking the History of Rhetoric, ed. 
Takis Poulakos (Boulder: West View, 1993): 135-152. Also see Jane Donawerth’s “Introduction: Adding 
Women’s Rhetorical Theory to the Conversation” in Jane Donawerth, Conversational Rhetoric: The Rise 
and Fall of a Women’s Tradition, 1600-1900 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012), 1-16. 
One of the most promising and sustained efforts to bring together the intellectual history of conversation as 
it relates to rhetoric and oratory can be found in David Randall’s The Concept of Conversation.  
 
5 See especially Chapter 9 in Stephen Miller’s Conversation: A History of A Declining Art (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 264-290; Donawerth (2012); and David Simpson, “The Cult of 
‘Conversation,’” Raritan 16.4 (1997): 75-85. 
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This impasse—together with the lack of connections between periods that it 
encourages—tends to obscure a second and related theoretical problem: public 
adaptations of conversation, when they do receive sustained critical attention, are often 
theorized as if they could actually replicate the ideal promised in the art of conversation. 
This study does not dispute the view that conversation among friends is among the 
sweetest things in life.6 However, it rejects the notion that the ideal of conversation, 
which, at its best, carries with it a promise of something bordering on religious 
experience, is the appropriate place to base a theory for the variously makeshift and 
highly orchestrated models of “conversation” we see so much today. The goal of this 
project is nevertheless constructive. In contrast to the bulk of contemporary criticism of 
conversation, I use this assumption of difference not as an end for criticism on the current 
state of rhetoric, conversation, or contemporary political communication but rather as a 
starting point for understanding the practices and contexts leading up to and following the 
public conversational turn. The ultimate aim of this project is not to outline another 
decline thesis, but rather to explain the resourcefulness—and rhetorical significance—of 
the public conversational dynamic.  
Building on existing histories and critical vignettes of conversation, and drawing 
upon the rhetorical tradition as a theoretical basis for understanding the range and poles 
of the genre (which I detail in the next chapter), I argue that the proper place on which to 
base a theory and history of public conversation is not in ideals of rationality, equality, or 
unadulterated sociability but rather in observable, public practices. Tracking the method 																																								 																					
6 For more on this view see especially Madeleine De Scudéry, “Of Conversation,” in The Rhetorical 
Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, ed. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg (Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), 767 and Michel De Montaigne, “Of the art of discussion,” in Michel de 
Montaigne: The Complete Works, trans. Donald M. Frame (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 855.  
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of Norbert Elias, who in the The Civilizing Process sets out to sketch a process by 
showing “the movement itself, or at least large segments of it, as a whole, as if speeded 
up,” in this study I seek to illustrate more durable iterations of public conversation in the 
context of law, government, culture, and style.7 Following key moments and debates in 
the rhetorical tradition (Chapter Two), a formalized eighteenth-century impetus for 
conversation (Chapter Three), together with nineteenth (Chapter Four), twentieth, and 
twenty-first century (Chapter Five) rehearsals of the genre, I set out to uncover 
motivations and functions of the public conversational dynamic that distinguish it from 
the conversational ideal. In the end, I conclude that, however close or far the public 
conversational model may come to the democratic and philosophical ideals that inspire it, 
it is an important compensatory strategy that helps to make possible common life.  
 
Competing Ends of Conversation: Candidate Trump and President Obama  
The scope of the conversational turn is vast and full of contradictions. By way of 
introduction, consider two sets of contemporary “conversations,” both of which were 
delivered in Iowa in the summer of 2015. The first, an interview of then presidential 
candidate Donald Trump conducted by Republican pollster Frank Luntz, took place on 
July 18, 2015 at the Family Leadership Summit in Ames. The second, which was 
recorded on September 14, 2015 at the State Library of Iowa in Des Moines and 
published the following month in The New York Review of Books, was entitled “President 
Obama & Marilynne Robinson: A Conversation in Iowa.” Both performances were 
oriented toward the 2016 presidential election and included thoughts on the current 
political climate and visions for the future. Highlighting the ubiquity of the genre, both of 																																								 																					
7 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing, 2010) 71.  
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the conversations also consisted of two people (typically an interviewer and an 
interviewee), sitting down, partially facing each other, with some sort of mug or cup next 
to them.  
The first exchange, between Trump and Luntz, took place at a conservative 
summit on a stage in front of a live audience. It was also being recorded for a televised 
audience. (C-SPAN, the public service station dedicated to public affairs programming, 
aired a live performance of the talk. All of the texts I cite in the following section are 
pulled from transcripts or archived videos from C-PSAN.) Although the discussion would 
be most talked about because of Trump’s inflammatory comments about Senator John 
McCain (“He’s a war hero because he was captured. I like people that weren’t captured, 
OK? I hate to tell you.”), the most relevant feature here is its demonstration of 
conversation in the context of a populist style of politics.  
 Following two questions involving the audience, Luntz opened the 
conversational interview by introducing the subject of education and its relationship to 
jobs. In theory, the exchange might have provided an opportunity for some of the 
compensatory strategies for conversation that I detail in Chapter Four: compression, 
discovery, cultural mediation, and cultural reform. Historically, at least, the United 
States’ famous (and partial) quest for “education for all” was, I would argue, a direct 
expression of the search for these potentially corrective qualities of conversation in public 
life. However, in practice, these strategies can be used for all kinds of autocratic ends. 
Witness, for example, how Trump obfuscates the substance of the question (i.e., 
education on a national scale) and instead maneuvers away from complicated 
technicalities and toward frank (and only frank) speech.  
	7	
Luntz:  
So, I need to ask you. The most important attribute of a successful workforce is 
their education and training. There is a major issue out there, and I know how 
focused you are on getting the best employees. Common Core has been very 
controversial. The president has had to step back on it. What should the next 
president do with Common Core and with education, so that you can hire the 
employees you want to hire?  
Trump: 
A great question. Common Core has to be ended. It is a disaster. It’s a way of…  
(Applause)  
It’s a way of taking care of the people in Washington that frankly, I don’t even 
think they give a damn about education, half of them. And I am sure some of 
them maybe do.  
Luntz: 
Do you want to use that word in this forum?  
Trump:  
I will, I will. Because people want to hear the truth, Frank. I watch you all the 
time; they want to hear the truth.  
(Applause)  
I mean, exactly what Frank said is what is wrong with our country. We are so 
politically correct that we cannot move anymore.  
You know? And Frank, and Frank… 
	8	
Wait a minute, wait a minute, [Luntz interjects] because politically correct is 
political… [Trump] We have to be able to express ourselves.  
Luntz:   
But don’t we go too far?  
Trump:  
Too far?  
Luntz:  
Don’t you feel that you went too far in what you call [Trump interjects: Saying 
the word damn?]…[Luntz] Mexicans coming across the border?  
Trump:  
Oh no, not at all. No, I’m very happy.  
(Applause)  
Well, let me tell you not at all. No, not at all.  
(Applause)  
Two things. I am so proud of the fact that I got dialogue started on illegal 
immigration… 
 
Remember how the original question put to Trump was about education? The 
crowd apparently did not. They instead seemed to be really excited about his use of the 
word “damn.” That Trump was clever enough to make a pun out of the commentators 
name (Frank) only heightened that original blow. As I discuss later in this study, the 
tactic of being “frank” goes back to at least Plato and has haunted democratic judgment 
from the beginning. It introduces important questions related to style and content, and 
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how the two are strained in democratic settings. Political theorist Elizabeth Markovits 
suggests in her study on frank speech, for example, that in the Gorgias Socrates is 
“playing” with the ideal of frank speech (parrhesia) by “drawing on Athenian oratorical 
traditions that seem to violate its dictates” and “calling attention to” frank speech as a 
trope. “While Socrates remains committed to the idea of truth in speech,” writes 
Markovits, “his practice highlights the difficulty and vulnerability of democratic 
speech.”8  
One of the vulnerabilities that Trump takes advantage of in his conversational 
exchange with Luntz is the populist appeal of saying “out loud what people…are thinking 
inside.”9 In contrast to career politicians who kowtow to the latest special interest group, 
the implicit argument goes, Trump, by calling out metonymous “Washington,” is 
claiming to represent the democratic sovereign writ large. His willingness to say out loud 
what other people are thinking, in other words, represents the “rightful” source of 
sovereignty (i.e., the people) rather than any “sectional interest.”10 This common 
maneuver comes straight out of the populist playbook. As political theorist Margaret 
Canovan outlines in one of her many works on the subject, “Populists love transparency 
and distrust mystification; they denounce backroom deals, shady compromises, 
complicated procedures, secret treaties, and technicalities that only experts can 
understand.”11 Given the conversational interview’s obvious goal of accommodating 
																																								 																					
8 Elizabeth Markovits, The Politics of Sincerity: Frank Speech, Plato, and Democratic Judgment 
(University Park, Penn State University Press, 2008), 4.  
 
9 Jean-Marie Le Pen as quoted in Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of 
Democracy,” Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 4.  
 
10 Canovan, 1999, 4.  
 
11 Canovan, 1999, 6.  
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informal, impromptu speech, it is not surprising that populist appeals can flourish in this 
genre and perhaps why Trump’s simplistic answers to complicated questions are met with 
applause.  
Beyond the particularities of Trump, however, is a structural issue that is 
embedded into the democratic experiment. The chasm between complex issues, the 
diffusion of knowledge, and the means to interpret and apply truths was a concern for 
American citizenry from the beginning. In his 1796 Farewell Address George 
Washington urged the promotion of “the general diffusion of knowledge” saying, “in 
proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential 
that public opinion should be enlightened.”12 For reasons that I will show in Chapters 3 
and 4, conversation was publicly adapted in earnest in the United States (in the first half 
of the nineteenth century especially) in the service of uniting these ends. Populism is but 
one expression of it. That is why, when Trump says he is “so proud of the fact that I got 
dialogue started on illegal immigration” it sounds indistinguishable from any other 
contemporary speaker. The call for starting a “dialogue” or “conversation” on a topic is 
heard so often as to have become a trope. Indeed, it is only recently that the existence of a 
common language necessary for such a “conversation” has even come into question.13  
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
 
12 George Washington. “Washington’s Farewell Address, 1796,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, 
Lillian Goldman Law Library, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. For more on the 
corresponding nature between government and knowledge, see Daniel Walker Howe’s fascinating account 
of the American postal system in What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 225.  
 
13 The conversation between President Obama and Marilynne Robinson, which I will preview in the 
following section, identifies this lack of commonality as a stumbling block. For a non-academic analysis on 
the cultural significance of the loss of a shared language and its associated loss of speech’s power, see 
Vinson Cunningham’s article following the 2016 shooting of five police officers in Dallas, “Obama and the 
Collapse of Our Common American Language,” New Yorker, July 13, 2016.  
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What Trump’s answer on whether he went “too far” obscures, however, is that by 
calling Mexicans “rapists” (which is what Luntz is referring to) Trump did not start a 
metaphorical conversation so much as end one. And that, at least from a populist or 
demagogue’s perspective, is precisely the point. As Canovan describes the appeal, 
“populists claim that…complexity is a self-serving racket perpetuated by professional 
politicians, and that the solutions to the problems ordinary people care about are 
essentially simple.”14 Meanwhile, Jennifer Mercieca, a rhetorical scholar with a 
forthcoming book on the demagoguery of Trump, identifies how Trump’s “lack of 
specificity about how he would accomplish…goals is less relevant than his self-assured, 
convincing rhetoric.”15 In this reading, the essence of the question—how to keep 
American students globally competitive—was less important than the confidence with 
which he projected his criticism of a controversial, top-down policy (“Common Core has 
to be ended. It is a disaster.”) (“It’s a way of taking care of the people in Washington that 
frankly, I don’t even think they give a damn about education, half of them.”)  
While by many accounts Trump’s refusal to concede ground would be considered 
antithetical to conversation (“Oh no, not at all. No, I’m very happy.), in the Trump 
repertoire this maneuver is so consistent as to be considered further proof of his 
authenticity. “Trump’s self-congratulating rhetoric makes him appear to be the epitome 
of hubris, which, according to research, is often the least attractive quality of a potential 
leader,” writes Mercieca.16 “However, Trump is so consistent in his hubris that it appears 																																								 																					
14 Canovan, 1999, 6.  
 
15 Jennifer Mercieca, “The Rhetorical Brilliance of Trump the Demagogue” The Conversation, December 
11, 2015.  
 
16 Mercieca, 2015. The research she references is Jeffrey C. Alexander’s The Performance of Politics: 
Obama’s Victory and the Democratic Struggle for Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
	12	
authentic: his greatness is America’s greatness.” Mercieca’s insight regarding Trump’s 
perceived authenticity may begin to explain why, at a summit with the mission of 
“strengthening families, by inspiring Christ-like leadership in the home, the church, and 
the government,” it was not the “homespun values of hard work, and honesty, and 
humility”—something President Obama and Marilynn Robinson would soon discuss—
that would get a hearing, but rather hubris, “frankness,” and bluster.  
The second conversation, between Obama and Robinson, could be considered a 
response to the Iowa summit, since, on one level, it attempts to work as a corrective to the 
fear and divisiveness that Trump’s rhetoric encourages. However, this is not to suggest 
that the two conversations are opposites. I pair the two conversational interviews in Iowa 
because they are neither wholly similar nor wholly dissimilar from one another. Both, for 
instance, have what basically amounts to an interviewer and an interviewee (a scenario 
that proponents of pure conversation would describe as disqualifying).17 Both engage in a 
back and forth style of communication performed and recorded in front of a live or 
anticipated audience. Because in both instances the back and forth contributes to and 
changes the course of the conversation, they both might also be considered what Lindal 
Buchanan theorizes as “collaborative” in their delivery.18 And finally, both are what 
Carolyn Miller would describe as the same genre, or “recurring responses” to social 
situations.19 Highlighting the recurring pattern of the conversational dynamic, the genre is 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
 
17 Stephen Miller, Conversation: A History of a Declining Art. Yale: Yale University Press, 2006, 14; 
Egbert S. Oliver,  “Who’s For Conversation?” Today’s Speech 6.2 (April 1958): 5-6.  
 
18 Lindal Buchanan, Regendering Delivery: The Fifth Canon and Antebellum Women Rhetors (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2005), 133, 134.  
 
19 Carolyn Miller, “Genre as Social Action” Quarterly Journal of Speech 70 (1984), 151.  
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not merely a form, but rather a response or action that “‘fuses’ substantive, stylistic, and 
situational characteristics.”20 
Thus, while operating within the same genre, the two conversational interviews 
can obviously highlight a range of motives, situations, and responses. In the case of 
Obama and Robinson the premise of the conversation was entirely different. In contrast 
to Luntz, who was at the summit to conduct a conversational interview with multiple 
presidential candidates and, in the process, uncover details about their policy positions 
and general attitudes surrounding their candidacies, Robinson was seated across the table 
from Obama because, as an author he admired, she was “first in the queue” of people 
with which he wanted to have an idea-based conversation.21 Much like nineteenth 
conversational theorists Ralph Waldo Emerson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Margaret 
Fuller, Obama described the conversation he proposed as “an experiment.”22 And, in the 
same vein as Madeleine DeScudery, he hoped the range of the themes discussed would 
be expansive, “easy and natural,” and “correct but not hypercorrect.”23 By way of 
introducing the type of conversation he had in mind Obama said, “I’d like…just to have a 
conversation with somebody who I enjoy and I’m interested in; to hear from them and 
have a conversation with them about some of the broader cultural forces that shape our 
																																								 																					
20 Miller, 1984, 152. 
 
21 President Barack Obama and Marilynne Robinson, “President Obama & Marilynne Robinson: A 
Conversation in Iowa, The New York Review of Books, November 5, 2015.  
 
22 Obama and Robinson, 2015. For more on the idea of conversation as a “magnetic experiment” see Ralph 
Waldo Emerson’s, Society and Solitude.  
 
23 De Scudéry, 2001, 761.  
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democracy and shape our ideas, and shape how we feel about citizenship and the 
direction the country should be going in.”24  
Although there is a general sense of equality, friendship, and turn-taking between 
Robinson and Obama that is mostly absent in the more journalistic setting of Luntz and 
Trump, there are still unambiguous roles outside of the conversation that come into play. 
As interviewer and sitting President of the United States, Obama’s role is clearly different 
than Robinson’s, particularly at the start of the conversation. His efforts at informality 
(“you got a fancy award at the White House”) (“you just kind of mash them all 
together?”) (Does that sound, like, too stuffy?) contrast with her tone, which rarely strays 
in its seriousness and earnestness (“I do, indeed.”) (“The word ‘cosmopolitan’ was never 
applied.”) (“Well, I believe that people are images of God. There’s no alternative that is 
theologically respectable to treating people in terms of that understanding. What can I 
say? It seems to me as if democracy is the logical, the inevitable consequence of this kind 
of religious humanism at its highest level. And it [applies] to everyone.”) With Obama, 
one gets the impression that he is seeking to reorient the listener, and perhaps himself and 
Robinson, away from his title as President and toward the idea-based dynamic that he is 
hoping to create with Robinson. Robinson, meanwhile, is probably a little more wooden 
than she might otherwise appear if the conversation were not also being recorded and 
oriented for an audience (namely, the expected feature in The New York Times Review of 
Books). There is a sense in which Robinson has something to prove (i.e., that her 
contributions live up to Obama’s vision for her as an interlocutor) that seem to hamstring 
the interplay between gravity and levity that true conversation ideally embodies. 
																																								 																					
24 Obama and Robinson, 2015.  
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None of this, however, prevents either interlocutor from revealing maxims over 
the course of the conversation that probably took years to get to. When Robinson 
suggests, for example, “that the basis of democracy is the willingness to assume well 
about other people,” it comes on the heels of delivering lectures, writing essays, and 
having the topic (i.e., “the role that fear may be playing in our politics and our democracy 
and our culture,” as Obama put it) “very much” on her mind for a long time.25 
Meanwhile, when Obama says, “America is famously ahistorical. That’s one of our 
strengths—we forget things” or “part of what makes America wonderful is we always 
have this nagging dissatisfaction that spurs us on,” what he is showing, paradoxically, is 
the kind of intimate knowledge of American history that takes years to distill.26 This 
capacity to compress layers of knowledge is a feature of rather than a departure from 
conversation, particularly conversation of the philosophical and intellectual variety. 
Indeed, one of the markers of “good intellectual conversation,” writes Lawrence Buell, is 
that it “tends to become a series of aphorisms.”27  
Although the conversation between Obama and Robinson is atypical of what we 
see in contemporary iterations of the genre (here, Trump and Obama are at opposite ends 
of the spectrum) this basic difference between the distillation of ideas and the pursuit of 
sound bites is an important one to observe, since the conversational style is consistently 
																																								 																					
25 Obama and Robinson, 2015. 
 
26 President Barack Obama and Marilynne Robinson, “President Obama & Marilynne Robinson: A 
Conversation—II,” The New York Review of Books, November 19, 2015. 
 
27 Lawrence Buell, Literary Transcendentalism: Style and Vision in the American Renaissance (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1973), 96.  
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faulted for promoting the latter at the expense of the former. 28 While not incorrect, this 
common critique can (ironically) signify an unnecessarily reductive view of public 
conversation. What the conversational model promotes is brevity. Whether or not a 
speaker or writer conveys something profound or something vacuous generally has more 
to do with substance than duration.29 Remember that one of America’s most important 
speeches, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, was shorter in length than most of its 
contemporaries, simpler in its purpose, and—while masterful in its mixing of high and 
low styles—more plainspoken in its form. It lasted two minutes. And yet, when Robinson 
evokes the Gettysburg Address in her conversation with Obama, she uses it to paint a 
picture of something expansive: “I think that in our earlier history—the Gettysburg 
Address or something—there was the conscious sense that democracy was an 
achievement. It was not simply the most efficient modern system or something. It was 
something that people collectively made and they understood that they held it together by 
valuing it.”30  
The President identifies one challenge in our democratic system (which, as I will 
show in a later chapter, was actively mitigated both formally and informally at various 
times throughout American history) as the capacity for having a common basis for 
conversation. “Part of the challenge is—and I see this in our politics—is a common 
conversation. It’s not so much, I think, that people don’t read at all; it’s that everybody is 																																								 																					
28 For an important link between the rise of sound bites and the American disinvestment in eloquence see 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.   
29 Of course, how audiences alter received texts can complicate this scenario significantly. Comedy shows, 
for instance, thrive on splicing material to make politicians look even more absurd or contradictory than 
they often are.  
 
30 Obama and Robinson, II, 2015.  
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reading [in] their niche, and so often, at least in the media, they’re reading stuff that 
reinforces their existing point of view. And so you don’t have the phenomenon of here’s 
a set of great books that everybody is familiar with and everybody is talking about.”31 
Obama’s assessment of our current rhetorical climate is reinforced by historians and 
borne out by numerous quantitative studies.32 I do not dispute it. However, it also 
threatens to return the conversational dynamic back into a static idea or a symbol rather 
than, as Miller conceived genre, a dynamic response that “fuses substantive, stylistic, and 
situational characteristics.”33  
After all of that particularity in regards to conversational maneuverers and set 
pieces, have we merely returned to the metaphor of conversation? And, if so, what to 
make of the difference between the metaphor of conversation and democratic debate? 
Near the conclusion of the two-part conversation published in The New York Times 
Review of Books, it does not seem to be additional conversation in politics that Obama 
and Robinson are after but rather democratic decision. Robison says, “I wish we could 
have a normal politics where I disagree with people, they present their case, we take a 
vote, and if I lose I say, yes, that’s democracy. I’m on the losing side of a meaningful 
vote.” To which the President adds, “And I’ll try to make a better argument the next 
time.” “Exactly,” says Robinson.34   																																								 																					
31 Obama and Robinson, II, 2015. For more on the relationship between heterogeneity, style, and the need 
for a “collective sentiment,” see Bradford Vivian, “Style, Rhetoric, and Postmodern Culture,” Philosophy 
& Rhetoric, 35.2 (2002): 223-243. For a historical overview of this phenomenon of fragmentation 
beginning in the 1980s see Daniel T. Rodgers, The Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011).  
 
32 See especially Stephen Hawkins, et al., “Hidden Tribes: A Study of America’s Polarized Landscape,” in 
More in Common, 2018. 
 
33 Miller, 1984, 152.  
 
34 Obama and Robinson, II, 2015. 
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How Scholars Have Approached the Question   
There is little debate among historians about the conversational turn. Scholars 
widely acknowledge its impact. Still, there is no comprehensive study that seeks to 
explain—across fields and epochs—the conversational dynamic as a contemporary, 
inventive, and consequential rhetorical adaptation. Nor are there sustained attempts to 
delineate the underlying assumptions that animate this modern, public phenomenon. 
Instead, the literature on rhetorical conversation typically falls into one of five categories: 
1) the humanistic metaphor of conversation; 2) conversation as a stylistic frame; 3) the 
history of conversation; 4) analysis of how actual conversation “works” (including the 
ways in which it can fail); and 5) communicative models for deliberation in a liberal 
society. This last category, which is probably most common, can be further divided into 
direct (face-to-face) and mediated (circulatory) approaches to deliberation. “People talk 
to each other directly, or they read and watch the argument circulate through the modern 
print and media culture,” writes the speech historian William Keith.35  
Within this larger spectrum, there are two primary ways rhetorical scholars have 
approached public models of conversation: historically and by genre. Of these, some of 
the most helpful works for understanding the “conversational turn” open with the express 
goal of rethinking our overemphasis—even fixation—on public models of conversation.36 
																																								 																					
35 William Keith, Democracy as Discussion: Civic Education and the American Forum Movement. 
(Lanham: Lexington Books), 2007,5.  
 
36 In “The Cult of Conversation,” David Simpson (1997) takes up our “love affair” with conversation, 
noting, “the word is all over the place” (75). He wonders why we insist on transforming “writing into 
speech” and why we seek to convert “impossibly large and complex groups into medium-size dinner 
parties” (75). Like Sampson, Gary Remer (2008), critiques the view of the conversational model 
expounded by deliberative democrats, arguing that for classical rhetoricians, “political deliberation was 
based on oratory, not conversation” (1, emphasis added). Social-political critiques (Freeman, 1972; 
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Thomas Farrell, for instance, in an effort to offer “something more powerful than a 
metaphor for good reading,” valuably begins to fill in “the middle ground” between 
rhetoric and conversation.37 His concern follows a long line of thinkers—from Richard 
Rorty to Alasdair MacIntyre, Kenneth Burke, and H.G. Gadamer—who invoke 
conversation as a “paradigm for humanistic inquiry.”38 However, he differs from these 
authors in his willingness to imbed the “reflective capacity of rhetoric” in both the 
“metaphor” of conversation (what Farrell calls “conversation as argument-constituted 
communicative action”) and conversation “in general” (or, as he describes it, “the sloppy, 
playful, give-and-take of ordinary life).”39 Farrell, in other words, “lumps” conversation 
as metaphor and conversation as “the most generalized form of talk” in order to develop a 
mechanism for examining the to and fro between rhetorical argument and spontaneous 
conversation.40 
 However, he also places conversation at the opposite end of intentionality, which 
is something Robert Branham and W. Barnett Pearce have identified, at least in most 
public address, as a false model. The “conversational frame” in Branham and Pearce’s 
view is not a reflection of actual spontaneity, but rather a studied, rhetorical choice. Mark 
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
Gurstein, 1996; Tonn (2005) are useful as well. Observing a prevalence of “therapeutic discourse,” Dana 
Cloud (1998), for instance, counters the view that more public or national conversations are the appropriate 
method for solving systemic social problems. According to Cloud, the “rhetorical strategy of offering 
therapeutic consolation as a substitute for political and economic compensation has become a 
commonplace diversion from political engagement in contemporary American society” (xiii).  
 
37 Thomas Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture, Norms of Rhetorical Culture. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), 231. 
 
38 Farrell, 1993, 232.  
 
39 Farrell, 1993, 232. 
 
40 The phrase “the most generalized form of talk” comes from Ronald Wardhough, How Conversation 
Works, (Hoboken: Wiley, 1991), 1.  
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Twain’s lectures and after-dinner speeches, for example, though taken to be extempore, 
were in fact the product of carefully “rehearsed” and “calculated informalities.”41 In 
contrast to Farrell, who views unrehearsed, dialogic conversation as something we “fall 
into,” Branham and Pearce and Jamieson focus their analysis on the rhetorical power of 
monologic simulations of conversation. 42 This is not to suggest, however, that hiding the 
amount of forethought that goes into a performance is the only thing at stake in this 
model or that the audience is somehow completely unaware of the dynamic in which they 
participate. Quite the contrary, a recent dissertation on the “Common Style” in American 
politics suggests that politicians’ unpretentious and seemingly unstudied way of speaking 
is what “makes U.S. politics possible.”43 Where for Colene Lind the underlying question 
is how to negotiate “the paradox of merit” (i.e., how political leaders can be exceptional 
while also appearing ordinary), for Branham and Pearce the question has to do with the 
broader alignment of power among speaker, audiences, and observers. Examining 
varying degrees of implied inclusivity, Branham and Pearce conclude that, “the broadly 
																																								 																					
41 Robert James Branham and W.  Barnett Pearce. “The Conversational Frame in Public Address.” 
Communication Quarterly 44 (1996): 425.  
 
42  Farrell, 1993, 235. There is a long rhetorical tradition of such “calculated informalities.” Castiglione 
(1967) refers to the “uncontrived simplicity” that we find more agreeable than “carefully calculated” 
displays of beautiful things (87). “Excessive diligence” in speech is similarly harmful, even in attempts to 
appear carefree. This he calls nonchalance to the point of affectation (68). On the subject of laughter, the 
rule is similar in Quintilian. “Again,” he says, “while I want my orator to speak ‘urbanely,’ I do not at all 
want him to seem to be striving for this” (6.3.31). Soon after, he adds: “also to be avoided…is any hint of 
premeditation or of the ready-made speech”(6.3.34). The same dynamic appears in additional contexts, 
including for instance classic literary theory. “The true poet, while straining every nerve, would yet give the 
appearance of being merely at play,” says Horace in his second epistle.  
43 Colene Lind, “The Common Style in American Politics: A Rhetorical Analysis of Ordinary, Exceptional 
Leadership.” PhD diss. (University of Texas, Austin, 2013), 19. Even democratic Athens made use of such 
mutually accepted fictions. See especially Josiah Ober’s Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (1991).   
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inclusive conversational frame, with all its intimations of intimacy and identification, 
generally conceals rather than reinforces power.”44   
Both the “conversational frame” that Branham and Pearce outline and the 
“common style” that Lind describes are important to this study for the way in which they 
link style with ideological, democratic, and ostensibly egalitarian ideals of public 
conversation. Also important to the backdrop of this study is Stephen Lucas’s brief but 
insightful article, “From Oratory to Public Speaking.” In it, Lucas recognizes the long-
standing arc of public conversational styles and its relationship to broader cultural and 
political forces at work. He writes, “[E]ven before the end of the nineteenth century, both 
the nature of public speech and the perception of the speaker had departed from the 
neoclassical model of oratory. As the patrician world that undergirded the model 
succumbed to an increasingly democratic and industrialized society, the older traditions 
of civic rhetoric began to give way as well. Language became more colloquial and speech 
delivery became more conversational.”45 This attention to broad contributing factors is 
especially noteworthy because Lucas’s article is primarily devoted to a synopsis of 
changes to public speaking in the twentieth-century. As such, he discusses the 
technologies that revolutionized public speaking at the time, including the microphone, 
radio, and television. However, unlike other relevant studies, which are primarily 
organized around a single issue (for example, media influences: Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 
1988; Neil Postman, 1985; Marshall McLuhan, 1964; or democratic education: Frederick 
Antczak, 1985; William Keith, 2007; Robert Connors, 1997), Lucas applies a bird’s-eye 																																								 																					
44 Branham and Pearce, 1996, 426. 
 
45 Stephen Lucas, “Public Speaking.” In Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, edited by Thomas O. Sloane (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 640.  
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view that makes room for twentieth-century transformations turning on business, 
economics, and presidential power.   
Building on the methods and insight provided by Lind, Branham and Pearce, and 
Lucas, this project takes an interest in social, cultural, and political foundations that 
impact what the conversational dynamic conceals, but also what it reveals. That is, while 
Lind and Branham and Pearce usefully explain why, considered within the context of 
politics and general power structures, a rhetor might deploy this model, we are still left to 
wonder about its role—and persistent appeal—not only as a monologic frame, but also as 
a mutually constructed social and political dynamic. And while Lucas makes a strong 
case for how audiences became “predisposed to the conversational mode” during the 
twentieth century, we are still left to wonder how this dynamic took shape and to what 
extent earlier contributing factors still impact American rhetorical culture today.46 This 
requires a closer look at history. Before looking back, however, I will briefly turn to the 
“crystallization” of the conversational mode.  
 
The Ubiquity of Conversation  
In contrast to the art of conversation, which was first codified in the Renaissance, 
the modern conversational dynamic—a cumulative rhetorical style and metaphor that, 
while borrowing from oratory and conversation, is really neither—rose to prominence as 
a hybrid that, though “not an act of true conversation,” is admittedly everywhere.47 
Although not the only dynamic in use (see Robert Hariman’s bureaucratic style and 
																																								 																					
46 Lucas, 2001, 643. 
 
47 Branham and Pearce, 1996, 436.  
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Aletha Staunton Hendrickson’s rhetoric of intimidation for relevant counterexamples), by 
the twentieth century conversation would become the prevailing paradigm for all of 
written and spoken discourse, serving as a model for academic writing, talk shows, 
business, journalism, science—even understanding itself.48 This would hold true not just 
in traditional rhetorical spheres (like deliberative politics), but also across a larger and 
more general category of public life. Indeed, by the time of this writing (when the public 
conversational dynamic appears to have perhaps exhausted its meaning), technologies 
and theories designed to promote its practice have elevated the public ideal of 
conversation into perhaps “the most overblown metaphor” of our time.49  
“The word is all over the place,” said David Simpson about our “love affair” with 
conversation: “What explains this desire to turn writing into speech, impossibly large and 
complex groups into medium-size dinner parties?”50 What explains this desire, this study 
suggests, is not the illusion that we are on equal footing but rather the “remarkable 
agitation” and “constant tension” that comes from knowing we are not.51 This volatility 
constrains what speakers and publics can do. Unlike a Roman or Athenian audience of 
the Classical period, one cannot suppose that citizens of modern democracies read the 
same books, share the same social class, or benefit from a single set of public values that 
have been inculcated and reinforced across time. Writing in the mid eighteenth century, 
																																								 																					
48 Branham and Pearce, 1996, 423-439; Robert Hariman, Political Style: The Artistry of Power (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1995) and A.S. Hendrickson, “The Rhetoric of Intimidation: A Study in the 
Rhetoric of Institutional Power” (PhD diss., University of Maryland College Park, 1993). 
 
49 Hariman, 1995, 135. 
 
50 Simpson, 1997, 75.  
 
51 Alexis de Tocqueville, trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Democracy in America. Volume Two, Part II, Chapter 
13, (New York: Literary Classics of the United States), 2004, 626 and 627. 
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after the social splintering and concussive impact of division of labor was already felt, 
Montesquieu observes this modern disadvantage when compared to the ancients: “In our 
days we receive three different or contrary educations, namely, of our parents, of our 
masters, and of the world. What we learn in the latter effaces all the ideas of the 
former.”52 In contrast, “most of the ancient peoples lived in governments that had virtue 
for their principle, and when that virtue was in full force, things were done in those 
governments that we no longer see and that astonish our small souls.”53 In other words, 
our education (broadly defined) does not afford the full vigor a unified ideal inspires.  
In practical terms, this limits what a rhetor can do. Because rhetoric is a “social 
invention” (as James Berlin puts it), arising of out a particular set of circumstances and 
making “a peculiar kind of communication possible,” it also impacts the parameters for 
action.54 If a person’s capacity to speak is already narrowed by cultural and intellectual 
fragmentation, then it stands to reason that the reverse—what audiences seek—would be 
as well. As Barnett Baskerville outlines in his inquiry of American attitudes toward 
orators and oratory, “Where a certain kind of oratory is valued, it will flourish; when it 
ceases to be valued, it will change or cease to exist. The value we assign to an activity is 
likely to determine the quantity and quality of the product.”55 Baskerville’s suggestion 
that a rhetor would frame and follow ideals is important to this study because it suggests 
																																								 																					
52 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. 
Stone, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 35.  
 
53 Montesquieu, 1989, 35. 
 
54 James A. Berlin, Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges. Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1984, 1.  
 
55 Barnet Baskerville, The People’s Voice: The Orator in American Society. Lexington: The University of 
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that conversational rhetoric (like any other prominent style) is borne out of a compound 
of dynamics that exceed the motivations or strategies of any one speaker. Indeed, 
Jamieson observes that rhetorical conversation has replaced deliberative oratory as “the 
norm.”56  
Although the conversational model is most often studied qualitatively, its 
prominence in American rhetorical culture is supported by quantitative studies as well. 
Using computer-assisted content analysis to track inaugural addresses and annual 
presidential messages from 1789 to 2000 (totaling 1.8 million words), Elvin Lim shows 
that the rhetorical patterns in presidential speeches have become more conversational as 
well as more assertive, more democratic, more anti-intellectual, and more abstract.57 He 
defines conversational rhetoric as being more intimate, increasingly focused on the 
trustworthiness of the speaker, and more anecdotal.58 Roderick Hart, using DICTION 
software to analyze a large corpus of presidential speeches and press conference, finds a 
similar proliferation of narrative and storytelling in a variety of modes of presidential 
speeches. 59  
It is not just in presidential rhetoric that the conversational dynamic is evident; 
researchers observe the conversational mode in settings well beyond the rostrum. For 																																								 																					
56 Jamieson, 1988, 54.  
 
57 Elvin T. Lim, “Five Trends in Presidential Rhetoric.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32.2 (2002), 343, 
330. For more on the anti-intellectualism and its impact on audience expectations see Richard Hofstadter, 
Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).  
58 Lim, 2202, 343. 
 
59 Roderick Hart, “The Press and The Presidency in Contrast,” in Columns to Characters: The Presidency 
and the Press Enter the Digital Age, Stephanie A. Martin ed., (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2017), 
63. For more on the role of narrative and storytelling in conversation see Neal Norrick, Conversational 
Narrative: Storytelling in Everyday Talk (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000) and 
Livia Polanyi, Telling the American Story: A Structural and Cultural Analysis of Conversational 
Storytelling (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).  
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example, Laura Krugman Ray describes Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan’s style as 
“remarkably conversational,” both at her confirmation hearing and in her continued work 
from the Bench.60  “Whether she is writing for the Court, concurring, or dissenting, 
Kagan’s style is remarkably conversational,” observes Ray. “She employs a range of 
rhetorical strategies to speak directly to the reader, suggesting that her enterprise is less 
indoctrination than a more congenial mode of persuasion. Leavening her legal prose with 
colloquial diction, she engages the reader in something approaching an informational, if 
one-sided, chat.”61 The author also appeals to Kagan’s humor, a central part of 
conversation that is too often overlooked in critiques of “ersatz” models. Ray opens with 
this story: “When, in a lead-in to a question about an attempted terrorist attack, South 
Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham asked Kagan where she was on Christmas 
Day, she famously replied, ‘You know, like all Jews, I was probably at a Chinese 
Restaurant.’ Graham, presumably startled, was nonetheless appreciative, responding, 
‘Great answer. Great answer,’ before returning to his serious theme.”62 The linguist 
Deborah Tannen argues that humor such as the kind Kagan deployed in the exchange 
with Graham “makes a person’s presence in a conversation more strongly felt than any 
other sorts of contributions.”63 The fact that Ray places this anecdote in such a prominent 
position suggests that was the case here.  
																																								 																					
60 Laura Krugman Ray, “Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan’s Supreme Court Opinions,” Indiana Law 
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Yet despite this seemingly insatiable demand for conversation and scholarship 
available to illuminate our understanding of its features, none of these isolated studies 
have led to sustained critical attention of the conversational turn. In fact, the proliferation 
of conversational modes and metaphors in contemporary practices has in some ways only 
added to an already problematic object of study for the field of rhetoric. Depending on 
how you define it, conversation initially appeared in ancient rhetoric and philosophical 
treatises as dialectic, Platonic dialogue, and sermo. Together these “sibling modes” were 
all considered both rivals and complementary species of rhetoric (which at the time 
chiefly meant oratory).64 However, while conversation was envisioned to be 
complementary to oratory, and while Cicero even envisioned conversation (sermo) as a 
branch of rhetoric, the two types of speech were theorized in profoundly different ways. 
As genres devoted to contrasting (public and private) spheres oratory and conversation 
were basically considered opposites—oratory to the realm of public affairs (negotium) 
and conversation to times of leisure (otium). To many historians of rhetoric this polarity 
meant oratory and conversation were not only different, but also incommensurable.  
This opposition naturally influences how researchers study and theorize 
conversation as a cultural dynamic and, as Branham and Pearce have shown, rhetorical 
tactic.65 Scholars emphasizing argumentation and political deliberation tend to dismiss its 
social purpose, while those concerned with the purity of conversation foreclose the 
possibility that there might be something telling in a model that, though clearly drawing 
from the principles developed within the art of conversation, might also necessarily (and 																																								 																					
64 Randall, 2018, 26.  
 
65 The “conversational frame” in Branham and Pearce’s (1996) view is not a reflection of actual 
spontaneity, but rather a studied, rhetorical choice. 
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unapologetically) pivot away from it. Within the speech tradition—political oratory in 
particular—patterns of critique focus on the ways conversational models fail to live up to 
the ideal of rational, impersonal debate. Common criticisms about conversational appeals 
in this view include: 1) that it emphasizes personality more than substance;66 2) that it 
treats public problems with private models of intimacy and therapy rather than action or 
changes in policy;67 3) that although it purports to be egalitarian, it is in reality more 
exclusive than formal rhetoric and argumentation since, unlike voting or formal debates, 
the rules for participating in “conversation” and the means by which decisions are 
reached are implicit rather openly stated;68 and 4) with its emphasis on personal 
experience and intention, that it is hostile to the commonplace tradition—by many 
accounts the bedrock of classical education and the rhetorical tradition.69 If we are to 
understand why, despite these shortcomings, practitioners, theorists, and teachers of 
writing and speech would so openly promote conversation, then a closer look at the 
circumstances preceding the “crystallization” of the conversational dynamic becomes 
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Press, 1985), 164-185.  
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essential.70 As social historian of conversation Peter Burke aptly puts it, “there is an 
enormous difference between the vague awareness of a problem and systematic research 
into it.”71  
 
The Making of a Hybrid Art  
If we think back to President Obama’s comment in the opening set of Iowa 
conversations about contemporary political challenges stemming from a lack of basis for 
a “common conversation,” it become clearer why contextualizing the digital era within 
the broader sweep of American history is so important. It is true that American political 
parties are more polarized than previous periods, and that the explosion of 24 hour 
network channels in the mid 1990s and the media decadence beginning in the first 
decades of the twenty-first century appears to have directly contributed to it.72 It is also 
true that other differences of which Americans were always keenly aware—income 
inequality, for example—are greater now than they have been since the 1920s.73 
However, we would also do well to remember that Americans have struggled with 
creating a basis for common ground from the beginning.  
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Overview of the Study  
However revolutionary the digital age may be—and there is little question that the 
changes have been dramatic and sweeping—these changes were not created out of an 
entirely new configuration.74 Nor did they produce one. As Richard Sennett points out in 
his writing on changes to the public domain, when critics speak of revolutions, they 
“often suggest to the imagination of their readers that beforehand there was one society, 
that during the revolution society stopped, and that afterward a new cycle began. This is a 
view of human history based on the lifecycle of a moth.”75 According to Sennett, the 
results of this are not simply a disconnect between periods, but also a failure to identify 
current dilemmas. “The error is more than that of failing to see how one condition of life 
blurs into another;” he writes; “it is a failure to understand both the reality of cultural 
survival and the problems this legacy, like any inheritance, creates in a new 
generation.”76 This study is thus meant to serve as a prehistory to a topic that, although 
motivated by present rhetorical challenges, is delineated primarily through a closer look 
at history.  
In Chapter 2, I survey how conversation came to be viewed as simultaneously 
hostile to and indispensible for public life. Rather than dismissing public conversational 
rhetoric as altogether un-rhetorical and unprecedented, as contemporary studies with a 
classical orientation are apt to do, I argue that hybrid models of conversation are in 
important ways an extension of, rather than a departure from, the rhetorical tradition. 
Building on David Randall’s (2018) provocative claim—that conversation superseded 																																								 																					
74 Rodgers, 2011; Keane, 2013.  
 
75 Sennett, 1977, 23.  
 
76 Sennett, 1977, 23.  
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oratory in the Renaissance—I identify specific bases for judgment that the rhetorical 
tradition already provides for the genre of conversation. This includes an initial survey of 
style and a closer looker at the “poles” of conversation.  
Chapter 3 examines the open-endedness and fixedness of American political 
foundations and its influence on rhetorical culture. I detail how debates over the 
Constitution set the stage for an enduring controversy that the conversational dynamic 
was enlisted to mitigate. In particular, I consider how “We, the People”—with all its 
political, legal, and rhetorical import—was both deliberately and extemporaneously 
fashioned to bridge the contradictory nature of equality and non-equality in America.   
Chapter 4 outlines some of the cultural topographies that animated public 
conversation in nineteenth century United States. It is divided into three parts. In the first, 
I focus on society and politics, highlighting the ways in which conversation was adapted 
with the help of government and in response to sweeping societal changes. In section 
two, I give special attention to the newspaper and its contributions to the reading public 
as explained, in part, by the transmission and ritual views of communication. Section 
three works to unite some of the conceptual and methodological problems that have kept 
women’s contributions in the nineteenth century isolated from rhetoric “in general.” I use 
Margaret Fuller as an example of how to bridge conversational practices and theories. 
Taken together, I argue that the disjointedness of styles that was visibly introduced in the 
nineteenth century (and still remains with us today) must be understood as an overall 
trend in the history of rhetoric rather than a series of wholly unrelated expressions. 
In Chapter 5, I turn to the question of style. Although verbal style has in the past 
two decades enjoyed a modest revival of interest, I suggest it is especially important now, 
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because it provides a uniquely stable unit of measurement. By looking at the different 
materials of public conversation as indicative of something larger and broader than “just” 
a technological medium (e.g. television) or “just” the ability of the speaker, we can begin 
to articulate some of the deeper cultural implications that are bound up in the differences 
between public and private conversational styles. Using twentieth and twenty-first 
century examples as a way to ground my claims, I conclude this study by performing 
three rhetorical analyses that highlight and explain the centrality of the conversational 
dynamic in American public life.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE RHETORICAL TRADITION AS A BASIS FOR A NEW THEORY OF 
CONVERSATION 
 
“Speech also has great power, and that in two areas: in oratory and conversation. Oratory 
[contentio] should be employed for speeches in law-courts, to public assemblies or in the senate, 
while conversation [sermo] should be found in social groups, in philosophical discussions and 
among gatherings of friends—and it may also attend dinners!”  
 
-Cicero, On Duties 
 
“Bring several rhetoricians together, let their speeches contribute to the maturing of one another 
by the give and take of question and answer, and you have the dialectic of the Platonic dialogue.”  
 
-Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 
 
Even though rhetoric and artful conversation have always been connected and are 
commonly theorized as collaborative arts that complement each other, their relationship 
is not readily understood. Indeed, at times their correlation is denied. Many historians of 
rhetoric suggest that privileging conversational models of public speaking over argument-
based, enthymematic oratory is a complete reversal of the classical model of rhetorical 
practice and education.77 Conversely, and just as significant, argument is commonly 
theorized as the “enemy of conversation.”78  
																																								 																					
77 For example, Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1988) suggests that the systems of “education championed by 
Cicero, Quintilian, and Rapin… facilitated the creation of enthymemes” by building a common language 
through its emphasis on shared history, literature, philosophy, and common experience; whereas now, “the 
increasing specialization of education in the United States limits the ability of a political speaker to 
persuade the body politic” (18). Additional examples of this view can be found in Weaver, 1953; Connors, 
1997; Ong, 1971; Antczak, 1985; Cmiel, 1990; Remer, 1999, Clark and Halloran, 1993. In more specific 
contexts, the shift toward conversational models of rhetoric, together with the myriad factors that 
contributed to it, is further dismissed as a transformation that upended the possibility for true eloquence. 
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This ambivalence creates a curious tension in the literature on conversation. On 
the one hand, the art of face-to-face conversation—epitomized as sociable talk without a 
specific agenda—is said to be either irrevocably in decline or in desperate need of 
reclaiming.79 On the other hand, practically every modern communication invention—
whether the nineteenth-century penny press, or twentieth-century radio, or the twenty-
first-century explosion of user-generated content—has conspired to make the rhetorical 
structure of conversation (what Peter Gibian calls the “alternation between many 
voices”) not just possible in public life, but desired and expected.80 Indeed, the urge to 
simulate conversation is so pronounced that even “single-voiced” prose consistently 
attempts to imitate conversational tone and style.  
This change has not gone unnoticed by historians and communication scholars. 
To give one relatively recent example, as part of the dialogic rhetorical structure, William 
Keith lumps varieties of conversation into two sets: face-to-face and circulatory. “People 
talk to each other directly, or they read or watch the arguments and ideas that circulate 																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
Lee Cerling writes, for example, that the “aggressive promotion of the conversational style left little room 
for a rhetorical style appropriate to public discourse” (1995, 195). 
78 Stephen Miller (2006), 218, emphasis added. In his social history of language Peter Burke similarly 
observes that the most recurrent theme in polite conversation was the need “to avoid forms of speech which 
were considered either too direct or excessively pedantic or technical” (1993, 108). Benedetta Craveri 
arrives at a similar conclusion in her detailed study of the seventeenth and eighteenth century French 
salons, saying “nothing is more opposed to esprit in conversation than study and business” (2005, 342). 
Anything that is overly pedantic, “too precise and formal,” or “always on the same note” is similarly 
disparaged in conversation. For Madeline De Scudery and her contemporaries in the Renaissance, the habit 
of fixating on one subject, leaving nothing unsaid, was considered “pestering and heavy” in conversation. 
(2001, 768 and 771). Dialectic is an obvious exception to the view that argument is the enemy of 
conversation.  
79 Michael Oakeshott, “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind, An Essay,” London: Bowes 
and Bowes, 1959; Miller, 2006; Benedetta Craveri, The Age of Conversation. Trans. Teresa Waugh. New 
York: New York Review Books, 2005; Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a 
Digital Age. New York: Penguin Press, 2015.  
 
80 Gibian, 2001, 71. Regarding the explosion of user-generated content, Keane (2013) observes, “some 90 
percent of the data that now exists has been created during the past two years” (3).   
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through the modern print and media culture.”81 This description helpfully unites “actual” 
and “metaphorical”—or even just delayed—conversations.82 Focused on organized 
public forums in the early part of the twentieth century, this delineation also builds on 
earlier studies concerned with the social nature and foundations of public life. Jürgen 
Habermas’s seminal study, The Structural Transformations of the Public Sphere, is 
probably the most influential of these inquiries, since, extending well beyond the 
particularities of conversational and deliberative forums, it influences how we understand 
the long-term relationship between a reading and conversant public.  
In a more recent work, David Randall begins what he calls “the first part of a 
yoked recasting of the history of rhetoric and Habermasian theory.”83 Although I only 
discovered this book (published in Edinburgh in 2018 and forthcoming in the United 
States in 2019) in what I thought was the last week of writing this dissertation, his study 
fits squarely within the conceptual and historical impetus for this project. It also suggests 
there is some momentum for examining conversation as it begins to, not just “take on 
rhetorical features,” as Thomas Farrell puts it, but actually upstage oratory as the 
predominant mode of persuasion.84  
Randall provides a helpful path for understanding public conversation as a 
rhetorical dynamic that is not purely deliberative. This requires a reorientation away from 
																																								 																					
81 William Keith, Democracy as Discussion: Civic Education and the American Forum Movement. 
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007, 5. 
82 Delayed conversations are a fixture in the rhetorical tradition, extending from rhetoric’s inception to the 
present. A dialogue, for instance, is as a “literary work in conversational form,” according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary. A letter is “conversation at a distance” (Miller, 2006, 167).  
 
83 Randall, 2018, 2. 
 
84 Farrell, 1993, 241. 
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ideals and toward practices. Such a maneuver does not preclude us from envisioning 
public rhetoric as it could be, but it does require us to start with things “as they are.”85 
Focusing on the transformation of rhetoric between the Renaissance and the beginning of 
the Enlightenment, he outlines a history of the emergence and increasing universalization 
and democratization of conversation. To do this, Randall “reorganizes the history of 
rhetoric along the broad lines of Jürgen Habermas’… historical analysis.” 86  However, he 
importantly substitutes conversation “for quasi-Kantian reason in Habermas’ public 
sphere.” 87 The difference between the conversation Randall is describing and the “quasi-
Kantian reason” of Habermas’ deliberative model seems profound, touching not just later 
interpretations of the public sphere (including the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth-
century rhetorical dynamics, all of which I visit in subsequent chapters), but also how 
earlier depictions of conversation are understood. (Here, I am thinking in particular of 
Cicero’s treatment of sermo.) Philosophies and histories of the newspaper also play a 
part. For example, Randall locates the newspaper and its predecessor, the “news letter,” 
as a key mode “by which conversation acquired the means to subsume oratory.”88  
This claim—that conversation superseded oratory in the Renaissance—is 
important, because it openly addresses a phenomenon (i.e., the conversational turn) that 
up until now has only been obliquely examined. Whereas Habermas “argued that the 																																								 																					
85 Tocqueville (2004) draws out the importance of reminding citizens in democratic societies that they have 
the power to shape their own destiny, saying, “the goal is to exalt men’s souls, not to complete the task of 
laying them low” (573). Specifically, he extends a caution to “historians who live in democratic times” that 
they not “deny certain citizens the power to act on the fate of the people” or to “deny peoples themselves 
the ability to shape their own destiny, thereby making them the subject to either inflexible providence or a 
sort of blind fatality” (572). 
 
86 Randall, 2018, 2. 
 
87 Randall, 2018, 2. 
 
88 Randall, 2018, 173.  
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printed newspaper provided the medium of rational discussion through which the public 
sphere was constituted,” Randall asserts “the newspaper was a transformed descendant of 
epistolary rhetoric rather than some coagulation in print of disembodied reason.”89  
Epistolary theories arose sometime around the first century B.C. E. and, even 
then, belonged to the genre of sermo (conversation).90 Boethius and other Christian 
scholars cited and adapted Cicero’s theories of rhetoric throughout the Middle Ages, 
when letter writing become a formal discipline of rhetoric.91 However, according to 
Randall, it was around 1500 that the Renaissance humanist letter was fully inverted from 
the classical conception of the private correspondence to an established genre with an 
expressed interest—or rather, imperative—to engage in public affairs.92 By the 1620s and 
1630s, at the peak of their commercial heyday, letters were not just being publicly 
distributed, but fetching a noteworthy sum.93 The progression to a commercial use for 
letter writing was at once gradual and sudden. Citing Thomas Wilson’s Arte of 
Rhetorique (1553) and William Phiston’s The Welspring of Wittie Conceites (1584), 
Randall first submits that both Tudor and Italian humanist “considered letters to fall 
within rhetoric’s scope.”94 From there, he details how the letter was first “standardised 
																																								 																					
89 Randall, 2018, 172. 
 
90 Robert Cape, “Roman Women in the History of Rhetoric and Oratory,” in Listening to their Voices: The 
Rhetorical Activities of Historical Women, ed. Molly Meijer Wertheimer. (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1997), 118.  
 
91 See especially James Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint 
Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981 
and Bizzell Herzburg’s (2001) introduction to Medieval Rhetoric, 431-449.   
 
92 Randall, 2018, 168.  
 
93 Randall, 2018, 176.  
 
94 Randall, 2018, 175. 
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and abstracted into a letter of pure news” while being passed on “from one person to 
another with increasing frequency, such that it became less and less like that the 
correspondent and the recipient of a news letter would know one another.”95 Eventually, 
the correspondents of news simply became anonymous, with one of the few remnants of 
this practice appearing in the designation foreign correspondent.96  
The impact of the news letter was not just that it “embodied a familiar 
conversation” or expanded the scope to a “universal and anonymous audience” but that it 
so in, part, through style. “The newspaper, by way of the news letter, preserved aspects of 
the style of familiar conversation,” writes Randall, “but, as it shifted in medium toward 
print, transformed into a distinctly persuasive communication between anonymous 
correspondents and anonymous recipients.”97  Like Keith’s assessment of the twentieth 
century, the newspaper incorporated two modes of conversation. First, as a form of 
conversation, the newspaper expanded the available subject matter so that it included all 
public affairs. Second, the newspaper openly used the conversational style as a form of 
persuasion.98 The prominence of style and subject matter are topics this chapter will soon 
address.  
Still left to account for is the question of how newer models of hybrid 
conversations fit within, and would benefit from, earlier histories of conversation. Rather 
than dismissing public conversational rhetoric as simultaneously un-rhetorical and 
unprecedented, as contemporary studies with a classical orientation are apt to do, I argue 																																								 																					
95 Randall, 2018, 176. 
 
96 Randall, 2018, 176 and 177.  
 
97 Randall, 2018, 166.  
 
98 Randall, 2018, 173.  
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that hybrid models of conversation are an extension of rather than a departure from the 
rhetorical tradition. Like other rhetorical dynamics, conversation is notoriously 
challenging to define since its nature is interconnected with use. However, in contrast to 
other systematizations of eloquence in the rhetorical tradition, conversation is more 
difficult to pin down, since, as Ronald Wardhaugh puts it, it is “the most generalized 
form of talk.”99 While this definition provides a useful starting point for thinking about 
the mundaneness that threatens the status of conversation—Mikhail Bakhtin points out in 
reference to the Renaissance that “candor of speech” can sometimes even teeter towards 
“cynicism”—it is necessarily incomplete when placed in a historical-rhetorical context.100  
This chapter aims to identify grounds for a theory of conversation that are not 
“revisionist” in intent but rather broader and further reaching. To use the language of 
Wayne Rebhorn, I aim to “lump” rather than “split” the multiple iterations and practices 
of conversation.101 Building on Randall’s claim—that conversation superseded oratory in 
the Renaissance—I identify specific bases for judgment that the rhetorical tradition 
already provides for the genre of conversation. This includes an initial survey of style 
and a closer looker at the poles of conversation. 																																								 																					
99 Wardhaugh, 1985, 1. Conversational Analysis (CA), a subfield in Linguistics, has made considerable 
inroads into explaining the formal structure of conversation. While different in its goals, CA has helpfully 
informed this project’s concern with the broader rhetorical and cultural significance of conversation. In 
addition to Wardhaughs’s How Conversation Works, CA studies on which I have both directly and 
indirectly drawn include Neal Norrick, Conversational Narrative: Storytelling in Everyday Talk 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000); Livia Polanyi, Telling the American Story: A 
Structural and Cultural Analysis of Conversational Storytelling (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989); and 
Deborah Tannen, Conversational Style: Analyzing Talk Among Friends (Norwood: Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, 1984).  
100 Mikhail Bahktin,“The Problem of Speech Genres” in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, trans. Vern 
W. McGee and ed. Carl Emerson and Michael Holquist. (Austin: University of Austin Press, 1986), 97.   
 
101 Wayne Rebhorn. The Emperor of Men’s Minds: Literature and the Renaissance Discourse of Rhetoric 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 8.  
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Understanding Style as a Conceptual Link Between Rhetoric and Conversation  
Style plays a unique role in understanding the link between rhetoric and 
conversation since, unlike conversation—which was not codified until the Renaissance—
style was conceived as an integral part of rhetoric and included in its theories and 
pedagogies from the beginning. Indeed, scholars point out that “in Western learning, style 
has been included in the study of rhetoric for nearly three millennia.”102  However, while 
historians of rhetoric have generally accepted that rhetoric’s long and winding history 
contributes to a diversity of concurrent (and sometimes contradictory) meanings and uses, 
the same privilege has not been granted to conversation. As a consequence, conversation 
has not received the historical and theoretical allowances that would enable a robust 
theory of rhetorical conversation to develop. A closer look at style bridges some of this 
distance.  
Like rhetoric generally, style’s fortunes have risen and fallen based on external 
factors such as education, religion, and politics. However, beyond this general arc (with 
which anyone working in the history of rhetoric is familiar) there is the more acutely felt 
problem of style’s eternal relationship to appearances. Indeed, one cannot really advocate 
for style’s implication in the other canons of rhetoric without embroiling oneself in one of 
the most enduring debates in philosophy and rhetoric: whether or to what extent style (or 
form) and content (or meaning) are inseparable.103 The question goes back to at least 
																																								 																					
102 Chris Holcomb and M. Jimmie Killingsworth, Performing Prose: The Study and Practice of Style in 
Composition (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010), 71.  
 
103 For twentieth century iterations of this debate within the field of composition and rhetoric see especially 
Paul Butler’s “Reclaiming an ‘Inventional Style’ in Composition” in Out of Style: Reanimating Stylistic 
Study in Composition and Rhetoric (Logan: Utah State University Press, 2008): 56-85.  
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Plato, who in his famous dialogue, Gorgias, likens rhetoric to “cookery.”104 Rhetoric 
insinuates herself into other branches, says Socrates in the Gorgias. She “pretends to be 
that into which she has crept.”105   
The challenge with this attack on appearances, however, is that one can escape it. 
Any alleged alternative—say, frankness of speech—is itself a style. Indeed, the Rhetorica 
ad Herennium includes frankness of speech in its list of figures of thought. As political 
theorist Elizabeth Markovits details in her study on the politics of sincerity, frank speech 
has been deployed as a rhetorical strategy since antiquity. Like Kenneth Cmiel, who 
outlines the rise of plain speech in nineteenth-century United States, Markovits expresses 
concern with how appeals to transparency are detrimental to public life for the way in 
which they obscure the two measures by which the public should come to judgment: the 
visible and the articulable. In her reading of Plato’s Gorgias, for instance, Markovits 
suggests that Socrates is not simply attacking rhetoric. Rather, he is “playing” with the 
ideal of frank speech (parrhesia) by “drawing on Athenian oratorical traditions that seem 
to violate its dictates” and “calling attention to” frank speech as a trope.106 “While 
Socrates remains committed to the idea of truth in speech,” writes Markovits, “his 
practice highlights the difficulty and vulnerability of democratic speech.”107   
																																								 																					
104 Plato, Gorgias in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from 
Classical Times to the Present. Second Edition. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, 121.  
 
105 Plato, Gorgias, 2001, 98.  
 
106 Elizabeth Markovits, The Politics of Sincerity: Frank Speech, Plato, and Democratic Judgment 
(University Park, Penn State University Press, 2008), 4. 
 
107 Markovits, 2008, 4. Also see Carolyn Miller “Should We Name the Tools?” in The Public Work of 
Rhetoric: Citizen-Scholars and Civic Engagement, ed. John M. Ackerman and David J. Coogan. 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 19-38.  
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Early Imperial Roman attitudes toward style were much different.  As Erica 
Bexley details in her study on the performance of oratory in that period, persona theory, 
which suggests “public self-display is the main and perhaps only mean’s of realizing 
one’s identity,” figured heavily in this period (c. 31 B.C.E. - 100 C.E.).108  This was a 
time when personhood was conceived by a performance-based model, elevating style 
(which had already been codified as a formal part of rhetoric during the Hellenistic period 
(c. 323 B.C.E. -31 C.E.)) to an even more prominent position.  
Alongside rhetorical precepts, a concern for stylistics was also closely wedded to 
the mastery of Latin and Greek. For example, Cicero opens On Duties with the 
recommendation that his son Marcus acquire “equal command” of Latin and Greek, both 
for “the study of philosophy” and also “the practice of oratory.”109 Classical training was 
central to humanistic learning, not merely as a representation of scholastic philosophy—
although it was that—but also for the broader tradition that it embodied: “the weight of 
past habits of thought,” as Peter Burke details it.110 Indeed, with respect to rhetoric, style 
was vital. It was viewed (particularly in the Roman tradition) as the material through 
which the entire rhetorical training was accomplished.  
Chris Holcomb and Jimmie Killingsworth advance this architectonic view of 
style, highlighting its importance, not just as a method for criticism or dramatization of 																																								 																					
108 Erica Melanie Bexley, “Performing Oratory in Early Imperial Rome: Courtroom, Schoolroom, Stage.” 
(PhD diss. Cornell Univeristy, 2013), 4, emphasis added.   
 
109 Cicero, De Officiis, 1.1.1.  
 
110 Christian Thomasius as quoted in Burke (1993), 65. Tocqueville devotes an entire chapter of Democracy 
in America (Volume 2, Chapter 15) to explaining “Why The Study of Greek and Latin Is Particularly 
Useful in Democratic Societies.” After outlining key differences between what was called “the people” in 
antiquity and in contemporary (nineteenth century) times, he concludes that the classics, while not beyond 
reproach, impart “special qualities “ that “can serve as a marvelous counterweight to our particular 
deficiencies. They prop us up where we are most likely to fail” (2004, 546).  
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the self, but for its role in the totality of composition and speech practices. In Performing 
Prose they point out, for example, that classical rhetoricians “invested considerable 
energy in cataloguing verbal devices they heard from both bema and rostrum, as well as 
from poet and rhapsode. Their primary aim was not to generate a vocabulary for literary 
analysis (although the terms they devised work well for such purposes). Rather, they 
were assembling a repertoire, a collection of verbal moves orators could weave into their 
choreographed productions.”111 Jeanne Fahnestock, who also draws from the classical 
tradition, makes a more general remark about style’s predominant role in Rhetorical 
Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion, saying, “Of all the parts of rhetoric, style is 
arguably the most implicated in the others, since linguistic choice is the point of 
realization for the rhetorical precepts and theories belonging to other canons.”112  
How did style move from such a prominent place in classical theories of rhetoric 
to one that is now habitually avoided? Historically, the conjunction of two events—first, 
the sixteenth century development of theories of rhetoric (chiefly Peter Ramus) that 
separated style from invention—and, second, the gradual relegation of philosophy, 
rhetoric, and the classics to single courses in the university as opposed to overarching 
methods—dramatically changed how rhetorical style was understood.113 In the sixteenth 
century, for example, despite the best efforts of Desiderius Erasmus’s On Copia (which 
sought, through amplification, to further link style and content), Peter Ramus effectively 
																																								 																					
111 Chris Holcomb and M. Jimmie Killingsworth, Performing Prose: The Study and Practice of Style in 
Composition (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010), vii.  
 
112 Jeanne Fahnestock, Rhetorical Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 7.  
 
113 See especially Thomas Miller. The Formation of College English: Rhetoric and Belles Lettres in the 
British Cultural Provinces. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 1997.  
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destroyed style’s implication in the other canons by reducing rhetoric to style and 
delivery only. Soon after, Omer Talon, a friend of Ramus, published two books on 
rhetoric that advanced a weakened stylistic tradition of rhetoric that would dominate for 
centuries to come. In this new scenario invention and arrangement were stripped from 
rhetoric entirely, leaving only the so-called “flowers of rhetoric.”   
According to Belgian philosopher and argumentation theorist Chaïm Perelman, 
“the extraordinary influence of Ramus hindered, and to a large extent actually destroyed, 
the tradition of ancient rhetoric that had been developed over the course of twenty 
centuries and with which one associated the names of such writers as Aristotle, Cicero, 
Quintilian, and St. Augustine.”114 Indeed, it was not until the 1960s, when, as Paul Butler 
put it, the “rediscovered trove of classical rhetorical theory…was coming to light in 
English departments,” that style would get a serious hearing.115  
Commonly studied at the level of a sentence (and so distinguished from 
arrangement, whose smallest metric is the paragraph), it was arguably not until Robert 
Connors’s seminal essay “The Erasure of the Sentence,” that composition began serious 
discussions “about the role of style in the discipline.”116 However, even into the twenty-
first century, the aesthetic capacities of rhetoric as a contemporary rationale or 
methodology only received “scant attention from modern rhetoricians.”117 As Bradford 
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Vivian put it, rhetoricians tend to “resign consideration of style largely to supposedly 
regrettable episodes in the history of the discipline.”118  
However, it is not simply disciplinary preferences that have hindered the 
development of what Vivian calls as a “contemporary rationale and methodology for the 
study of style.” The fourth canon is still suspect for reasons that harken back to Plato. In 
Political Style: The Artistry of Power, Robert Hariman usefully lays out the problematic 
of whether political style is “merely epiphenomenal” (and thus unimportant), or a threat 
to modern democratic states (and thus dangerous).119 According to Hariman, the 
suspicions against style as an analytical category for understanding social reality “are 
both methodological and political”: on the one hand, there is the charge that we should be 
paying attention to “more substantive determinants of political action;” on the other hand, 
there is the claim that “scholarly appreciation of style encourages an ‘aesthetic politics’ 
conducive to fascism.”120 Although Hariman is working within a broader notion of style 
(that is, as a way or manner of doing something), he still usefully lays out the problematic 
of why the formal study of style cannot be both unimportant and dangerous. According to 
Hariman, the formal study of style is not just important, but necessary for explaining and 
defending against threats in the contemporary world. “The greater problem,” says 
Hariman, “is not rewarding fascism but of recognizing how modern societies have 
become unduly defenseless against aesthetic manipulation.”121 Indeed, it is worth noting 
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that during the very period that twentieth-century Americans were most worried about 
outright political propaganda they were increasingly being influenced by the emerging 
and seemingly apolitical dynamic of conversation, a circumstance which I detail in 
Chapter 5 of this study.  
Currently style is enjoying a “modest revival.”122 However, much of it attention is 
still coming from outside of rhetoric, composition or speech departments. “Despite the 
rich and enduring legacy of rhetorical approaches to style,” observes Fahenstock, “many 
if not most scholars who analyze language today do not in fact consciously draw on the 
rhetorical tradition.”123 Paul Butler similarly outlines how it is that style simultaneously 
experienced a submergence and re-emergence in composition studies. “Just as 
composition has turned away from serious stylistic inquiry, other areas of society and 
culture have often embraced style theory and practice with almost unprecedented 
interest,” writes Butler.124 Thus, what was once part of a classical curriculum resurfaced, 
not in rhetoric and composition classrooms, but in cultural studies, linguistics, 
performance studies, and, perhaps most commonly, outside of the university curriculum 
entirely.125  
 
 
 
																																								 																					
122 Holcomb and Killingsworth, 2010, viii.  
 
123 Fahnestock, 2011, 9. 
 
124 Paul Butler, Out of Style: Reanimating Stylistic Study in Composition and Rhetoric (Logan: Utah State 
University Press, 2008), 14. 
 
125 Butler, 2008, 18. 
 
	47	
Situating Style Within the Conversational Dynamic  
While by now so commonplace as to be unnoticeable, the configuration of two 
people sitting on a stage talking to each other in front of a live audience is a relatively 
modern phenomenon. As an American practice, Peter Gibian identifies the mid-
nineteenth century (America’s “Age of Conversation,” 1820-1850) as the period when 
“the public seemed especially keen to see the character of important personalities 
expressed ‘live’ in the give-and-take of supposedly spontaneous conversation.”126  
Gibian’s remark on conversational performances is especially important because it is 
directed to a verbal mode that—while as a metaphor is admittedly everywhere in the 
literature on conversation—as an actual verbal practice in the nineteenth century has 
“almost completely disappeared from our maps of American literary and cultural 
history.”127  
Gibian’s historical perspective is also noteworthy because it deepens our 
understanding, not only of nineteenth-century American rhetorical practices, but also 
contemporary ones. Rather than placing the majority of conversation’s diagnostic power 
on technologies, as twentieth-century studies are apt to do, Gibian locates the genesis of 
contemporary hybrid forms (e.g., talk show and talk radio) in nineteenth century social 
conditions that emerged long before television or radio were ever invented. “As the 
traditionally private mode of conversation begins in the mid-century to be developed for 
public uses, becoming a form of mass entertainment, we can often feel we are observing 
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the first steps of what will emerge a century later,” writes Gibian.128 By emphasizing 
social rather than technological imperatives for conversation, Gibian enables a broader, 
more durable, and less reactionary view of the genre to appear. He stresses, for example, 
that the “widespread fascination with talk as the site for the most crucial revelations of 
individual character” and “interpersonal dynamics,” was being explored not only in live 
performances of conversation, but also in mid nineteenth-century trends in journalist 
writing and popular literature.129 
If we go back even further—and the argument of this chapter is that we must—we 
find that the social arrangement on which public conversation is based is not only 
historically motivated (as a cumulative rhetorical practice), but also conspicuously rooted 
in intellectual thought. In the same way that the debates over the U.S. Constitution began 
as open-ended deliberations that only later would solidify and set the future terms of 
debate (see Chapter 3), ideas about conversation, friendship, equality, and inequality 
were openly reconsidered and debated between roughly the mid fourteenth to mid 
seventeenth centuries.  
For example, in his history of the concept of conversation Randall claims that it 
was only after friendship was reoriented away from reason and virtue (as it had been in 
antiquity) and toward passion and intimacy (as it would be established by the 
Renaissance) that women were taken to be even capable of friendship—and by 
extension, conversation.130 This view, argues Randall, was first made possible by 																																								 																					
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Christian medieval thought, which emphasized the “inherently unequal friendship 
between God and man.”131 Although initially metaphorical, the removal of equality as a 
prerequisite for conversation opened up the physical scope of conversation, which was 
progressively expanded by Renaissance humanists and early modern courtiers.132 “The 
growing conception of conversation as possible between unequals—inherited from the 
innovative medieval Christian conversation between God and man—most radically 
altered conversation by making it a discourse which women could be conceived as 
capable of partaking,” writes Randall.133  
These claims, which Randall develops in what is perhaps the first history of early 
modern conversation in English, invite closer consideration. However, for my purposes 
here the main significance of Randall’s account is that the idea of mixed-sex 
conversation provided a model for actual mixed-sex social settings.134 Furthermore, once 
“opened up…to the whole world” and not just “members of the male elite” the 
conversational dynamic would take on a public (and also political) character from which 
it has yet to retreat.135  The implications of this expansion, in other words, were 
momentous. Indeed, while stressing that the rise of conversation need not come “at the 
expense of oratory,” he refers to the actual shift from oratory to conversation as “a 
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revolutionary triumph.”136 “Not reason’s dialectic, not rhetoric’s orations, but only the 
speech of conversation spoke to and with women—and so only in conversation did 
mankind learn to speak to one another in all their individuality and variety. The 
expansion of conversation to women made possible the first true universalisation of 
speech.”137 The impact, according to Randall, was twofold: not only did conversation 
acquire persuasive goals, but rhetoric became “conversationalised.”138 
The era in which rhetoric became conversationalised—the Renaissance—was a 
time when rhetoric was celebrated for its plasticity.139 No longer limited to forensic, 
deliberative, and epideictic oratory, rhetoric in this period was thought to be nearly 
everywhere and capable of doing almost anything: “Polymorphous and ubiquitous, 
rhetoric could serve practically all individuals and fit practically all situations as it 
blithely crossed long-established boundaries among disciplines, professions, and social 
classes,” writes Wayne Rebhorn.140 Petrarch (1304-1374) had initially conceived of 
conversation as a metaphor for framing the scholarly, across-time relationship between 
proto-humanists and the ancients (Cicero, in particular). However, the concept of 
conversation soon evolved into something that, although still regarded today as perhaps 
the metaphor for knowledge, would stretch the bounds of communicative practice and 
lived experience. 
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Indeed, although by the twenty and twenty-first centuries actual conversation 
would be the measure by which conversational rhetorics would be judged (and inevitably 
fail), what some consider the “great innovation of Renaissance humanists” was precisely 
their refusal to limit the applications of conversation to “actual and literary 
conversations.”141 Expanding to an ever-greater range of public places and political topics 
from which conversation was in the classical schema was largely excluded, by 1700 
conversation was not only reimagined but essentially “replaced oratory as the default 
mode of rhetoric.”142  
This was no mere language game, either, explains Rebhorn. In the Renaissance 
rhetoric (and thus conversation) was “a serious business” whose objective was “to affect 
people’s basic beliefs and produce real action in the world.”143 The development of the 
ideal courtier, for example, “took conversation from the leisurely retreat from the ancient 
political world to the courtly heart of the Renaissance political world.”144  Even the 
salons of polite society, which were hosted in drawing rooms and took place “under the 
banner of amusement rather than authority,” had enough political import to variously 
provoke exile and attract expertise.145 In her detailed history of the Paris salons, for 
example, Bendetta Craveri tells how in 1629 Cardinal de Richelieu banished Mme des 																																								 																					
141 Randall, 2018, 83. 
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Logos for her salon’s open sympathy for Louis XIII’s rebellious brother.146 In the 1720s, 
Montesquieu, whose work Spirit of the Laws was one of the central texts of eighteenth 
century thought—and which openly influenced the very foundation of American 
government (Chapter 3)—was active in the salons and clubs of Paris. He was a regular in 
Mme. Lambert’s salon and also attended the Club l’Entresol, where participants were 
invited based on particular expertise.147 Anne Cohler explains, “each session was 
formally divided into a time for general discussion of government and international 
events and a time when a paper was read and considered.”148 (This is a practice—an 
earlier version of the academic talk or lecture—or a reformulation of the classical 
symposium—that remains common across universities, governmental organizations, and 
policy-oriented institutions today.) 
 
Outlining a Method for Evaluating Conversation   
In order to understand how conversation came to be so volatile—simultaneously 
viewed as hostile to and indispensible for public life—a closer look at the poles of 
conversation is needed. Although the concept of “poles of conversation” comes from 
Peter Burke’s social history of conversation and Peter Gibian’s treatment of gravity and 
levity in conversation, the method I use to uncover this multivalent character of 
conversation appears in other histories.149 In his overview of rhetoric in the European 
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tradition, for example, Thomas Conley makes use of “highly compressed references” to 
perennial (and sometimes particular) rhetorical problems and responses.150 Equally 
valuable, Richard Hofstadter (1962) uses a specific concept (i.e., anti-intellectualism) as a 
way to shed light on broader aspects of society and culture.  
In the next and final section of this chapter I will make use of both of these 
movements to explain how conversation has at various points been adopted to rouse and 
pacify each of the classical modes of persuasion. While the question of public and private 
spheres remains a source of contention in the rhetorical tradition, it is important to 
consider that neither the dialogic structure of conversation nor the semblance of 
conversation intrinsically inhibits or promotes particular modes of proof. This is not to 
say that rhetorical periods might not valorize one mode of persuasion over the other. 
Clearly they do. Writing on the rhetoric of advocacy in Greece and Rome using 
fragmentary speeches, George Kennedy observes, for example, that in Rome “the moral 
and emotional factor is much fuller, and the logical element correspondingly less” than in 
speeches coming out of Athens.151 While no doubt there are subtleties beyond this 
framework, the overarching sensibilities are obvious enough for Kennedy to conclude 
that “a Roman audience would have found naked logic, i.e., sophistry, as offensive as the 
Greeks found it attractive.”152  
The shift from overwhelmingly “private” to overwhelmingly “public” styles of 
conversation provides another opportunity to explore this view. In its bluntest form the 																																								 																					
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rhetorical chasm between the public and private spheres offers an additional (and by 
some accounts primary) basis for explaining the conceptual and historical divide between 
rhetoric and conversation. The arguments for this division and its relevance to rhetorical 
culture are important, since they animate a central controversy to which this dissertation 
is addressed: why is conversation simultaneously viewed as hostile to and indispensible 
for public life? The problem with most readings of the public-private dichotomy is that 
they tend to conclusively link the conversational mode with an overemphasis on personal 
feelings and intentions—which can be damaging to public life153—when in fact there is 
nothing about the genre that demands these elements. It is true, for instance, that 
conversation thrives on spontaneity (a dynamic that produces an impression of sincerity, 
and along with it, a sense of trust and the building of ethos.)154 Creating opportunities in 
which spontaneity can be deployed or at least appear to be deployed is a common use of 
the dynamic (see especially Chapter 4). However, this may not have anything to do with 
personal feelings or intentions. Spontaneity can just as well be used to reveal strengths or 
flaws in logic, as dialectic shows, or rhetorical deftness, as in Castiglione’s sprezzatura.  
Writing during the Enlightenment, David Hume claimed that it was the separation 
of the learned and conversible worlds—not conversation as such—that caused the genre 
to become vacuous and detrimental to common life. “What possibility is there of finding 
Topics of Conversation fit for the Entertainment of rational Creatures,” he wondered, 
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“without having Recourse sometimes to History, Poetry, Politics, and the more obvious 
Principles, at least, of Philosophy?”155 Although some political theorists, like Rousseau, 
thought that “the more polite a society is, the more corrupt it is,” Hume took the opposite 
position.156 Rather diminishing political life, he believed that sociability (and its chief 
originator, conversation) did not merely influence but positively enhanced political 
stability because it moderates the passions.157  
Robert Hariman’s depiction of public and private life in “Cicero’s Republican 
Style,” suggests that the poles were not viewed as “separate realms, but rather differences 
phases” of a cohesive, civic-oriented life.158 The space for meditation that private life 
affords regenerates and prepares the orator to move back into the exhausting and 
exhilarating realm of performance.159 Although decorum—accommodating to 
circumstance, as Gary Remer puts it, or finding “the available means,” to use Aristotle—
would encompass consideration of others and the situations they inhabit, in Cicero’s 
letters the cardinal rule of decorum focused not on others, but on the self: “whatever else 
decorum is, it is essentially balance in one’s entire way of life as well as in individual 
actions.”160  
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In contrast to Roman “phases” of public and private life, the category of 
bourgeois society that Jürgen Habermas theorizes about in The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere didn’t work in direct service of politics, as Greek or Roman orators 
did, but rather regulated state authority. The public that Habermas describes, in other 
words, took place between the private realm and the state. This arrangement, according to 
Habermas, was unlike any other. He calls it “peculiar and without historical 
precedent.”161 Beyond the major differences between a classical rhetor and a new reading 
class, Habermas’s public sphere was predicated on an entirely different political and 
economic order than that of classical Greece. 
Unlike the emerging political economy of the modern state, the Greek polis was 
constituted in public debate and discussion, not state authority (which was grounded in 
private law and carried out through bureaucracy and taxation).162 The Greek polis, 
moreover, was “strictly separated” from the oikos (house or private sphere), whereas in 
the modern state the public and private spheres were not altogether distinct.163  In contrast 
to the Greeks, in the modern state the (private) household economy became publicly 
relevant.164 Eventually the boundaries between public and private passed down by the 
Greeks and the Romans were not just blurred, but “changed almost beyond recognition,” 
as Hannah Arendt describes it.165  																																								 																					
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The impact of this change was considerable, and is perhaps most conspicuously 
detailed in The Human Condition. By the time of the Enlightenment, Arendt argues, the 
primary aim of politics was no longer to serve as a platform for human excellence (“arête 
as the Greeks, virtus as the Romans would have called it”), but rather to establish 
security, in effect transforming communities “into societies of laborers and 
jobholders.”166 Not surprisingly, the merging of public and private speaking practices—a 
tendency, as I argue in this chapter, that was there all along—became more pronounced 
during this period.  
The salient point here, however, is that in Arendt’s view the public did not absorb 
the intimate and private spheres. Instead, a new realm, what she calls “the social realm,” 
developed and worked in the reverse order, absorbing and basically obliterating a truly 
public sphere. She writes that the two conditions that comprise human plurality—action 
and speech—were “banished into the sphere of the intimate and private,” and the 
connection between public performance and excellence was dramatically weakened.167 
Contrasting the classical separation between the public realm (which Arendt argues is 
marked by freedom and permanence) and the private realm (which she says is concerned 
with necessity and transitoriness), she critiques the social, which eclipses the two 
classical spheres. Unlike the public (i.e., political) realm, the social emerges not as a 
matter of public significance but as a way of organizing “the life process itself;” activities 
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once connected with “sheer survival” were in the modern period “permitted to appear in 
public.”168   
Why is this important? Like Habermas, Arendt highlights the uniqueness of the 
modern age. However, she arrives at a harsher assessment of the possibilities the new 
period brought. She submits that the rise of the social not only obscures the public and 
private but—through the dissolving of the proper functions of these two classical 
categories—actually removes the appropriate platform for excellence. Excellence 
requires the presence of others, says Arendt, “and this presence needs the formality of the 
public, constituted by one’s peers, it cannot be the casual, familiar presence of one’s 
equals or inferiors” (49).  
Writing about roughly the same period, the coffeehouses and salons Habermas 
describes undoubtedly operated on different terms than the public forum for excellence 
that Arendt extols. Nevertheless, in Habermas’s estimation the critical reasoning of 
private persons on public issues was able to accomplish something vitally important at 
the time: political confrontation of church and state authorities. In contrast to the 
individual distinction sought in the agonistic forum (which theorists such as Hannah 
Arendt, Robert Connors, and Walter Ong advocate), these “ongoing” conversations and 
discussions lacked both the formality and sanctity demanded by the classic portrayals of 
conquest, excellence, and even critique. Once the “monopoly of interpretation” was 
wrested away through public discussion, works of art, philosophy, and literature began to 
lose “their aura of extraordinariness,” as Habermas describes it.169 This understanding, 
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which positions inclusiveness and distinction at opposite poles, will prove a recurring 
theme in the history of conversation and a source of contention in the case studies of this 
project.  
 
The Poles of Conversation  
When Peter Burke talks about the “poles of conversation” he is referring to a 
tension and balance between animating principles of conversation. These include equality 
and hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion, competition and cooperation, and spontaneity and 
study.170 From Stephen Miller’s history of conversation we can add real and ersatz and 
feminine and masculine dynamics (also see Rebhorn, 1995). Peter Gibian (2001) 
develops gravity and levity, while Benedetta Craveri’s (2005) history of the French 
salons emphasizes seduction and aversion. These are just a few examples of the kind of 
heuristics available to deepen our understanding of what the conversational dynamic 
encompasses. However, it is also useful to think about the question in a more systematic 
light. In the final pages of this chapter, I outline three of the key genres of conversation 
that developed in antiquity. I do this with a view toward enhancing the available method 
for spotting the poles of conversation.  
 
Philosophical Dialogue  
Plato’s dialogues are viewed as perhaps “the supreme example of the 
conversational style.” 171 Even though the Greeks did not theorize conversation and were 
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specifically oriented toward the public in their oratory, as a cultural, literary, and 
philosophical practice, conversation figured prominently. It is telling, for example, that 
the Symposium nonchalantly starts in the middle of things (“In fact, your question does 
not find me unprepared.”) and ends with the three remaining interlocutors of the dialogue 
drifting (or about to drift) off to sleep.172 What is more, the speeches are not too strident 
in their presentation (“All right…Well, the speeches went something like this—) even 
though they contain serious philosophical discussion, including a description of a 
Platonic Form (Beauty). This is a dialogue where Aristophanes hiccups during a soaring 
oration, where Alcibiades is plastered, and where flute-girls are sent away. It is also one 
of Plato’s best-known and influential works. In the introduction to their translation 
Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff submit that the Symposium is “less explicitly 
dialectic than his other works,” may partly be the point.173 “That serious philosophy can 
be done at the same time that entertaining, even comic events and conversations are 
depicted is not only true but may actually be the message with which the Symposium 
itself ends.”174 Practiced and reformulated in countless ways since the Greeks, dialogues 
would continue to be defined by their open-endedness, inquiry into truth, and alternation 
of voices.  
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Dialectic  
Dialectic, or the art of philosophical disputation, is a conversation among experts. 
Although more formal and issue-oriented than true conversation, it is similar enough in 
dialogic structure to be associated with it.175 Aristotle famously imagines rhetoric as an 
antistrophos (or counterpart) to dialectic. Because rhetoric is popularly oriented its modes 
of proof are different than dialectic’s: they include not only appeals to reason (logos), but 
also to character (ethos) and emotion (pathos). George Kennedy puts the distinction this 
way: “Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, not, as rhetoric does, by continuous 
exposition. A dialectical argument does not contain the parts of a public address; there is 
no introduction, narration, or epilogue, as in a speech—only proof. In dialectic only 
logical argument is acceptable, whereas in rhetoric the impressions of character conveyed 
by the speaker and the emotions awakened in the audience contribute to persuasion.”176 
Cicero, meanwhile, distinguished dialectic from rhetoric by the subject matter to which it 
was addressed: rhetoric attends to definite (or concrete) questions while dialectic 
responds to indefinite (or abstract) ones.  
 
Sermo  
In classical Rome sermo was the genre of otium. Although some scholars 
theorized that it could be applied to public affairs (In De Officiis, for example, Cicero 
recounts that the conversational style of Caesar allowed him to defeat other advocates at 
the bar) its starting point was leisure: social gatherings, informal discussions, and dinner 																																								 																					
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with friends.177 Subjects that Cicero outlines as appropriate for conversation include 
home, politics, practice of professions, and learning.178 The Romans were nothing if not 
practical. In fact, given these two features—first, that Cicero theorized conversation 
where others did not and, second, that he was writing in a culture that was less 
speculative than the Greeks—one would think that Roman rhetorical theory would be 
more appealing to modern rhetoricians. (Tocqueville, whose analysis of American 
politics and society I will explore in the following chapter, emphasizes again and again 
this utilitarian bent of Americans, saying “nothing is less suited to meditation than the 
circumstances of democratic society.”)179 Conversation and utility are not the only areas 
of commonality, either. Robert Cape, for example, points out that Roman women played 
a prominent role in developing sermo, yet they continue to be underappreciated in 
feministic histories. “Whereas Greece had social and legal codes that make it extremely 
difficult to prove that women spoke in public, much less recover aspects of their public 
speech, in Rome during the late republic and early empire respectable women were 
ubiquitous in public and were legally allowed to deliver orations in court,” says Cape.180 
He, like Thomas Conley before him, speculates that the “modern preoccupation with 
things Greek probably obscures the fact that Roman rhetoric has probably contributed 
more to the rhetorical tradition in the West.”181  
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One example of this influence can be found in their treatment of the more fluid 
boundaries between the public and private realm. Although the places for rhetoric were 
still distinguished in Rome through otium (leisure) and negotium (public affairs), 
eloquence was much more inclusive than the Greeks. Among other things, this meant that 
the boundaries between conversation and public speech were more intertwined. Agnostic 
contests, conversation (sermo), and speeches (oratio) were all considered under the 
banner of eloquence.182 What is more, in contrast to Athens, where “public-speaking was 
off-limits to respectable women,” Rome developed a conceptual place in which women 
rhetoric had a part. 183 But it was not only the presence of women that can account for this 
fluidity.  
Michele Kennerly thinks that changing political climates played a part also. She 
speculates that the shift from a slipping republic (during which Cicero wrote his 
rhetorica) to a fallen state may account for the newfound relevance for sermo. During 
this transitional period between a republic and empire, Cicero linked private conversation 
(sermo) to political speech.184 In other words, at a time when opportunities for senatorial 
speeches were in decline, Cicero conceived of a practical motivation for linking a 
conservational style and philosophy. “The challenge for Cicero in De Officiis becomes 
one of how to translate foundational Stoic philosophical tenets (such as the sovereign 
importance of maintaining human fellowship) and typical philosophical stylistics (such as 
conversing instead of competing) to rhetorical situations. Cicero not only parlays Stoic 																																								 																					
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philosophical content into oratorical tone, he also tries to convince readers of the worth of 
adopting that tone to one’s rhetorical repertoire and adding it to fit oratorical 
occasions.”185 By doing so, he “publicizes the persuasive power of a conversational 
manner, a communicative style consonant with Stoicism’s emphasis on human 
togetherness,” says Kennerly.186 
Cicero displays this same flexibility toward the poles of otium and negotium in his 
development of the doctrine of styles. Even as he rehearses Hellenistic rhetoric’s three 
varieties—plain, middle, and grand—he suggested that individual words could be used 
appropriately in any context, including conversation: “The words used in conversation 
are no different from those we use in more energetic speech, nor are they drawn from one 
category for daily use, and form another for use on the stage and in other forms of 
display. Rather, they lie within everyone’s reach, and when we have picked them up, we 
form and shape them at will, like the most malleable wax. Accordingly, the way we speak 
is sometimes grand, sometimes plain, and sometimes we hold to a middle course.”187 
Like Aristotle before him and Quintilian after him, Cicero stresses the importance of 
speaking naturally, saying that “in each of these three forms there should be a kind of 
charming complexion, not as the result of rouge that has been laid on, but of blood that 
flows through them.”188   
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Conclusion  
What are the consequences in the field of rhetoric for failing to account for the 
conversational turn? Viewed from a historical perspective, there is some reason to believe 
that the refusal to acknowledge the gradual overtaking of conversation as a synecdoche 
for rhetoric has jeopardized the very discipline its defenders aim to protect. Randall, who 
notably is not writing as an “insider” in the academic discipline of rhetoric, but rather as a 
historian seeking to explain the importance of the history of conversation to the history of 
rhetoric, argues that “to describe rhetoric as essentially oratory—to defend rhetoric as 
essentially oratory—is to recapitulate the old arguments of philosophy against rhetoric, 
and ultimately to endorse not only rhetoric’s historical declension narrative but also to 
endorse the justification for its replacement. To describe rhetoric as oratory, no matter 
with what fulsome intentions, is to anticipate its obsequies.”189  
What is particularly noteworthy about Randall’s claim is that, to arrive at his 
argument about conversation becoming the default mode of rhetoric by the end of the 
seventeenth century, he places women’s speech at the center of this shift. Jane 
Donawerth, who is writing as a historian of rhetoric, makes the same move in her history 
of conversational rhetoric. However, she stops short of saying that conversation became 
the model for all of rhetoric. Rather, she stresses that “for women, because of their 
relative restriction of domestic roles, conversation rather than oratory becomes the model 
for all public discourse.”190 In other words, conversation did not become a universal 
rhetoric, but rather a domestic one. Similarly, when tackling the question of whether there 
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is any connection between contemporary composition studies (which regularly offer 
conversation as a model for discourse and a model for pedagogy) and the women’s 
tradition of conversational rhetoric (whose arc she locates between 1600-1900) 
Donawerth again demurs. The final sentence of her book reads: “While there is not a 
direct link from the women’s tradition of rhetoric to these examples of contemporary 
composition pedagogy, nevertheless, we can yet learn something about our own teaching 
practices from a tradition that taught women how to enter the conversation.”191 
It is tempting to simply disagree with Donawerth and say her assessment is 
wrong. However, a closer review of her steps reveals something more telling, and thus 
much more important. The argument she is making is an institutional one. When 
Donawerth says there is “no direct link” between pedagogy and conversational rhetoric 
what she means is that there is no direct link in the way it is taught and talked about in 
rhetoric and composition departments. And she is correct about that. “The disappearance 
of conversational rhetoric was a loss that recent developments in composition studies 
make apparent. Rhetoric and composition theory would have benefited from a strand that 
concentrated on dialogism, collaboration, and consensus during communication. 
Twentieth-century rhetoricians missed an opportunity when they cast off elocution as 
sentimental instead of incorporating the bodily language of emotions into public 
speaking. And certainly, an art of listening might have developed into methods of 
training conflict negotiations much sooner.”192 Here I would question the goal, even 
possibility, for consensus to be expressed in conversation (unless by consensus she means 
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identification and select areas of agreement) since, unlike pure dialectic (in which the 
truth or falsity of a claim is exposed) there is no final “getting to the bottom of things.” 
The end of public conversation, if we are to put it in those terms, is a moving target. 
Indeed, not unlike the philosophical dialogues, which comprise one of the three earliest 
models of conversation, there is reason to believe that “public conversations” are 
necessarily open-ended and are more likely to be “adjourned rather than resolved.”193 
(Even in the formal context of law and the courts, “consensus is not readily 
discoverable,” a point John Hart Ely brings out in his seminal work on judicial review, 
Democracy and Distrust.194 I detail some of the controversies surrounding this view in 
Chapters 3 and 5 of this study.) Still, the core of what Donawerth is saying about the 
ways in which rhetoric, composition, and communication departments have missed out 
by failing to account for the conversational turn is key and should not go unnoticed.  
Even as twentieth-century rhetoricians mostly failed to account for actual 
performances of conversation, rhetoric—as a social and cultural practice of persuasion—
continued to proliferate, mix, and push the bounds of public conversation with little 
concern for the side of an academic argument on which it landed: conversational 
metaphors, conversational practices, or ersatz conversations. While formalists (of one 
variety) watched in horror as publics indefatigably sullied the art of conversation, people 
carried on altering the genre to suit their own ends. I do not disagree that there are 
reasons for skepticism and alarm in American rhetorical culture, and that various versions 
of conversational iterations have indeed contributed to it. However, as this study turns 
from overarching patterns in Western European practices and theories of conversation to 																																								 																					
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more contemporary hybrid ones, we will do well to remember that if our goal is to 
understand American culture and language in use, identifying the ways at which 
conversation fails to meet an allegedly universal standard is not only an inappropriate 
method but also a self-defeating one.  
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CHAPTER 3 
GOVERNMENT: AN IMPETUS FOR CONVERSATION  
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 
 
“Each government, other than the despotisms, is a particular arrangement of equality and 
inequality.”  
 
-Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748)  
 
“The United States Constitution can be regarded as a rhetorical text: one that establishes a set of 
speakers, roles, topics, and occasions for speech. So understood, many of its ambiguities and 
uncertainties become more comprehensible, for we can see the text as attempting to establish a 
conversation of a certain kind and its ambiguities as ways of at once defining and leaving open the 
topics of conversation.”  
 
-James Boyd White, “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law” (1985)  
 
In Norms of Rhetorical Culture, which develops a theory on civic participation 
and practical reasoning, Thomas Farrell calls rhetoric a “practiced imperfection” 
motivated in part by the necessity to locate and explain a culture’s “identities, 
accomplishments, and needs.”195 He argues that “shared understandings of a people” are 
often expressed in foundational texts.196  Legal theorists, historians, political theorists, 
and communication scholars writing about the Constitutional period all underscore this 
rhetorical function of foundational texts: Although they approach the period in myriad 
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ways, as a set this scholarship consistently highlights the performative nature of the 
formation of the American government. 
Rather than a set of rules, they maintain that the Constitution (and governance) is 
best understood as a rhetorical process. James Boyd White, for instance, famously argues 
that law (which he defines as “a set of resources for thought and argument”) comprises 
one set among Aristotle’s available “means of persuasion.”197 Not only that, but he also 
describes the Constitution as an attempt to start a conversation. He writes: “The United 
States Constitution can be regarded as a rhetorical text: one that establishes a set of 
speakers, roles, topics, and occasions for speech. So understood, many of its ambiguities 
and uncertainties become more comprehensible, for we can see the text as attempting to 
establish a conversation of a certain kind and its ambiguities as ways of at once defining 
and leaving open the topics of conversation.”198 Describing more than just a metaphor, 
White theorizes law as a branch of rhetoric concerned with “constituting culture and 
community.”199  
It is not just the rhetorical function of the completed Constitution, however, but 
also the process of its formation that will prove of central importance to the 
conversational turn. From the period between the Revolution and the ratification of the 
Constitution a compound of causes led to an increasing legal and philosophical emphasis 
on both equality and the individual. By the nineteenth century, rehearsals of these ideals 
(together with numerous other forms of cultural survival), hastened a sea change in 																																								 																					
197 James Boyd White, “Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life,” The 
University of Chicago Law Review 52.3 (Summer 1985): 689.  
 
198 White, 1985, 697. 
 
199 White, 1985, 692, emphasis added.  
 
	71	
American discourse away from monologic oratory and toward egalitarian conversation 
where all citizens could, at least in theory, contribute. While central for explaining the 
underlying assumptions that animate the public conversational dynamic, this chapter is 
not dedicated to conversation or oratory. Rather, it aims to introduce some of the 
conceptual problems (and promises) that arose during this period for which 
“conversation” would later be called upon to address.   
 
On the Social Implications of American Political Theory  
Political theories are created (and repeated) in response to specific, cultural 
circumstances. In The Letters of the Republic, for example, Michael Warner argues that it 
is “the Constitution’s printedness that allows it to emanate from no one in particular, and 
thus from the people.”200 Recognizing the influence of surrounding circumstances, both 
Michael Schudson’s The Good Citizen: A History of Civic Life and Jennifer Mercieca’s 
Founding Fictions go beyond the parameters of the Constitutional debates themselves to 
exemplify how the larger social milieu can be advantageously probed for clues that 
extend, not just into formal questions of law (which I take up in Chapter 5), but into the 
necessarily evolving American rhetorical culture. In the same way, political theory—
which links the exigencies of formal and informal structures of government—is itself a 
form of “practiced imperfection” (to use Farrell’s term). It responds to specific identities, 
accomplishments, and needs. What this means, among other things, is that it can be 
critiqued. As Mercieca phrases it, “political theory is not an elite form of discourse that 
corresponds to truth, but rather a form of persuasion and an act of human 																																								 																					
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imagination…as such it can be debated as easily as any other piece of art or other 
influential text.”201  
The impact of American political theory also does not begin and end with the 
Founders. Thoroughly egalitarian in its ability to change, it is always in the hands of 
those who wrestle with it and reinforce it for their own eras. This capacity for self-
government was in fact a stated goal from the beginning. As Gordon Wood points out in 
his seminal book on the period, building a “permanent basis for freedom” was not just a 
secondary expectation for the Constitution but the primary “essence of the 
Revolution.”202  
This is not to suggest that political theories can be argued without restraints. In 
the same way that foundational configurations (like any other influential text) do not stay 
merely in the realm of ideas, so political theories shape (and limit) reality by making their 
way into discernible action. In the case of American politics, the Federalists left a clear 
and lasting mark on how campaigns would be waged and politics would be understood in 
the United States. Although the Federalist v. Antifederalist debates were suited to the 
constraints and circumstances of the time (several of which I outline in this chapter)—
their legacy (e.g., a ratified Constitution and the first ten Amendments of the 
Constitution) noticeably fixed “the terms of future discussion.”203 In particular, says 
Wood, the triumph of the Federalists “helped to foreclose the development of an 
intellectual tradition in which differing ideas of politics would be intimately and 																																								 																					
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genuinely related to differing social interests.”204 This, too, would have far-reaching 
consequences. By taking the political struggle “outside of the context of a contest 
between rulers and the people,” the Federalists in effect pitted one individual against 
another.205 As Wood writes, “individuals in America” became “the entire society:” 
Americans had begun the Revolution assuming that the people were a 
homogenous entity in society set against the rulers. But such an assumption belied 
American experience, and it only took a few years of independence to convince the best 
American minds that the distinctions in society were “various and unavoidable,” so much 
so that they could not be embodied in government. Once the people were thought to be 
composed of various interests in opposition to one another, all sense of a graduated 
organic chain in the social hierarchy became irrelevant, symbolized by the increasing 
emphasis on the image of a social contract. The people were not an order organically tied 
together by their unity of interests but rather an agglomeration of hostile individuals 
coming together for their mutual benefit to construct a society.206  
Called in varying degrees to participate in their own governance, the selfsame 
individuals were thus cast as political peers and social rivals. The result of the rise of the 
individual under the banner of equality was not unity, but social antagonism. Americans 
struggled with this dynamic from the start. Indeed, although it is true that the Founding 
Fathers all shared the belief that they were creating a government based on the will of the 
people, to speak only of their disinterested republican virtue (a self-sacrificial capacity 
which was thought to place public good before—and outside of—private interests) belies 																																								 																					
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the fact that Americans struggled to reconcile distinctions between political and social 
equality from the beginning.  
In her study on the move from republican to democratic “fictions” of American 
citizenship, Jennifer Mercieca argues that the “logic of the new constitution was different 
from the logic of the Revolution,” shifting from a romantic fiction to a tragic one.207 No 
longer calling people to actively fight corruption, defend liberty, critique the government, 
and work for the common good (as the call for action leading up to the Declaration had), 
the new Constitution codified a new type of government that, according to Mercieca, 
“had the semblance of republicanism but not the substance.”208 By this she means that a 
republican citizenry should be active and, indeed, powerful. Instead, the Constitution 
conceived of a citizenry that was inactive: according to Mercieca, the Constitution 
delineated a citizenry that “could not be trusted to defend liberty and prevent tyranny.”209 
Schudson takes a less critical stance than Mercieca in his treatment of the observable shift 
following the Revolution. However, his emphases on practical and theoretical questions 
over representation corroborate the same schematic: both Mercieca and Schudson 
underscore a basic “reorganization” in the culture between the Revolution and the 
ratification of the Constitution.210 The process of this reorganization is often described as 
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“an extended conversation.”211 Meanwhile, the product of this protracted conversation 
(i.e., the ratified Constitution) is itself conceived of as its own discrete conversation. 
Even though evolving, the topics of conversation that are available to a public are 
constrained and goaded by terms laid down in the American legal framework.212  
 
On the Parameters of Law and Conversation  
This chapter outlines the parameters of conversation that the founding generation 
set. This would have lasting impact on American identity and rhetorical culture. Unlike 
other studies, which may highlight the dialogic or communicative construct of 
nationhood without even mentioning the somewhat constricting role of legal foundations, 
this chapter keeps law at the center.213 That is, by necessity, this chapter toggles back and 
forth between the open-endedness and fixedness of American political and legal 
foundations. However, because reform has primarily occurred through reinterpretation, it 
is also necessary to think in terms of layers—which stick—rather than erratic or 
wholesale transformations. Jeffrey Tulis explains the dynamic in these terms: “American 
political development may be usefully treated as a layered text. Basic structural features 
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of the regime have not been substantially altered. Political reform has proceeded through 
reinterpretation of the Constitution rather than by replacement, or even significant 
amendment, of its structural principles.” 214 Building on the announced method of this 
project (i.e., “lumping” as opposed to “splitting”), this chapter specifically traces a legal 
and cultural “reorganization” over questions of sovereignty and equality. In particular, I 
consider how “We, the People”—with all its political, legal, and rhetorical import—was 
both deliberately and extemporaneously fashioned to bridge the contradictory nature of 
equality and non-equality in America.   
In contrast to nineteenth century rhetorical histories, which highlight the 
“concussive” way in which democracy was finally felt by the masses, I argue that 
equality was something the colonies and then the new republic struggled with all 
along.215 That is, the early American republic did not have a handle on equality and then 
lose it. Rather, despite, or rather because of, its relatively egalitarian starting point, the 
Revolution aggravated rather than lessened social chaos. Indeed, only out of this 
upheaval, and following a two-year period of uniquely public and sophisticated debates 
over views of government, would a Constitution be ratified that reverted, at least in part, 
to a less equal and more “monarchical notion of using private power to carry out public 
ends.”216  
This came as a shock to many. The republican Revolution, which had only been 
fought a few years before, sought to do away with this very system of politics that placed 																																								 																					
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private interests at the center of politics. “The Revolutionaries sought to destroy the 
patronage that had permeated áncien regime politics and to create citizens who were 
equal, independent, and free from dependencies on grandees and patrons,” writes 
Wood.217 What’s more, the goal of the revolution was not simply to destroy one system 
of government but also to replace it with a more republican—and more equal—form. The 
Founding generation openly sought to “assert the primacy of the public good over all 
private interests, indeed, to separate the public from the private and to prevent the 
intrusion of private interests into the public realm.”218  
And yet, despite these initial aspirations to erect a truly republican government, 
the Constitution that was ultimately ratified rejected a number of foundationally 
republican ideals: The Constitution was not predicated on a unity of interests. It did not 
hinge on public service as a form of virtue. And it did not assume that the thirteen States 
could identify (let alone disinterestedly promote) a public, “common” good.219 In its 
place, these were some of the very qualities that although in theory central to classical 
republicanism, the Constitution notably—and, for reasons I outline in this chapter, 
explicably—rejected.  
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Three Frames: Foundational Texts 
Theorists commonly think of and refer to foundational texts as a set. Farrell refers 
to “the shared understandings of a people” that are “expressed in general concepts—in its 
historical ideals, its public rhetoric, its foundational texts, it ceremonies and rituals.”220 
Richard Hofstadter, author of the influential history on Anti-Intellectualism in American 
Life, lumps together the Founding Fathers as a group of thinkers. He describes them as 
“sages, scientists, men of broad cultivation, many of them apt in classical learning, who 
used their wide reading in history, politics, and law to solve the exigent problems of the 
day.”221 Equally common is the tendency to view the Declaration of Independence (1776) 
and the U.S. Constitution (1787) as not just foundational, but a conceptual unit. For 
example, in his dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) (a landmark Supreme Court case 
which I will take up in a later chapter), Justice Thomas suggests the Framers “captured” a 
type of liberty in our Declaration of Independence that they then “sought to protect” in 
our Constitution.222  
Although there are good reasons for combining the Constitution and the 
Declaration of Independence (and, as a rehearsal of American ideals, people will no 
doubt continue to do so), it’s important to remember that the appeals to authority and 
treatments of equality in these two texts are profoundly different. One key difference 
between the Declaration and Constitution, for example, is that the Declaration explicitly 
relies on natural law, while the Constitution conspicuously does not. Neither the source 
for individual rights nor the basis for sovereignty emanate from the same place in the two 																																								 																					
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documents. (This is the case whether viewed as an expression of political theory or a 
basis for law.)  
In Democracy and Distrust, constitutional theorist John Hart Ely explains 
practical reasons for the Declaration to have relied on natural law and for the Constitution 
to have avoided it. He classifies the Declaration of Independence as an “indictment” and, 
above all, a “brief,” in which people are “likely, and often well advised, to throw in 
arguments of every hue.”223 “People writing briefs for revolutions are obviously unlikely 
to have apparent positive law on their side, and are therefore well advised to rely on 
natural law.”224 The Constitution, in contrast, “was not a brief, but a frame of 
government,” creating positive law that, upon ratification, “virtually everyone in America 
accepted…as the document controlling his destiny.”225  
Beyond these differences in available arguments, the Constitution was responding 
to a different set of exigencies. If the Declaration and Constitution appeared not only 
different in source but also in substance, then political distance between the Articles of 
Confederation and the ratified federal Constitution was perhaps even more so. This is 
because, as Wood points out, “the problem of sovereignty was not solved by the 
Declaration of Independence.”226 Immediately following independence the first 
imperative was not an “extensive exploration into the problem of politics”—least of all 
the complicated question of sovereignty—but rather a more tangible and localized 
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concern with “the formation of the state constitutions.”227 Indeed, it was not until a 
stronger, federal constitution was proposed to replace the Articles of Confederation that 
the question of sovereignty was revisited and, in a rare event, publicly brought to a 
head.228 For reasons that I outline in the following section, notions of sovereignty quickly 
changed, however, not just in the interim between the colonists’ subjection to a monarchy 
and the formation of the new republic, but over the course of the debates over the 
Constitution itself.  
 
The Rise of the Individual   
Much has been written about the transformation in political thinking from the 
period between the American Revolution and the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. There 
are good reasons for this. The period, roughly between 1776 and 1787, not only 
inaugurated the beginning of American democracy as we understand it today, but it also 
marked a dramatic pivot away from classical views of politics and toward a uniquely 
American and recognizably modern one. Unlike classical models of government (with 
which the Founding Fathers were famously well-acquainted), the emerging representative 
democracy openly incorporated private interests into the affairs of government. Equally 
significant—and so radical as to be misunderstood even by some of the Founding Fathers 
themselves—the new Constitution in effect destroyed classical notions of mixed 
government and, along with it, any social basis for the branches of government. By the 																																								 																					
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time the Constitution was written, the executive branch did not represent the benefits of 
monarchy (rule by the one); the upper house did not represent an aristocracy (rule by the 
wise few); and the lower house was not the singular expression for democracy (rule by 
the many). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Sovereignty in a Mixed Government  
 
In its place, a new notion of sovereignty emerged out of debates over the 
Constitution that drew its force from individuals independent of government. “In all 
governments,” argued James Wilson of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, “there 
must be a power established from which there is no appeal, and which is therefore 
absolute, supreme, and uncontrollable. The only question,” said Wilson, “is where that 
Sovereignty		
Democracy			
Aristocracy		
Monarchy	
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power is lodged?”229 Sovereignty, he argued, is derived solely from the people, “as the 
fountain of government.” And whether “the people” distributed that power through the 
states or the federal government, “they have not parted with it; they have only dispensed 
such portions of power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare.”230  
As the Federalists of the 1780s would come to propose, neither the power of state 
or federal governments, nor the strengthening of branches within them (in particular 
judicial and executive at the expense of legislative) were at odds with the liberty of the 
people since the only source out of which any governmental branch derived its power 
was a singular, indistinguishable one: the sovereignty of the people. As James Madison 
wrote in Federalist 46, “The federal and State government are in fact but different agents 
and trustees of the people.”231 Although it was the Antifederalists who worried about the 
actual loss of democratic power by the people, it was the Federalists who most 
persuasively wielded the egalitarian phrase to suit their aristocratic ends. For example, in 
the same January 29, 1788 text, Madison went on to argue that “the adversaries of the 
Constitution [the Antifederalists] seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their 
reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as 
mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to 
usurp the authorities of each other.”232 The problem, said Madison, was not that the 
proposal to strengthen a federal government would limit citizen action (an issue rhetorical 
critic Jennifer Mercieca takes up in Founding Fictions). Nor was it that bolstering one 																																								 																					
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imperative (e.g., minority rights) might run roughshod against another imperative (e.g., 
democratic legislation). (These issues I take up in Chapter 5.) Rather, the issue, as 
Madison cast it, was the Antifederalists’ purported inability to see just how democratic—
how all encompassing—the authority of individual sovereignty actually was. “These 
gentlemen,” wrote Madison, “must here be reminded of their error. They must be told 
that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people 
alone.”233  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Individual Sovereignty Replaces the Mixed Government Model 
 
In contrast to the classic mixed regime model, which conceived of government as 
interconnected with social qualities reflected in society, in this new model the social 																																								 																					
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realm allegedly had little to do with it: if sovereignty was now made up of one thing 
only—individuals, each of whom were, at least politically and in principle, equal—then 
any additional social orders would be superfluous. In this new model, there was no social 
realm at all, or, rather, none that the branches of government could encompass or delimit. 
They were too numerous and diffuse.  
As Madison famously held in Federalist 10, the possibilities for difference of 
opinion and interests were endless and impossible to contain. “As long as the reason of 
man continues to be fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be 
formed,” he wrote. “As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-
love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the 
former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.” Far from describing a 
homogeneous or disinterested public, Madison assumed self-interest and difference, not 
unity, as the necessary starting points for the fortification of a new government. Although 
in no way ideal, Madison would admit, experience following the Revolution had shown 
that factions (i.e., interested majorities) were unavoidable: “Complaints are everywhere 
heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens…that our governments are too 
unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that 
measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the 
minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”234  
A stronger government was needed, in other words, to control the vices of men 
whose interests were no longer privately and publicly discrete, but rather openly 
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intertwined.235 No longer could one assume that a majority would act in the interest of the 
public good (i.e., in the interest of people’s welfare) or that they would relinquish power 
to the minority simply in the name of justice. In light of this, rather than controlling the 
existence of factions, which were inevitable, Madison sought to control their effects.  
Initially, Madison cast the solution in republican terms. In Federalist 10, he 
outlined a way to control factions by enlarging a republic to such an extent that a single, 
cohesive majority would be difficult to achieve.236 Highlighting one of the notable ways 
in which the new government was “a prodigy,” Madison’s approach, although not 
initially well received at the Convention, was ultimately integrated into the new 
Constitution, turning the “oracle” Montesquieu’s well-known theory of the necessity of a 
small republic on its head.237 However, over the course of the debates leading up to the 
reification of the Constitution, this republican justification for the new configuration was 
gradually muted. Underscoring the interconnectedness between formal and informal 
political structure and calculated and spontaneous rhetorical culture, the Federalists 
ultimately abandoned public appeals to the “aristocratic-sounding” scheme, instead 
framing their proposals for a new government using their opponents’ decidedly 
democratic (i.e., Antifederalist) terms.238  
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A Nation Founded on Ideas  
Writing in the 1830s, Tocqueville emphasized the interplay between formal and 
informal systems of government through symbolism and abstraction. “The government of 
the Union rests almost entirely on legal fictions. The Union is an ideal nation that exists 
only in the mind, as it were, and whose extent and limits can only be discovered through 
an effort of intelligence.”239 This emphasis on fictions is particularly important with 
respect to the Constitution, because it explains why the rehearsal and public performance 
of foundational ideals is still so important to Americans’ sense of identity today. “The 
United States was founded on a set of beliefs,” says the historian Gordon Wood, “and 
not, as other nations, on a common ethnicity or common language, or religion.”240 
Equally important, the ideals on which the nation was founded were not just 
assumed in the American landscape and settled once and for all; rather, they are still 
evolving and actively dramatized today (a dynamic which I discuss more fully in 
Chapters Four and Five). Consider, for instance, the opening paragraphs of Barack 
Obama’s 2013 Presidential Inaugural Address, which I quote at length since they so 
clearly exemplify the enduring relevance of what I am discussing in this chapter:  
 Each time we gather to inaugurate a President we bear witness to the enduring 
strength of our Constitution. We affirm the promise of our democracy. We recall that 
what binds this nation together is not the colors of our skin or the tenets of our faith or the 
origins of our names. What makes us exceptional—what makes us American—is our 
allegiance to an idea articulated in a declaration made more than two centuries ago:  
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‘We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ 
Today we continue a never-ending journey to bridge the meaning of those words 
with the realities of our time. For history tells us that while these truths may be self-
evident, they’ve never been self-executing; that while freedom is a gift from God, it must 
be secured by His people here on Earth. The patriots of 1776 did not fight to replace the 
tyranny of a king with the privileges of a few or the rule of a mob. They gave to us a 
republic, a government of, and by, and for the people, entrusting each generation to keep 
safe our founding creed. And for more than two hundred years, we have.241  
Even a quick unpacking of the language here exemplifies how Americans still 
struggle to make the adjustments necessary for the “complex coherence of a society” and 
the “reorganization” of history that Michael Schudson finds so essential.242 While the 
passage begins with a temporal “each time,” it advances to a less transient foundation of 
“more than two hundred years.” The passage does this using the stylistic form of 
antithesis in which contrasting ideas are placed next to each other. The scheme works 																																								 																					
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both as a line of reasoning and as a stylistic pattern delivering content the audience would 
know to expect.243 Thus, “while freedom is a gift,” it must be “secured;” While “all men 
are created equal” may be a “self-evident” truth, its impact in practice can hardly be 
assumed. “What binds this nation together” is “a never-ending journey” that denies any 
capacity for programmed or “self-executing” fulfillment. Indeed, even the solid 
underpinning that is suggested by the “enduring strength of our Constitution” and the 
passage of two centuries is qualified with what is yet to come (“And for more than two 
hundred years, we have.”). By ending this section of the speech in the past perfect tense 
(“we have”), the former President’s words call to mind a test. This test (“to keep a 
government of, and by, and for the people”) is by necessity both forward and backward 
looking, requiring a continual affirmation of the things that held and hold us together.  
As a rehearsal of American ideals, this articulation is largely a performative one. 
Not only is it publicly spoken, but also, and more importantly, it dramatizes the essential 
(and, no doubt, rhetorical) connection between things as they are now and things as they 
might be. Indeed, we see this evidenced again in the same passage above: in order for the 
“meaning of those words” [in the Declaration of Independence] to match “the realities of 
our time,” certain actions are required. Actions the President lists include that we 
“affirm,” “bridge,” and “keep safe” the ideals that were first articulated in 1776.  
Although the dynamic I am describing here explains, in part, why Americans still 
have a need to revisit this critical period of history, the rehearsal of American ideals is 
only one part of American public life and, most central to this study, an impetus for the 
conversational turn. Formal theories of government, which are rarely rehearsed in public 																																								 																					
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speeches, are also just as much at play. For example, if we return the opening preamble 
of the Constitution—“We, the People”—and consider not just its rhetorical power but the 
practical implications of its departure from the Article of Confederation (which opened 
“We, the States”) it becomes clearer why “We, the People” was so disputed.  
 
Shifting Fictions  
“‘The question turns, sir,” said Patrick Henry at the opening of the Virginia 
Convention, “on that poor little thing—the expression, We, the people, instead of the 
states of America.’”244 Although by now the preamble of the Constitution, ‘We, the 
People,’ is a source of democratic pride, when it was drafted, the pivot away from ‘We, 
the States’ (as it was in the Articles of Confederation) to ‘We, the People’ represented a 
loss of liberty. The problem was one of both omission and implication. In contrast to the 
Constitution (pre Bill of Rights), a majority of state constitutions enumerated protections 
of individual rights. A federal constitution, however, would supersede state laws. This 
omission of protected rights threatened to undermine the liberties for which Americans 
had just fought.   
The problem of implication was that the consolidation of a federal power meant 
that, where necessary and in the cases of conflict, the federal power would supplant states 
laws. This was a major source of controversy during debates over the constitution and a 
recurring theme in the Federalist v. Anti-Federalists debates. “Brutus,” for example, 
raised this criticism of the constitution’s relationship to state laws in Anti-Federalist 84: 
“For it being a plan of government received and ratified by the whole people, all other 
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forms which are in existence at the time of its adoption must yield to it.”245  Although as 
a party the Federalists were always in the minority, on the question of consolidating 
federal power in a constitution, they unmistakably dominated.246 The Federalists 
accomplished this not by changing the formal structure they proposed, but by shifting 
their justification for it. That is, they shifted the question of sovereignty from the States to 
a more singular, indivisible invention: the People.  
“We, the People” (much like “We, the Sates”) is a fiction. “It might be the best 
fiction on which to rest government, a fiction that no one wished at this point to 
challenge,” writes the historian Edmund Morgan, but it still must be “recognized as a 
fiction.”247 To suggest that explanations about who governs are “fictions,” however, is 
not to suggest that the narratives we tell about how the few are chosen to represent, 
govern, or rule over the many are altogether divorced from reality. In fact, David Hume 
would suggest in his theory of consent, all governments rest on fictions. As Morgan 
explains in his history of the rise of popular sovereignty, “the success of government 
requires the acceptance of fictions…this maxim extends to the most free and most 
popular governments, as well as to the most despotic and most military.”248 Fictions are 
necessary, in other words, because they help both governors and the governed create, 
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revise, amend, and critique stories about the foundations of sovereignty (i.e., how and 
why the few are chosen to represent, govern, or rule over the many).  
In a representative democracy such as the one created by the Constitution, this 
fiction is particularly important, since, even as it is premised on the will of the people, it 
“excludes some” but not others “from the decision-making process.”249 In fact, not only 
does this configuration hinge on “an elected form of aristocracy,” it also necessitates an 
additional level of abstraction. “The people who submitted to a government of their own 
supposed creation had to remember that government is always something other than the 
actual people who are governed by it, that governors and governed cannot be in fact 
identical.”250 Even in seventeenth-century England, where the idea of “sovereignty of the 
People” was reintroduced from the Greeks, it was assumed that people would not speak 
for themselves, but rather through Parliamentary representation.251 How, then, did the 
Federalists go about arguing that the Constitution was an action—not of the States—not 
of Representatives—but simply and directly of the People?  
In the first stages of America’s founding theories of mixed-government were 
assumed. Although later he would be mocked for it, John Adams, for example, was not 
initially an outlier in his belief that mixed government was the ideal form of political rule. 
After the Revolution, when Americans set out to design their state constitutions, the 
question the Framers asked was not whether a mixed government was preferred (that was 
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assumed), but rather what proportion would be allotted to each of the government 
types.252 In this configuration, which is comprised of the three classical types of 
government—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—sovereignty is not only split, but 
only exists as “a compound built of three distinct parts.”253  
 
Figure 3.3: Mixed Government as Compound of Three Distinct Parts  
 
One advantage of the mixed model of government is that it has a built-in system 
to protect minority groups. As John Patrick Coby puts it, “The reason for choosing the 
mixed-regime model of protecting minorities is the perception that society is not a natural 
whole, composed of one population, more or less all the same, but is a union of distinct 
																																								 																					
252 Wood, 1998, 203.  
 
253 John Patrick Coby, “The Long Road toward a More Perfect Union: Majority Rule and Minority Rights 
at the Constitutional Convention,” American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and 
Culture 5 (Winter 2016): 32-33. Also see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A 
Fascimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769. Vol. 1 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 149-151, 
155.  
 
Democracy		
Aristocracy		
Monarchy		
	93	
communities artificially brought together.”254 The problem that surfaced by the mid 
1780s, however, (and one reason why a stronger federal constitution was deemed 
necessary) is that initially states were too democratic. By selecting the aristocratic 
(senate) and democratic (house of representatives) legislatures in essentially the same 
manner, states lost any advantages the two different societal elements were envisioned to 
bring: “If the theory of mixed government were to be useful, the two houses could not 
embody the same interests, could not contain the same kinds of men with similar 
education and social standing,” observed Wood.255 The propensity to fill the two houses 
from the same pool of people thus revealed a flaw in state constitutions and the Articles 
of Confederation.  
As Jefferson sensed in his Notes on Virginia, “Being chosen by the same electors, 
at the same time, and out of the same subjects, the choice falls of course on men of the 
same description.”256 Jefferson wasn’t the only one to express this concern. Commonly 
contrasted as competing voices for the publicly waged Federalists and Antifederalist 
debate,257 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson fully agreed on this point: both were 
“baffled by the apparent inability of the people to perceive the truly talented.”258  
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Having rejected the hereditary imperialism of the Crown, Americans struggled to 
pin down qualities that could be reliably identified as distinctively senatorial or 
aristocratic. This is not to say they were not aware of distinctions. Quite the contrary, in 
some ways they were obsessed with them. “Social distinctions and symbols of status 
were highly respected and intensely coveted” by Americans at the time, writes Wood, 
perhaps “even more greedily than by the English themselves.”259 Distinctions abounded, 
moreover, not just in habit, but in abstract political theories as well, since neither equality 
nor republicanism were understood to mean social leveling or lack of difference.260 
“Even the most radical republicans” who professed a shared will of the people “admitted 
the inevitability of all natural distinctions: weak and strong, wise and foolish—and even 
of incidental distinctions: rich and poor, learned and unlearned.”261  
The issue for the leaders of the founding generation was thus not whether there 
were critical distinctions but rather on what grounds aristocratic and senatorial merits 
would be delineated.262 Indeed, what was so revolutionary about this early vision for 
republicanism was not that it took Jefferson’s “self-evident truth” that “all men are 
created equal” to its broadest and fullest conclusion, but rather that it placed its faith in 
what we might call a self-made aristocracy, an eighteenth-century version of the rugged 
individualism that would later come to define American culture. This faith in a self-made 
aristocracy mixed democratic egalitarianism with a strong commitment to social order. In 
the place of preeminence by birth, much of the revolutionary generation believed 																																								 																					
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aristocratic qualities were to be personally cultivated and evidenced in virtue, self-
sacrifice, education, disinterestedness, and talent.  
In this restricted context, mobility itself was not viewed as a social irritant. Insofar 
as it “represented equality of opportunity and careers open to talent” mobility in fact “lay 
at the heart of republicanism.”263 However—and this was key—any movement or change 
in social position was predicated on the assumption that there were clearly established 
ranks together with clearly defined ways to move about them. Wood writes, “Most 
Revolutionary leaders clung tightly to the concept of a ruling elite, presumably based on 
merit, but an elite nonetheless…The rising self-made man could be accepted into this 
natural aristocracy only if he had assimilated through education or experience, its 
attitudes, refinements, and style.”264 There was a “crucial difference,” in other words, 
between “orderly and disorderly mobility.” 265  
 
Equal Yet Unequal   
The early American republic did not have a handle on equality and then lose it. 
Both Federalists and Antifederalists worried about the dynamic between citizens of 
different social classes; they worried, too, about competing interests of small states and 
large states, majorities and minorities, and between those who would make laws versus 
those who would enforce them. At issue were not just the concepts of political liberty and 
governmental power, but the practical distinction between the “People” and their 
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representatives. As Colene Lind puts it, the question of equal representation—however 
defined—“has haunted the American republic since the founding.”266  
While more people than ever before would participate in the world’s first, mass 
democracy, the effect following the Revolution was not unity but turmoil. Far from 
satisfying the craving for political liberty, equality of conditions instead invited 
challenges to “all distinctions, whether naturally based or not” and exacerbated social 
competition.267 Yet, in this same way, it was through this lack of total equality that 
participants saw just how unprecedented the degrees of liberty, equality, and political 
representation actually were. That something different was afoot was not just felt in the 
early Republic but observed. Even before the Revolution the Colonies were more 
egalitarian than their counterparts. “What was different in America was not only that 
ordinary people were less poor and less destitute than the poor of England,” observes 
Wood, “but also that American aristocracy and the wealthy gentry whom ordinary people 
railed against were considerably weaker and less established than the English aristocracy 
and gentry.”268 However, despite, or, rather because of this relatively egalitarian starting 
point, the Revolution aggravated rather than lessened social chaos.269  
 “Although the Revolution had placed government almost wholly in the hands of 
the people, the people were still suspicious and jealous…In all of the states, from New 
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England to South Carolina, the egalitarian atmosphere spread by the Revolution made 
‘superiority from incidental circumstances not annexed to merit…galling and 
insufferable,’” writes Wood.270 Or, as a Connecticut periodical from 1786 reported: 
“Every man wants to be a judge, a justice, a sheriff, a deputy, or something else which 
will bring him a little money, or what is better, a little authority.”271 Underscoring the 
important link between formal mechanisms and broader rhetorical culture, democratic 
foundations do something to the mind that other forms of government do not: they 
“awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it to the 
full.”272  
In fact, says Tocqueville, the desire for equality becomes more “insatiable as the 
degree of equality increases.”273 As the social crisis of the 1780s (which set the stage and, 
as the Federalists argued, need for the new Constitution) had shown, equality of 
conditions was so significant in part because it was not simply an abstract ideal, but 
rather a visible element of society that was realized in degrees. Both the social upheaval 
of the 1780s and the 1830s are described in terms of visibility. Tocqueville, who wrote 
Democracy in America during the 1830s, describes the effect this way: “When conditions 
are almost alike, it is not easy for one man to persuade another. Since everyone can see 
everyone else at close range, and all have learned the same things together and lead the 
same life, they are not naturally inclined to accept one of their member and follow him 
blindly. It is unlikely that one man will take on faith what he hears from another man just 																																								 																					
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like himself or his equal.”274 According to Wood, the decade following the Revolution 
produced a similar visible effect: “the most pronounced social effect of the Revolution 
was not harmony or stability but the sudden appearance of new men everywhere in 
politics and business.”275  
Meanwhile, the same individual confidence and relative access to equal 
circumstances that would spur Americans on to seek better conditions would also activate 
another, equally malleable, social trait to which Tocqueville would refer again and again: 
envy (together with a general resentment against superiority). “I found the democratic 
sentiment of envy expressed in a thousand different ways,” writes Tocqueville. 276 It 
wasn’t just the low salary that the highest-ranking officials would receive;277 or the 
Constitutional ban on titles of nobility;278 or the lack of uniforms for public officials that 
ensured democratic officials blended in with the multitudes—although these all were 
important.279 Following what Montesquieu had observed almost a century before, 
Tocqueville observes: “Public officials themselves are well aware that they have been 
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granted the right to wield power over others only on the condition that in regard to 
manners they descend to the same level as everyone else.”280  
 
“An Entirely New Theory”   
While it was Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws that made famous the idea that 
laws impart certain habits in the people they govern, it was Tocqueville who, building on 
his fellow Frenchman, applied it to the peculiar conditions of the United States. 
According to Tocqueville, equality of conditions (a condition that, while never able to be 
fully achieved, is marked by the equal access to rights, education, and fortune) is 
professed to have a “prodigious influence” on everything: “It creates opinions, engenders 
feelings, and modifies everything that it does not produce.”281 Following his famous trip 
through the United States in the 1830s, Tocqueville more specifically reported: “I found 
in the United States that restlessness of heart which is natural to men when, all conditions 
being almost equal, each person sees the chance of rising.”282 This “chance of rising” 
would gradually become so entrenched as to become, as Frederick Antczak words it, “a 
permanent part of the national identity.”283 
 But it was also out of this mixture that Tocqueville perceived something else: “I 
observed that in the conduct of affairs people often displayed a great mixture of 																																								 																					
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presumption and ignorance, and from this I concluded that in America as in Europe, men 
were subject to the same imperfections and exposed to the same miseries.”284 In one 
sense, in other words, the political configuration of the United States was hardly 
exceptional. While the distinctly American political agreement would eventually become 
the longest surviving national charter and (as Tocqueville called it) the “most perfect” of 
all constitutions, as a design for government its flaws were no different from any other: it 
espouses a political theory and creates a formal system of government that can never 
ensure equality, liberty, or unflawed representation. “Democracy does not do away with 
class distinctions,” writes Tocqueville.285 Neither does the Constitution. If we think of the 
Constitution as an American political theory—as a product of human imagination and 
debate—then this “practiced imperfection” loses its impenetrability and simply becomes 
a way to better understand American identities, accomplishments, and needs.  
And yet, the fact that the Constitution (still) confronts “individuals” rather than 
“peoples,” also means that its strength is “not borrowed,” as other forms of sovereignty 
had been, “but drawn from within.”286 This fact alone—however “piecemeal,” “diffuse,” 
and “open-ended” in its creation—was “based on an entirely new theory” that “must be 
counted as one of the greatest discoveries of contemporary political science.” 287 By 
shifting the social organization of politics from rulers and ruled to one autonomous 
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individual against another, the new political theory would impact not only what citizens 
sought from their government, or how politicians campaigned and related to their 
constituents, but, more generally and more fundamentally, how individuals would 
publicly engage with one another. That is, beyond shaking the foundations of political 
science, this new political theory percolated into everyday attitudes, including how 
people thought. “Quick assessments of specific facts, daily study of the shifting passions 
of the multitude, momentary chances and the skill to grasp them—these are the things 
that decide how affairs are dealt with in democratic societies.”288  
If the simultaneous establishment of the world’s first mass democracy and the 
codification of downright monarchical understandings of public and private power sound 
conflicted, it’s because they are. However, the reasons for this paradoxical quality cannot 
be understood as the product of a purely theoretical or practical debate. Both people’s 
lived experiences in the years following the Declaration of Independence and the applied 
negotiations that emerged out of debates over the Constitution contributed to this 
paradoxical character. What makes the piecemeal political theory of the United States so 
exceptional is not that it was purely republican, or democratic, or that it actually achieved 
equality in either political or social form, but rather that it announced the ambition to do 
so and gave Americans the means to attempt it. “The great privilege of the Americans,” 
wrote Tocqueville, “is to make errors that can be corrected.”289  
Part of the American effort to correct its errors is reflected in the conversational 
turn. I detail nineteenth, twentieth, and (to a lesser extent) twenty-first century American 
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expressions of this rhetorical endeavor in the subsequent chapters. In view of all this, it 
becomes clearer why scholars’ tendency to limit the conversational dynamic to, on the 
one hand, “metaphors for good reading or liberal democracy conversation” or, on the 
other, an “ersatz” performance, is too narrow for explaining some of the most important 
features of this publicly-oriented dynamic.290 Both practical and theoretical influences are 
at work in the conversation turn and they do not involve the simple desire, as David 
Simpson puts it, “to turn the country into a giant dinner party.”291 From the period 
between the Revolution and the ratification of the Constitution a compound of causes led 
to an increasing legal and philosophical emphasis on both equality and the individual. By 
the nineteenth century, this compound hastened a cultural sea change in American 
discourse away from oratory and toward conversation, a subject that I take up in the 
following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
MASS CULTURE: THE GOLDEN AGE OF ORATORY AND  
THE AGE OF CONVERSATION 
 
“We grudge, and cannot reconcile it to ourselves, that anyone should go about to cozen fortune 
without the stamp of learning! We think because we are scholars there shall be no more cakes and 
ale! We don’t know how to account for it, that barmaids should gossip, or ladies whisper, or 
bullies roar, or fools laugh, or knaves thrive, without having gone through the same course of 
select study that we have! This vanity is preposterous, and carries its own punishment with it. 
Books are in a world in themselves, it is true; but they are not the only world.” 
 
-William Hazlitt, “On the Conversation of Authors,” 1820 
 
“In America during these same years conversation could never be contained in the salons of one 
class…it proliferated through many levels of society in a democratic diversity of forms…the 
public seemed especially keen to see the character of important personalities expressed ‘live’ in 
the give-and-take of supposedly spontaneous conversation.” 
 
-Peter Gibian, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Culture of Conversation, 2001 
 
On July 13, 1859, New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley sat down for what he 
describes as a “nearly two hours’ conversation” with Brigham Young, the President of 
the Mormon Church.292 The interview took place in Salt Lake City and included “many 
matters of public interest;” it was published verbatim in the Tribune on August 20, 1859. 
Daniel Boorstin dubbed it the “first full-fledged modern journalism interview with a 
public figure.”293  
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At the time, the format was innovative enough that it drew national attention. It 
was memorialized in an illustration on the cover of another nineteenth-century 
innovation, Harper’s Weekly. (Other monthly magazines that would emerge during this 
same period (1850s-1860s) include Putman’s and The Atlantic.)   
Issues discussed in the interview included: the Mormon Church’s positions on 
church doctrine, Slavery, whether Utah, if admitted to the Union, would be a Slave State, 
and polygamy. In his introduction, the newspaperman Greeley explained the exchange as 
having begun with “unimportant conversation on general topics.”294 He then requested to 
“ask some question bearing directly” on “the doctrines and polity [organization] of the 
Mormon Church.295  
Already, one can see clear differences emerging between public and artful 
conversation in the scenario described by Greeley, including whether it could be called 
conversation at all.  When conversation is defined as “talk without a purpose,” as Stephen 
Miller does in his history of the art of conversation, an interview is clearly excluded.296 
“An interview is not a conversation,” Miller emphatically states, since conversationalists 
are enjoyed for “the pleasure they give, not the information they provide.”297 However, 
Miller does allow for conversation to be “purposeful in the sense that those present are 
trying to clarify an idea.”298 When, for example, on the topic of slavery Horace Greeley 
asks, “Am I to infer that Utah, if admitted as a member of the Federal Union, will be a 																																								 																					
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Slave State?” Brigham Young clarifies, “No; she will be a Free State…Utah is not 
adapted to Slave Labor.”299 In this sense, the nineteenth-century invention of the 
newspaper interview offers something altogether distinctive from a mere delivery of 
information. Serving as an exemplary for much of the experiments in conversation that 
would be famously developed in nineteenth-century United States, the Greeley-Young 
interview captures the dynamic of compression, cultural mediation, cultural reform, and 
discovery that would be so typical of the period.  
This chapter outlines some of the cultural topographies that animated public 
conversation in nineteenth-century United States. It is divided into three parts. In the first 
section, I focus on society and politics, highlighting the ways in which conversation was 
adapted with the help of government and in response to sweeping societal changes. In 
section two, I give special attention to the newspaper and its contributions to the reading 
public as explained, in part, by the transmission and ritual views of communication. 
Section three works to unite some of the conceptual and methodological problems that 
have kept women’s contributions in the nineteenth century isolated from rhetoric “in 
general.” Taken together, I aim to show how the public conversational dynamic became 
so entrenched in the nineteenth century as to become a permanent part of American 
rhetorical culture.  
 
I. On the Expanding Arenas for Conversation  
The idea of a national conversation was developed in the nineteenth-century and 
collectively embraced as a matter of common good made possible by technological 
expansion. Although the ambition to engage in a collective conversation was not limited 																																								 																					
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to the United States, it was arguably best achieved here. If, as Lawrence Stone argues, 
“societies are profoundly affected by the way people think of themselves,” there could be 
no doubt that Americans were fixated on becoming more equal and that conversation was 
considered a means to get there.300 Following the promises laid down in the founding 
documents of the Republic, conversation was adapted to make the cornerstone of 
government more “sincere”—and further reaching. Daniel Walker Howe stresses how 
much these establishing ideals would reverberate across all levels of mid nineteenth-
century society, saying: “The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that all men had 
an unalienable right to the pursuit of happiness. In practice, Americans defined this 
pursuit not only in economic and political terms but also in moral and spiritual ones, and 
in terms of manners and lifestyle.”301  
In 1824, John Quincy Adams became the first president to refer to the American 
government as a democracy in an inaugural address.302 Within the span of a few decades 
(roughly 1820s to 1850s) public schools were created; literacy rates swelled; the Lyceum 
and the public lecture movement emerged;303 refined and crude speaking styles mixed;304 
access to cheap print materials multiplied;305 wide reading in the classics (which, despite 
its abundant and far-reaching benefits, was arguably inconvenient by design) 
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plummeted;306 and virtually “all coherent efforts to exclude people of ‘middling culture’ 
from public debate” were undermined.307 Women, meanwhile, no longer barred from the 
public speaking platform, gradually stepped out of the drawing room and onto the 
rostrum.308  
New arenas for verbal exchanges—not just among, but between communities—
also dotted the landscape. “In every sizable city, dozens of business establishments 
beckoned customers with the promise of conversation, a meal, a cup of coffee or pint of 
rum, lodging, books, magazines—and newspapers,” writes Charles Steffen.309 Boarding 
houses, reading rooms, medical offices, literary societies, steamboats, train cars, 
conversation clubs, and informal civic societies all invited spontaneous, unstructured 
talk.310 From elite salons to working-class saloons, Americans everywhere developed 
what Peter Gibian describes as “a fascination with new venues for conversational 
exchange that might test the boundaries of public and private life.”311 Echoing this 
invitation for new conversational arenas, the historian Katherine Greer refers to the mid-
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nineteenth-century America as “a world full of parlors” in which new ways of showing 
oneself in both private and public forms could be developed.312  
Equally important, and intertwined with the rise of a reading and conversant 
public, organized opportunities for live speech multiplied during this same period. 
According to Tom Wright (and in contrast to Walter Ong’s account of print-based 
cultures), orality during the nineteenth century could best be described as “resurgent” 
rather than “residual.” 313  New textual forms of the “talking mind” expressed in print 
were “called in to reinforce, not replace, the spoken word,” says Wright.314 For example, 
the same circuit riders that preached salvation laid the groundwork for the reform 
movements that would define the era. The period of religious revival known as the 
Second Great Awakening, which had its heyday from 1820 to 1840, subsisted on camp 
meetings and “circuit riders” skilled in generating emotional responses through live talk. 
Both literacy and church membership soared. The message preached was also more 
democratic than previous denominations: unlike the Puritans’ and Calvinists’ belief in 
predestination, the Methodists and Baptists sermonized that all races and people were 
eligible for salvation, regardless of circumstance at birth. Like the first Great Awakening, 
one of the side effects of the revivalist movement was an expansion of political 
consciousness within the lower reaches of society.315  
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Although it was designed to benefit all and offend no one, the Lyceum movement 
of adult education (which lasted roughly as long as the revival period), generated a 
similar fervor. “It has been discovered,” marveled one Boston reporter “that the two 
objects of entertainment and improvement may be united in one pursuit.”316 Considered 
by many to be a ritual of citizenship, the public lecture circuit originated by the Lyceum 
emphasized useful knowledge. Expertise and experiences were compressed and 
dramatized by noted preachers, scholars, explorers, humorists, and scientists—almost all 
white men—together with runaway slaves, Native Americans, and, on occasion, 
women.317  
After the Lyceum movement of adult education gradually morphed into a more 
overt form of popular entertainment in the mid nineteenth century, the performances of 
talk, although less frequent, became even more organized and more lucrative. Peter 
Cherches refers to the “star courses” of the mid-century as a form of early network 
broadcasting.318 The Chautauqua movement, meanwhile, integrated not just Lyceum-
style popular lectures into its curriculum, but also question-and answer sessions (now a 
staple of public talks) and attendant performances of “conversations.”319  
Not all of the dialogic exchanges of the period were this structured. Volatile 
modes of expression were far from uniform, both in character and in purpose. To give 
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one example, although commonly referred to as a national characteristic, the ethic of self-
improvement—the driving force of the Lyceum movement—was not uniformly 
embraced. In fact, the aspiration for self-development was attacked from above and 
below. Where Providence lyceum-goers in 1842 earnestly debated the question, “Who 
are recognized in the Constitution of the United States by the expression, ‘the people,’” 
others openly mocked the “peripatetic gentry” who roamed the country “with superficial 
essays written out of encyclopedias.”320 Daniel Walker Howe’s description of the 1840s 
minstrel shows, which lampooned the “pretentious” free Negro, dramatized contempt for 
a range of stations, not just the newly free: “the learned professions and learning in 
general, the newly rich, European high culture, abolitionism, evangelical reform, and 
women’s rights” were all the objects of scorn.321  
Unlike the ideal model of conversation in a harmonious, static, and “polite 
society,” in this nineteenth-century dynamic “a host of singular speakers” were usually 
“very much aware of inequalities.”322 In fact, according to Gibian, “what the mid-century 
outpouring of dialogic speech suggests, most basically, is that in this period the cultural 
vision on any issue could not be summed up in a single voice.”323 Carolyn Porter 
highlights this view: “Women, Afro- Americans, and working people all participated in 
the national conversation,” she writes.324 Indeed, in the same way that the “age of 																																								 																					
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reading” was not limited to a single class, the “age of conversation” was not limited to a 
singular aim or a class; it multiplied and expanded in unexpected directions.  
“Not all mid-century talk took the form of parlor pretension, and not all mid-
century talk groups were simply insulated bastions for a threatened social elite or 
conservative fortresses defending against the rise of new discourses or new ideas,” 
reminds Gibian.325 In the place of unmitigated parlor pretension, there was a response to 
the very fragile common ground of the period, perhaps, he suggests, best typified in the 
fictive “breakfast-table essays” of Oliver Wendell Holmes. In contrast to the French 
salons’ “art of turning things aside,” Holmes’ essays (which appeared as a running 
column in the Atlantic Monthly beginning with its first issue in 1857) dramatized, rather 
than eschewed interruptions, thereby highlighting each “changing of the voice.”326 
Reflecting the anxiety of the times, Holmes’ fictional essays at once hail and question 
whether conversational pleasure and its purported unifying bonds can withstand the 
problems of the day. 
Although these layers and networks all contributed to a so-called “national 
conversation,” they are more often critiqued for what they did not do (i.e., replace the 
benefits of a classical education and encourage true conversation or reasoned debate) than 
for what they did do (i.e., expand the number of participants and create a basis for 
common rituals).327 This signals a main difference between American contributions to 
conversational theories and practices and everything that preceded it.  
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Conventionally, programmatic approaches to conversation are said to flourish 
when political oratory has failed. Frank Lovett highlights this adaptive quality of 
conversation in what he calls the “politics of the second best.”328 (When considering the 
Renaissance courtier, for example, Lovett notes, that, “given the choice between trying to 
make one’s master a better person” (through the indirect art of conversation) “and not 
having a master at all…surely one would not opt for the former unless the latter was 
unavailable. Castiglione’s program must always therefore represent something of a 
‘politics of the second best,’ so to speak—a pragmatic response to tragically diminished 
opportunities for civic participation.”329)  
However, in the case of the United States, conversation was not developed as a 
replacement for oratory but in conjunction with it. What Barnett Baskerville identifies as 
“the Golden Age of Oratory” (1820s-1850s) and what Peter Gibian crowns “the Age of 
Conversation” (1830s-1850s) existed side-by-side.330 “Just as oratory was peaking as a 
mass phenomenon,” writes Gibian, “the more private art of conversation—a speech form 
related to oratory but in some ways its complement—was enjoying a rebirth of its own, 
subtly expanding the range of the voluble native tongue as it too became a popular craze 
and national obsession.”331 However, in contrast to the twentieth century (which would 
solidify the merging of oratory and conversation into public conversational rhetoric as the 
dominant paradigm for all of rhetoric), styles in antebellum American rhetoric were not 
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automatically subsumed under the banner of the “conversational style” or “frame.” In 
formal address, the conversational style was still an exception rather than the rule.  
While someone like Frederick Douglass (who, among other things, was venerated 
as perhaps “the only African American to become a national lyceum celebrity”) was 
praised for his “wit,” “naturalness,” “conversational style,” and seemingly “impromptu” 
delivery, his speeches and lectures flourished in tandem with oratory that could only be 
described as its opposite (in which Douglass was also notably adept).332 The “orotund,” 
“majestic,” “grand style” of speakers such as Daniel Webster and Edward Everett was a 
kind that would last for hours and be arranged for days. 333 These speeches were written 
with great care and treated as works of art. Brimming with references to literature, 
history, and a heroic past, they were chiefly written to “inspire veneration for American 
heroes and institutions, to celebrate American values and virtues…and to herald a 
glorious national future.”334  
On the face of it, the two styles of oratory and conversation that flourished during 
this period could not be more different. However, when viewed as a unit it is clear they 
oscillate back and forth between the aims of individual decision and shared 
understanding. If Wendy Sharer is right to suggest that historians of rhetoric have unduly 
privileged oratory as a site of individual action to the exclusion of more diffuse, 
collective ones, then it may help explain why the conversational turn, a slow-moving, 
cumulative influence, has been so overlooked by historians of rhetoric, despite its 																																								 																					
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reliance on the individual and its recognized use and popularity as a public dynamic.335 
Margaret Fuller’s varied explorations of conversation (which I detail later in this chapter) 
illustrate how proliferation and varieties of conversational iterations can actually work to 
impede scholarship, which tends to isolate, rather than expand upon, topics. Recognizing 
this tendency, David Simpson calls for “a renewal of attention to the general…by 
showing the historicality of our compulsive attention to particularities.”336 This chapter 
addresses this methodological problem by casting a wide net of nineteenth century 
“conversational” experiments (both real and ersatz) in the United States.  
 
On the Methods and Roles of Public Conversation  
The early to mid nineteenth-century was a period when, for the first time in the 
United States, a diversity of ideas and goods were exchanged on a national scale. In some 
ways, this is precisely what the founding generation had anticipated. However 
contradictory, discrete, or (as the Federalist argument for sovereignty would have it) 
individual in its practice, the maintenance of the ideals espoused in the Constitution and 
the Declaration were never solely a matter of personal preference or private concern. In 
democratic and republican politics, individual cultivation is always a public issue. George 
Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796 had already drawn a parallel between “the 
construction of individual character and the construction of the commonwealth.” 
Washington emphasized a coherence of purpose among individual happiness, nation-																																								 																					
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building, civic education, and a rising above regional and factional differences. He urged 
Congress to consider citizenship—both individual and collective—as a necessary 
ingredient for the republic, saying, “It is of infinite moment that you should properly 
estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and individual 
happiness.”337  
In keeping with the entirely new theory of democratic republicanism that debates 
over the Constitution had generated, the idea that individual cultivation was just as much 
a public issue as a private one became apparent almost as soon as the implications of 
“We, the people” were introduced.338 When a nation is founded on a will of the people 
that exists prior to and independent of government, then a question that immediately 
follows is how “public will” will be formed, consolidated, and, finally, rendered visible. 
This is a question that came into view in the nineteenth century and still persists today.  
Although it was not until the twentieth century that its implications were fully felt, 
the beginnings of what some have dubbed a “national conversation” began in earnest the 
century before.339  For reasons that I show in this chapter, this reliance on conversation 
would prove both a problem and a cure in the quest to inform and identify a unified “will 
of the people.” Moreover, while I am reluctant to use the term “national conversation” at 
all, its usage need not suggest a cohesive or resolved transformation. Rather, taking up 
what Dorothy C. Broaddus describes as a “schizophrenic model of America,” I aim to 
show how, through a series of conversational situations and strategies, conversation was 																																								 																					
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adopted in the service of competing (and at times even contradictory) ends.340 As I 
showed earlier in this study (Chapter Two), these competing ends or “poles” of 
conversation would exist even if the subject of this study were not “public” conversation 
but rather something like artful conversation or philosophical dialogues.  
However, its publicness does give it a unique character. In her tremendous history 
on the French salons, Benedetta Craveri suggests that while the ideal of conversation as a 
form of transcendence goes back to “the very origins of Western civilization,” its public 
prominence as an openly sought after ideal typically arises when political oratory and 
eloquence have failed.341 Although Randall (2018) takes the opposite tack in his recent 
study, arguing that conversation supplanted rather than reinforced oratory, the 
outcomes—changed characteristics of conversation in light of changed roles—are 
essentially the same. Although classically defined for its lack of utilitarian motives, 
conversation may be publically called upon in times when advantage is precisely the 
objective. Even before considering particular iterations of conversation, the dynamic may 
thus already be altered. The difference here is primarily one of expectation. For example, 
as a dynamic adapted to make the founding documents more “sincere,” one can hardly 
expect that conversation, tailored in this scenario to educate, reform, and unite the 
citizenry, would live up to the highest ideals of human experience. In the same way, as a 
strategy for rhetorical advantage, one could expect to find as many uses (and misuses) in 
conversation than may have existed in oratory. The conversational dynamic, in other 																																								 																					
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words, is neither as unobjectionable nor as ineffective as contemporary commentaries 
have made it out to be.  
And yet the dynamic continues to be studied as if it has no role other than artful 
conversation or deliberative reasoning and thus can simply be brought to scale. This is 
problematic, both for our understanding of the dynamic and for any public conversational 
practices that may yet flourish. As suggested in conversational handbooks and theories, 
expecting too much from conversation actually may destroy whatever promise there is for 
conversation. A too stubborn desire to say something clever, a fear of giving offense, 
holding on to one topic and not letting it go, dreary earnestness, defensiveness, over-
preparedness, too much asperity, an excess preoccupation with commerce, telling people 
what to think, and making a toil of pleasure are just few of the many ways the “magnetic 
experiment” of conversation can fail: in its truest form, conversation (not unlike a joke) is 
a high-risk, high-reward endeavor.342 In his study on style and vision in nineteenth-
century American literature, Lawrence Buell suggests conversation had a “special 
mystique” precisely because of its spontaneous nature: “As the least studied form of 
expression, it approached most closely the ideal of continuous inspiration.”343  
Conversation’s reliance on “perpetual discovery” and “improvisation” suggests 
two reasons why, as an art, there are so many ways conversation can fail and why, 
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despite its “universal availability” and ubiquity, conversation is so hard to do well.344 
Transcendentalist Amos Bronson Alcott (who publicly announced his aim to master the 
genre) was one of many devotees to observe, “there is nothing rarer than great 
conversation.”345 This emphasis on improvisation is further complicated when 
conversation is formalized in public programming and attempted on a large scale. 
Obviously, a “professional conversation,” which emerged somewhat rapaciously in the 
nineteenth-century United States, “is naturally apt to be more patterned than those in 
which there is no coordinator.”346 In other words, to the extent that a conversation is 
prepared, managed, and publicly administered, the versatile and unfettered nature of the 
medium (which theorists consistently identify as two of conversation’s signature 
qualities) are already compromised.  
Too often scholars have taken this fact and attempted to catch conversation in the 
act of failing. That is, in their efforts to “place” conversation in a category once and for 
all, they fail to see to what situations publicly adapted models of conversation are 
responding. Kenneth Burke’s Philosophy of Literary Form offers an apt example. If one 
were to catch someone reading a book on success and say, “Aha! But you’re not actually 
doing what the book says; you’re merely reading it,” that would be to miss the symbolism 
laden in that action: 
The reading of a book on the attaining of success is in itself the symbolic attaining 
of the success. It is while they read that these readers are “succeeding.” I’ll wager that, 																																								 																					
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in by far the great majority of cases, such readers make no serious attempt to apply the 
book’s recipes. The lure of the book resides in the fact that the reader, while reading it, is 
then living in the aura of success. What he wants is easy success; and he gets it in 
symbolic form by the mere reading itself. To attempt applying such stuff in real life 
would be very difficult, full of many disillusioning difficulties.347 
Nineteenth-century studies of American iterations of conversation (most of which 
would be technically characterized as “ersatz,” to use Stephen Miller’s term) are often 
prematurely “split” from artful models of conversation. While useful for bolstering the 
definition of “true” conversation (which the nineteenth-century practices worked 
tirelessly to blur), this approach fails to account for what people were really doing with 
language, regardless of classification. “You can’t properly put Marie Corelli and 
Shakespeare apart until you have first put them together,” writes Burke. “First genus, 
then differentia. The strategy in common is the genus. The range or scale or spectrum of 
particularlizations is the differentia.”348 Following Burke’s insight, this study (and this 
chapter in particular) builds on, extends, and elaborates the conversational categories and 
performances that nineteenth-century studies and histories have already identified.  
Michael Sproule hints at this need to build upon histories in what he calls “the Big 
Problem” in American rhetorical history.349 According to Sproule, there is still a need 
among theoreticians, teachers, and historians alike to better understand “the still murky 
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linkages between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries.”350 The Big Problem for our 
understanding of rhetorical history, in other words, stems from too much “splitting” and 
not enough “lumping.” In view of all this, the disjointedness of styles that was visibly 
introduced in the nineteenth century (and still remains with us today) must be understood 
as an overall trend in the history of rhetoric rather than a series of wholly unrelated 
expressions.  
Kenneth Cmiel usefully explains how Americans’ tendency to interchange 
different styles in a single rhetorical situation developed in the nineteenth century. As 
part of his superb contribution to the early movement in the 1980s and 1990s to fill in the 
“black hole” of this period of rhetorical history, Cmiel details how “middling styles 
encouraged people to shift back and forth across linguistic registers.”351 More 
specifically, in his chapter on “Democratic Idiom” he depicts the sometimes jarring mix 
of styles Americans used side-by-side: “Speakers might shift from the formal to the 
folksy as the situation demanded or they might merge refined and unrefined behavior in a 
single moment.”352  
Although Cmiel’s study does not focus on conversation directly, he is keenly 
aware of the interrelationship between style and the expectations for speaker and 
audience. “Increased education, combined with democratic sentiment, smashed 
neoclassical canons of speaker and audience,” he writes. “No longer could refined 
arbiters presume deference; no longer would the elite set the tone. In a democratic 																																								 																					
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culture, all would contribute.”353 This principle of participation would complicate the 
thesis advanced by numerous historians, that “rhetoric in general” reflects a “prized way 
of life.”354 While Baskerville is correct to say oratory is “more than a study of influence,” 
this principle of participation (even if it were only to stay at the level of an ideal) enlarges 
the pool of potential orators to such an extent that it renders the speaker practically 
indistinguishable from citizen. In nineteenth century United States, what this meant is not 
that the orator—distinguished for reflecting (and advancing) a prized way of life—did not 
exist, but rather that he existed alongside another, equally forceful, ideal: that he was but 
one among many (i.e., that “all would contribute”).  
For a myriad reasons, the contours of which I begin to outline in this chapter, 
various forms of conversation were taken up—formally and informally, in print and face-
to-face, between friends and among strangers, in small neighborhood microcosms and at 
massive, public gatherings in antebellum United States. Although the practice of these 
staged conversational gatherings remains an American staple today (and, indeed, a 
central component of mass entertainment throughout much of the globe), scholars of 
rhetoric have given surprisingly little attention to exploring their nineteenth century 
democratic beginnings or to understanding its appeal beyond the blanket concepts of 
education, entertainment, and conversation’s commodification as a “salable package.”355  
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II. Two Theories: The Transmission and Ritual Views of Communication   
Enduring appeals to conversation symbolize an effort to reconcile what James 
Carey has identified as two positions—the “transmission view of communication” and 
“the ritual view of communication”—that are continually goaded by the mass democratic 
experiment we call the United States. These views are especially prominent in relation to 
the newspaper, although they can be seen elsewhere. The transmission view of 
communication is “defined by terms such as ‘imparting,’ ‘sending,’ ‘transmitting,’ or 
‘giving information to others.’ It is formed from the metaphor of geography or 
transportation,” writes Carey.356 Nineteenth century advances in transportation figured 
heavily in this view. Indeed, what historians call the “transportation revolution”—which 
“telescoped” centuries of gradual changes into a single generation—dramatically reduced 
shipping costs, opened up new markets, and, as David Walker Howe puts it, essentially 
overthrew “the tyranny of distance.”357 Although it was the Great Migration westward 
that created new markets to reach in the first place, it was new technologies that made it 
possible. According to Walker Howe, “during the thirty-three years that began in 1815, 
there would be greater strides in improving communication than had taken place in all 
previous centuries. This revolution, with its attendant political and economic 
consequences, would be a driving force in the history of the era.”358   
The first commercially successful steamboat (1807) allowed vessels to travel 
upstream and against the current. The completion of the Erie Canal (1825) and 																																								 																					
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subsequent canals and waterways facilitated the shipment of goods from ports of entry 
inland. And the National Road (1811), the first federally funded road that was only ever 
partially completed, connected Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, 
and Illinois. However, it was above all the invention of the telegraph (1844) that eclipsed 
the tyranny of distance, in essence ending “the identity” but not destroying “the 
metaphor” of transportation and communication: “Although messages might be centrally 
produced and controlled, through monopolization of writing or the rapid production of 
print,” before the invention of the telegraph, “these messages, carried in the hands of a 
messenger or between the binding of a book, still had to be distributed.”359  
Nineteenth-century advances in transportation and manufacturing impacted the 
social realm too. In addition to improving daily living—purchasing basic household items 
like clothing and furniture suddenly became possible for most Americans—it also meant 
that people were no longer doing business only with people they knew.360 Not unlike the 
European Renaissance (and its attendant social disruptions) discussed in Chapter Two, 
the market, transportation, and communication revolutions of nineteenth-century America 
brought together strangers in ways previously unknown.361 As Adam Tuchinksy puts the 
slow reordering of social relationships leading up to the Civil War period: “Capital and 
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labor, once wedded to one another in an intimate and nearly familial condition, were now 
linked by the indifference and anonymity of cash, contract, and commodity.”362  
It was not simply advances in distribution methods and the indifference of 
commodity that changed social dynamics, but also a reduction in the costs of materials 
themselves. As early as the 1820s the United States had more newspapers and newspaper 
readers than any other country. According to the most comprehensive book on the 
subject, Frank Luther Molt’s American Journalism: A History of Newspapers Through 
250 Years, 1690-1940, there were three times as many newspapers in the United States in 
1833 as England or France. By 1860 this proportion was even greater.363 It was not just 
newspapers, however, that defined the American cultural landscape of this period, but 
print material more generally. By the 1840s the United States boasted the largest literate 
public of any nation in world history.364  
The effects of a reading public were visible across the social spectrum. “Many 
farmers and mechanics found time to read; even some factory operatives did,” writes 
Walker Howe. “It helped that people spent more time indoors, where whale oil and gas 
lamps shed more light than candles had. The mass production of eyeglasses, beginning in 
the 1830s, certainly helped. Those riding the newly built trains loved to read. Families 
often read aloud to each other, sitting around the fireplaces, so even family members who 
could not read for themselves gained exposure to the printed word.”365 First-hand 
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accounts of the period also bear this out. In his 1826 Phi Beta Kappa Address at Harvard, 
for example, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story characterized the age as one in which 
learning radiated “from all directions,” and particularly from the middle class of society. 
“One of the most striking characteristics of our age, which has worked deepest in all the 
changes of its fortunes and pursuits, is the general diffusion of knowledge. This is 
emphatically the age of reading.”366  
Impacting not just who had access to reading materials but also the expectations 
with which readers would approach them, the proliferation of newspapers and other 
prints materials did not simply expand audience reach but actually stimulated new 
attitudes and habits. Technological developments such as the steam-powered cylinder 
rotary press dramatically increased the output of print materials, transforming American 
publishing and making possible the mass production of disposable (i.e., daily) 
newspapers. The subscription delivery method, which posed a much higher barrier for 
popular use, was replaced with the daily newspaper, which became conspicuous—
literally—as a physical presence in cities. Newspapers were everywhere in antebellum 
America. A Philadelphia Public Ledger column of March 25, 1836 reported: “These 
papers are to be found in every street, lane, and alley; in every hotel, tavern, counting-
house, shop, etc. Almost every porter and drag-man, while not engaged in his occupation, 
may be seen with a paper in his hands.”367  
The abundance of actual, physical newspapers could not be overestimated in its 
influence. “This constituted a great societal change,” says the communication scholar and 																																								 																					
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media historian Michael Schudson. “The dragman with a newspaper in his hands was a 
far more important social and political unit than he had been in the days when his 
information came down to him from the mercantile and educated classes.”368 The 
consequences of this immediate access were at least two-fold. Not only did this 
correspond with a period of democratization and longer-term campaigns for reform (just 
as newspapers were also enlisted to oppose these reforms), it also impacted the 
immediate expectations of newspaper readers. 
Where previously readers approached printed material as a “precious objects,” 
they soon began to regard them as “more ephemeral.”369 Reading became broader and 
more diffuse. The shift from scarcity to abundance, from sacred texts to penny papers 
reduced the intensity with which readers approached reading material and “encouraged 
reading as a diversion.”370 Spectacle as entertainment featured prominently in the 
nineteenth century. Whether in live performances or print, producers and audiences alike 
relied on what theater historian Amy Hughes identifies as the relational qualities of scale, 
intensity, and excess as way to gauge and influence viewing habits. “Sensational scenes 
appeared not only on stage but also in other media. Books, newspapers, and illustrations 
frequently harnessed the scale, intensity, and excess of spectacle. These assorted texts 
and objects promoted viewing habits—tactics of seeing—that influenced how Americans 
consumed and experienced the world,” writes Hughes.371 Certainly this theatrical quality 
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seeped into newspapers. Schudson argues, for example, that newspapers, like everything 
else, adjusted their content as a result of changing societal demands: “newspapers for the 
uneducated dragman and porters must necessarily be different from those prepared for the 
rich merchants. They had to be more direct and more sensational. They required the spice 
of wit, or (as in the case of the police reports) the cayenne of a rather brutal comedy.”372  
The changes in nineteenth-century audience expectations that Hughes and 
Schudson describe are more in keeping with Carey’s “ritual view of communication” 
than a blanket appeal to democratic education first might suggest. “Under a ritual view,” 
writes Carey, “news is not information but drama. It does not describe the world but 
portrays an arena of dramatic forces and action.”373 In contrast to the transmission view 
of communication, which “dominates” American culture, the ritual view is only “a minor 
thread in our national thought.”374 Both views are important to this study, however, 
because together they offer a range in which the conversational turn might be expressed. 
“If the archetypal case of communication under a transmission view is the extension of 
messages across geography for the purpose of control, the archetypal case under a ritual 
view is the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and 
commonality.”375  
Put simply, any general search for markers of “public opinion” or “public will” 
will always exceed the transmission view of communication. Something beyond 
transmission is needed to account for the social backdrop in which public opinion is 																																								 																					
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shaped. Together the ritual view of communication and the transmission view of 
communication, although separately insufficient for explaining the conversational turn, 
highlight why the demands of mid-nineteenth century communication exceeded the 
boundaries of either deliberative rhetoric or artful conversation.  
 
Cultural Mediation and the Newspaper  
In his famous study, Public Opinion, Walter Lippmann points to some of the 
challenges presented by the American information system, and in particular the 
newspaper. Among of difficulties of democracy, he was astonished by how little progress 
(or even attention) political scientists gave to the question of how the will of a public 
would form before (and after) the proliferation of the newspaper. He writes: “The idea 
that men have to go forth to study the world in order to govern it, has played a very minor 
part in political thought. It could figure very little, because the machinery for reporting 
the world in any way useful to government made comparatively little progress from the 
time of Aristotle to the age in which the premises of democracy were established.”376 
After freedom of the press was introduced in the First Amendment as an instrument for 
democratic government, the question of public will was not solved, but rather obscured. 
On one hand, freedom of the press guaranteed civil liberties, which are of “fundamental 
importance” to a democracy since men are not likely to discover truth if they cannot 
speak it. 377 On the other, freedom of the press did not—because it could not— provide a 
means to decipher or secure truth.  
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An undue burden to secure this truth was thus placed on the newspapers, says 
Lippman, since the detection and transmission of public opinion rested on the assumption 
that “the press should do spontaneously for us what primitive democracy imagined each 
of us could do spontaneously for himself.”378  In other words, having the civic freedom to 
print or speak openly was not, in itself, a guarantee that citizens could assemble a true 
picture of the world. The civil liberty of a free press, while fundamental, could not satisfy 
the question of how truth about distant or complex matters is discovered in the first place. 
According to Lippmann, the unwarranted confidence in truth without effort 
mistakenly assumes “either that truth is spontaneous, or that the means of securing truth 
exist when there is no external interference.” This directness, however, is not possible for 
abstract concepts like “political fictions” and “imagined communities.”379 “When you are 
dealing with an invisible environment,” he writes, “the assumption is false. The truth 
about distant or complex matters is not self-evident, and the machinery for assembling 
information is technical and expensive.”380 Although to make his point Lippmann 
overstates how easily the ancients uncovered truth (for more on this, see, for example, 
Carolyn “Should We Name the Tools?”), his emphasis on Americans’ insistence that 
news be free (or the closest thing to it) still resonates today. “Nobody thinks for a 
moment he ought to pay for his newspaper. He expects the fountain of truth to bubble, 
but he enters into no contract, legal or moral, involving any risk, cost, or trouble to 
himself.”381  																																								 																					
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Just as Lippmann is concerned with the search, discovery, and dissemination of 
intellectual capital necessary to depict a “true picture” of the world, Americans of the 
nineteenth century encountered both this and an analogous cultural dilemma: “How was 
this continental nation to be held together, to function effectively, to avoid declension 
into faction or tyranny or chaos? How were we, to use a phrase of that day, ‘to cement the 
union?’”382 This was a time, in other words, when the societal and political demands of 
the union pulled in opposite directions. On the one hand, there was the desire to educate 
voting citizens to be able to reason, discern, and construct a “true picture” of the outer 
world. At the same time, the cultural need for unity placed an emphasis on shared 
experience and commonality.  
Anticipating the challenge of educating democratic audiences that scholars would 
endlessly explore,383 George Washington was already aware of the need called for formal 
and informal means of bolstering “public opinion.” In his 1796 Farewell Address, he 
urged the promotion of “the general diffusion of knowledge” saying, “in proportion as the 
structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion 
should be enlightened.”384 Americans certainly took this charge to promote the general 
diffusion of knowledge seriously, both as a matter of individual interest and collective 
will. In contrast to the public sphere Habermas conceived as independent from 
government, a key means for disseminating knowledge (i.e., mail) was integral to it. 
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Article I Section 8 of the Constitution gave Congress the power to establish Post Offices 
and post roads, while the U.S. Postal Service Act of 1792, which was signed by George 
Washington, created the United States Postal Department and offered substantial 
subsidies for newspapers. At the time, newspapers comprised the bulk of mail deliveries.  
However, the legislation also presented unanticipated consequences. “While the 
authors of the act wanted to encourage the development of the press,” writes the historian 
Charles Steffen, “they could not have foreseen how this exemption would transform 
newspaper offices from private businesses into public arenas.” 385 In addition to reduced 
prices for newspapers deliveries, the Postal Service Act allowed editors to exchange their 
own newspapers at no cost.  
The combination of these two subsidies had a profound effect on the influence 
and reach of the newspaper industry. People flocked to newspaper offices to have a peek 
at the flood of newspapers arriving daily from across the country. A central newspaper 
office from Washington, D.C., the Daily National Intelligencer, was receiving close to 
one hundred papers a day.386 “Our universal relish for newspaper reading” is so 
insatiable, remarked a Boston Daily Advertiser columnist in 1814, “that it has given rise 
to a general and habitual form of salutation on the meeting of friends and strangers: 
What’s the news?”387 The newspaper, with all its strengths and limitations, created the 
means for a national conversation hovering somewhere between a metaphor and a 
practice.  
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III. Bringing Women’s Rhetoric into the Realm of Rhetoric In General 
Like the newspaper, rhetoric in general took on a greater and greater mixture of 
roles. However, most feminist histories have not taken this into account. This has added 
another murky layer to the conversational turn. As discussed in an earlier chapter 
(Chapter 2), in the classical period, to speak of “rhetoric” was primarily (though not 
exclusively) to speak of oratory and its three species: judicial, deliberative, and 
epideictic. However, over time, as conversation and print began to dominate, the meaning 
of rhetoric also changed. Recent histories of women’s rhetorical theories and practices 
(many of which are still being recovered) have contributed to our understanding of the 
transition to a more conversationally oriented rhetoric. 388 However, in contrast to this 
study, which highlights the extent to which the dynamic of conversation became the 
preferred model in all of rhetoric, these histories tend to approach conversation as mode 
developed for women qua women, or, alternatively, as a resourceful (though not 
necessarily ideal) method of conciliatory resistance for the bold few who dared to engage 
promiscuous audiences.389 Of course, there are good reasons to emphasize the separation 
between men and women. Of all practices, rhetoric is notorious for having excluded 
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women as a matter of theory, education, and practice. In the United States, women were 
barred from the public speaking platform until the 1830s; at the federal level they were 
also denied the most fundamental part of democracy—the vote—until nearly a century 
after that. Nevertheless, to speak of women’s contributions as belonging only to women 
overlooks the fact that they weren’t just creating their own tradition but actively shaping 
rhetoric in general.  
More to the point, while useful for filling in the gaps, overly gendered treatments 
of the era have tended to obscure both the conversational dynamic and women’s 
contributions to it. Although feminist histories have made considerable inroads into 
rectifying the almost total negligence of women’s contributions to rhetorical theory in the 
canon, they have done so largely by relying on two separate lines of inquiry: women’s 
rhetoric (conversation) vs. rhetoric in general (oratory).390 Jane Donawerth, for example, 
importantly argues that women in the United States and England developed theories of 
rhetoric centered on conversation, rather than public speaking. She defines conversation 
as encompassing “small-group communication, from any private, informal verbal 
communication, to artful dialogue used in informal leisure and social activities.”391 
According to Donawerth, only after the rise of conversation as a model for composition 
pedagogy did  this women’s tradition disappear.392 However, in making this argument 
about “the rise and fall” of a women’s tradition and confining it neatly within one setting 
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(i.e., apart from oratory and apart from men), she misses the important influence of 
conversation, not just on composition pedagogy, but on rhetoric in general. Indeed, in the 
final sentence of her book, Donawerth concludes: “While there is not a direct link from 
the women’s tradition of rhetoric to these examples of contemporary composition 
pedagogy, nevertheless, we can yet learn something about our own teaching practices 
from a tradition that taught women how to enter the conversation.”393   
The point I wish to make here does not turn on whether or not any one historian 
gets the forecast right, but rather how, taken together, these histories might influence our 
broad view of conversation’s role in public life. I submit that the consistent segregation 
of the two modes suggests the gap between oratory and conversation was widening (or at 
last remaining steady) when in fact the two genres were closing in on each other. “In a 
sense,” says Christina Zwarg, “American feminist critics no less than conventional critics 
have depended upon two traditions to make their case: one masculine and self-obsessed 
and one feminine, subversive, and polyphonic.”394 This effort “to keep certain intellectual 
and cultural projects worlds apart” has come at the expense of our understanding of 
hybrid genres, of which the public conversational dynamic is certainly one. I would also 
argue that this over-reliance on two traditions blinds us to the lasting impact of hybrid 
thinkers, such as Margaret Fuller, who gain their force not from choosing to be “either 
public or private” but from deliberating mixing perspectives in a manner that extends 
beyond the public/private divide and into a realm that is neither wholly individual nor 
wholly collective.  																																								 																					
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In her study on delivery in the nineteenth century, Lindal Buchanan theorizes this 
as an unrecognized category—collaboration—that pervades the rhetorical products of this 
era. She defines collaboration as “a cooperative endeavor involving two or more people 
that results in a rhetorical product, performance, or event.”395 Although what Buchanan is 
describing is specifically related to the collaborative efforts that make delivery possible in 
antebellum women rhetors, her definition applies to the broader conversational 
experiments of the period.  
If we think back to the Greeley-Young interview, it becomes clearer how the 
format depends on mutual cooperation (which is not to say agreement).  Greeley traveled 
to a far-flung Western territory—Utah was not even a state at the time—to shed light on 
questions of public concern. By doing so, he also provided Young with an opportunity to 
clarify, explain, and defend the doctrine of the Latter-Day Saints. What resulted from the 
exchange depended as much on Young as it did on Greeley. A colleague of Greeley’s at 
the New York Tribune, Maragret Fuller, spent her life’s work developing and theorizing 
these promises of conversation, which is where we now turn.  
 
The Conversational Ranges of Margaret Fuller 
Fuller’s explorations of conversation were so varied that, although pioneering 
independently and as a collective, they exceeded the boundaries of any single iteration—
male or female—public or private—written or spoken—monologic or dialogic—literal 
or metaphorical. Straddling both sides of the debate over the fundamental goals of 
conversation (engaged chiefly between Fuller, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ralph Waldo 																																								 																					
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Emerson, William Hazlitt, and Bronson Alcott), Fuller divided her explorations of 
conversation “between an anti-interruptive oral practice oriented to the development of a 
single voice” and her “ground-breaking work in written dialogue that was crucially 
founded upon multivocality and interruption.”396 Robert Hudspeth describes her as 
“virtually at the head” of the urban frame of reference of conversation. Although she 
began her career as a “bookish young writer,” she “matured into a sophisticated analyst 
of her contemporary world,” using conversation as a frame of self in “involvement with 
and reaction to others.” 397  
For five years, Fuller was a professional conversationalist. At the Boston 
Conversations for Women (1839-1844), local reform elites paid a significant amount (ten 
dollars) to participate in a thirteen-class format that was designed to help women “see 
their own conversation not as decorative but as critical and consequential.”398 About 30 
persons usually attended each session. Although most of the conversations were 
exclusively for women, some of the meetings were mixed: altogether more than 100 
people, most of them women, participated in the conversations.399 In a letter to Sophia 
Ripley, Fuller articulated why she thought conversation, both as an art and an impetus for 
action, was appropriate for her audience of elite, urban women: she wanted to “ascertain 
what pursuits are best suited” to women in “our time and state of society, and how we 
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may make best use of our means for building up the life of thought upon the life of 
action.”400 As a type of pedagogy akin to the Socratic method, the conversations were 
meant to be a “drawing out” of the pupil by a combination of induction and response.401 
For Fuller, “reform came not through sudden conversions to absolute moral truths—the 
perfectionist method of both evangelical and abolitionists—but through introspection, 
self-criticism, and ‘conversation’ directed at interjecting a new rigor and creativity into 
women’s culture.” 402 If Lawrence Buell is correct, Fuller succeeded in her pursuit. He 
identifies Fuller’s Conversations for Women as one of three instances of Transcendental 
conversation that had the most impact.403  
During this period Fuller was also an editor for America’s first avant-garde 
intellectual journal, The Dial, which was modeled on conversation as a philosophical 
ideal. The Boston-based journal, which served as an incubator for both Fuller and Ralph 
Waldo Emerson’s public careers, “eschewed academic affiliation, disregarded 
commercial demands, promoted experimental writing, offended middle-brow tastes, and 
critically engaged the major reform ideas of its time.”404 In an 1839 letter to Margaret 
Fuller, Amos Bronson Alcott conveyed his vision for putting American intellectual 
conversation on the map by equating it to making a private conversation public: “before 
long a journal will be circulating the thoughts which are now talked about in private 
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circles.”405  However, not unlike the rhetoric of the French salons’ retreat from the 
“tyranny of popular tastes,” the exclusive sensibilities of the magazine were almost 
immediately criticized for championing an “older, antidemocratic ideal of aristocratic 
enlightenment.”406 The journal, despite its reform agenda and historic and cultural 
significance, soon dimmed in a “cultural vacuum.”407  Charles Capper put it this way, 
“never before had an American periodical enveloped itself in a mist so inwardly turned 
yet democratically open-air.”408  
Correspondence between Fuller and Emerson reveals during her editorship at the 
Dial that she “wished to be more catholic, more open-minded and democratic than she 
was, not less.”  As Ann Douglas reports the exchange, “she told Emerson at one point 
that when he had criticized her for welcoming ‘talent’ and not holding out for ‘genius,’ 
she had been flattered.”409 Following the Boston Conversations for Women and her 
editorship at the Dial, Fuller would continue to adapt her experiments with conversation, 
moving to New York to join what would become the most widely read and most widely 
circulated periodical in the country, the New-York Tribune. From December 1844 to 
August 1846 Fuller served as the literary editor of the Tribune and the paper’s only 
female staffer. Working at a much faster pace than she ever had in New England, she 
wrote more than 250 pieces for the Tribune, most of which she signed with a star (*). 																																								 																					
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Unlike the Dial, the Tribune was not only historically and culturally important, but also a 
widely popular penny paper written for the middle-class. Scholars refer to the Tribune as 
a “unique institution” with a “mass audience” on its way to becoming “the preeminent 
site for robust middle-class public discourse.” The “high-toned penny press” was 
international in its reach and known for publishing the “leading minds of the age,” writes 
Adam Tuchinsky in his intellectual history of the periodical.410 (Karl Marx, to give one 
example, was retained as an international correspondent for the Tribune for ten years.)  
Founded during the confluence of the manufacturing, transportation, and 
communication revolutions, the Tribune “was part of the surge of penny papers that made 
an extensive variety of printed material available to ordinary readers.” However, like later 
opinion magazines it also “distilled for a general public many of the progressive reform 
ideas of the time.”411 In this new opportunity, Fuller again advocated yet again for 
journalism as another type of conversation. “Journalism both satisfied and deflected 
Fuller’s need for personal communication,” says Douglas. “Its relative informality was 
congenial to her; she believed it to be in style and tone very close to ‘conversation.’”412 
As Fuller described it, “newspaper writing is next door to conversation and should be 
conducted on the same principles.”413 Indeed, the only thing that stopped Fuller from 
further developing adaptations of conversation was her untimely death following an 
overseas assignment in Rome as America’s first female international war correspondent. 																																								 																					
410 Tuchinsky, 2009, ix and Capper, 2007.    
 
411 Tuchinsky, 2009, ix. 
 
412 Douglas, 1977, 281. 
 
413 S. Margaret Fuller, “American Literature: Its Position in the Present time, and  Prospects for the Future,” 
in Papers on Literature and Art (New York: Wiley and  Putnam, 1846), 2:140, 139, 140.  
	140	
“Fuller’s ‘conversational’ approach to journalism actually feeds her transnational 
imagination,” writes Leslie Eckel, “for it encourages the productive juxtaposition of 
ostensibly diverging viewpoints and generates a drive to seek common ground, whether 
linguistic or political.”414  
 
Conclusion  
Much like the present, nineteenth-century United States contained a “rich variety 
of competing subcultures, no one of which was more representatively ‘American’ than 
the others,” suggests Richard Teichgraeber. 415 Toggling between them was not easy; nor 
did it come naturally. Writing about Ralph Waldo Emerson’s optimistic reference to the 
“sublime thoughts” and “penny wisdom” that “all men” had, Teichgraeber notes that the 
quest to collate a shared culture in the United States has always been a tenuous one: “The 
concept of a shared national culture was…every bit as elusive during the antebellum 
period as it is now—and not just because of the political and economic differences that 
divided North and South.” 416  
Historians concerned not only with language and literature, but also war and 
politics bear out Teichgraeber’s assessment. Rejecting the terms “Jacksonian” and the 
“Age of Jackson” as too limited for the era, in his sweeping history of the period between 
1815-1848, the historian David Walker Howe stresses that this “was not a time of 
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consensus.”417 The period leading up to the mid nineteenth century was instead a time of 
“diverse, deep, and durable” changes whose “consequences certainly rivaled, and 
probably exceeded in importance, those of the revolutionary ‘information highway’ of 
our own time.”418 The response to these changes was an appeal to conversation as a 
model for rhetoric “in general.” By the middle half of the nineteenth century the question 
was not whether public American discourse was turning more conversational, but rather 
in what sense, and, most importantly, to what end. America’s “golden age” of 
conversation emerged at a time when the principles of democracy, equality, and 
individualism were all being examined. Whereas popular books on conversation describe 
conversation as “anti-rhetorical” and contrast the genre with winning an argument (i.e., 
“a weapon of war”), the antebellum American experience suggests public iterations of 
conversation were not so far removed from rivalry—or antagonism. Conversation was 
increasingly displayed as a response to recurring social conditions that necessitated 
compression, discovery, cultural mediation, and cultural reform.  
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CHAPTER 5 
STYLE: ON THE DIFFERENTIA BETWEEN  
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONVERSATION  
 
 
The modern audience wants the speaker to talk just as directly as he would in a chat, and in the 
same general manner that he would employ in speaking to one of them in conversation.  
 
-Dale Carnegie, Public Speaking, (1926) 
 
In the interstices of sentences and the intersections between speech and behavior, voters find data 
they consider decisive. 
-Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Eloquence in an Electronic Age, (1988) 
 
The twentieth-century rhetorical history of the United States can be read, at 
bottom, as an unresolved controversy over the conversational dynamic. On the one hand, 
the integration of personal experience, the democratic arbitration of complex and 
technical material, and increased audience engagement were all purported benefits of the 
developing dynamic. On the other hand, these were also some of the underlying sources 
of it faults. Having been brought out of the realm of ideas, where it mostly stayed in the 
nineteenth century, the conversational dynamic was enlisted more and more in the service 
of influence. The conversational ideal was integrated into the realm of policy and, for 
better and worse, percolated through the very core of American attitudes—not only about 
how ideas were best expressed, but also in tangible practices ranging from the appropriate 
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size of governmental power to the public’s expectations about what they were entitled to 
know.419 This was the era when the demand for public conversational styles cemented.420  
The president became the symbol of politics and—whether speaking on technical 
subjects in a “fireside chat” (Franklin Roosevelt), drawing close to citizens through 
“unprecedented” self-disclosure on television (Ronald Reagan), or maximizing a 
shoestring campaign budget with an unconventional appearance on the Arsenio Hall 
Show (Bill Clinton)—presidents and presidential candidates found new ways to reach 
voters, while helping to shape the conversational dynamic into what Robert Branham and 
W. Barnett Pearce call the “hallmark” of public address.421 Although some researchers 
argue that it wasn’t until President Reagan that “scholars have had to explain the 
effectiveness of the public use of what is ordinarily regarded as private conversational 
style,” if we put the conversational turn in a broader historical context it becomes clear 
that inversion of public and private styles was the product of something deeper—and 
more subtle—than any single medium or individual style.422  
John Fiske explains this evolution of culture as something akin to modest 
redistributions compounded and disrupted over time: “Structural changes at the level of 
the system itself, in whatever domain—that of law, of politics, of industry, of the 
family—occur only after the system has been eroded and weakened by the tactics of 
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everyday life.”423 As I began to show in the previous chapter, by the late nineteenth 
century a sustained curiosity in conversation had begun to infiltrate (and irritate) 
paradigmatic American models for all of rhetoric. Peter Gibian suggests, for example, 
that in Henry James’s novel The Bostonians (1885), “the divided nation’s struggle over 
shifting notions of public and private life” was defined, “most fundamentally, as a 
struggle between two modes of speech:” public oratory and private conversation.424   
As Gibian describes it, at the time of James’s writing, conversation in the private 
sphere was playing out the power dynamics of the public sphere. In the two primary 
characters of The Bostonians, “we see how every conversation about the redistribution of 
power in American social life also enacts a small-scale redistribution of power; here tea-
table chats, lovers’ dialogues, drawing room discussions, and the communal talk of 
women’s societies are revealed as force-fields in which the grand battles of national 
politics are being waged.”425 Although it would take years to fully materialize, changes 
such as those unfolding in drawing room discussions evidence some of the discomfort 
felt when language use starts to shift from a more immediate, functional level to a 
broader, structural one.  
One way to illustrate how these features of the public conversational dynamic are 
borne out in American public life is by looking at how audiences react when the style is 
roundly rejected. Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s first and only public remarks on the 
“Report on the Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016 Presidential Election” 
are an apt example of this. In his 10-minute prepared statement on May 29, 2019, which 																																								 																					
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followed a widely talked about two-year special inquiry into the Russian interference and 
potential conspiracy with the Trump Campaign, Mueller engaged in none of the 
maneuvers that have come to define our “conversational” culture. He took no questions 
following the statement. He made no attempts to rephrase or simplify his findings. And, 
perhaps most importantly, he rejected the notion that a testimony before Congress would 
compel him to share or make public anything that he had not already said. In other words, 
there would be no new revelations through “conversations” about the investigation: “the 
report is my testimony,” said Mueller.426 “Any testimony from this office would not go 
beyond our report. It contains our findings and analysis and the reasons for the decisions 
we made. We chose those words carefully and the work speaks for itself.”427  
Although Mueller’s report and statement are both largely written in “plain style,” 
which has dominated popular American speech since the end of the nineteenth century, 
they nevertheless bare a notable departure from the kind of nonchalant, freewheeling 
delivery audiences have come to expect. The public’s reactions to this absence were 
noteworthy and, given the context, rather surprising. One would think, for example, that 
given the polarized political climate, a measured if not uncomfortable delivery—
Mueller’s voice actually quivers—would come as a welcome reprieve from the stream of 
histrionics that comes out of both political parties right now. Instead, the unconventional 
(i.e., non-conversational) statement was described by the New York Times’ Editorial 
Board as “considered and temperate, its delivery passionless, if not robotic.”428  																																								 																					
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What is more, despite the brevity of the public statement and the mostly short, 
declarative sentences in which it was delivered, the Editorial Board of a leading 
American newspaper felt the need to “decode” Mueller’s announcement. (Here, one 
wonders if the length (448 pages) and style of the report set the tone for this need to 
“decode.” Though generally clear, the report veered in key moment into deliberate 
obliqueness, such as when Mueller intimated that they believed the president committed a 
crime without accusing him of one ("If we had confidence that the president clearly did 
not commit a crime, we would have said so.")) 429 Whatever their reason, the Editorial 
Board made it clear that Mr. Mueller needed a translator to turn legalese into plain 
language, saying: “If you tuned out for a moment—and who could blame you—you 
might have missed the import of messages encoded in Mr. Mueller’s cautious 
language.”430 The article then spells out the some of the key findings, translated in a 
conversational style, so that readers can finally let out a collective sigh of relief. Consider 
this excerpt from the editorial:  
After briefly reviewing his mandate, as laid out by Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein, Mr. Mueller announced that his team was 
“formally closing the special counsel’s office,” that he was leaving the 
Justice Department and that “beyond these few remarks, it is important 
that the office’s written work speak for itself.”  
Translation: I’m done with this political circus. To understand my 
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findings, read my report. Please don’t ask me to testify.431  
Although verbal style is often overlooked in contemporary rhetoric, I suggest it is 
especially important now, in part because it provides a uniquely stable unit of 
measurement. Unlike corporal gestures (whose capacity is one element that differentiates 
speech from writing) or later advances in audio/visual machinery (which make observing 
a rhetorical performance in absentia possible), language remains a constant in which style 
is performed—regardless of medium. Highlighting this centrality of verbal style in 
composition, Chris Holcomb and Jimmie Killingsworth point out that “in written rather 
than spoken texts, style is the moment of performance, the moment when what we say is 
realized through language and communicated to our readers.”432  
Because the public conversational style that surfaced as a dominant form of public 
communication in the twentieth century is more emblematic of a larger cultural system 
than any singular trait, we stand to gain much from comparing examples across 
mediums. Rather than focusing on technology as the organizing factor, in other words, 
the particularity of style may actually help us broaden our understanding of the 
assortment of iterations that animate the conversational turn. By looking at the different 
materials of public conversation as indicative of something larger and broader than “just” 
a technological medium (e.g. television) or “just” the ability of the speaker, we can begin 
to articulate some of the deeper cultural implications that are bound up in the differences 
between public and private conversational styles.  
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The rhetorical tradition has paved the way for this approach (some of which I 
sketched in Chapter 2). Using twentieth and twenty-first century examples as a way to 
ground my claims, I conclude this study by performing three rhetorical analyses that 
highlight and explain the centrality of the conversational turn in American public life. 
The first analysis, “Dinner with Cupid,” introduces two degrees of style—one narrow, the 
other broad—and serves as a microcosm of the broader conversational dynamic. It 
illustrates how, even within the context of impromptu conversation, participants and 
viewers instinctively know there is no such thing as raw (or blank) linguistic material and 
how, knowing this, they use that material to signal, read, and make judgments about each 
other (whether correctly or not). The second analysis features a space midway between 
formal (e.g., governmental) and informal (e.g., mass media) influences. Using early 
editorial debates over the direction of National Geographic Society and its magazine, I 
show how, as a matter of editorial policy, the integration of conversational style and 
metaphor served to help launch National Geographic Society into its influential role as 
“the most widely read source of general scientific information in America.”433 In the third 
and final analysis, I turn to a landmark Supreme Court case, Obergefell v. Hodges, as a 
way to illustrate just how profoundly entrenched the controversial dynamic is in the 
United States. In particular, I argue that the Constitution animates some of the structural 
foundations and influences of the conversational dynamic by placing a sovereign 
individual with rights in tension with a public majority—without settling on an answer of 
how this tension should be resolved.  
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Taken together, these three analyses reveal patterns that help to explain key 
differences between the modern, public conversational dynamic and earlier forms of 
rhetoric. These include:  
 
The Use of Spectacle as Insight  
The conversational dynamic creates opportunities for spectacle, which are thought to 
reveal valuable sources of information. The spectacle may take the primary form of 
entertainment or consumer item, but it also is thought to disclose character, expertise, 
inner motivations, and things “as they really are.” The conversational dynamic 
choreographs opportunities for (apparent or actual) impromptu interactions, which 
provide the basis for this spectacle.  
Illustration: “Dinner with Cupid” 
 
The Practical Development of Conversation as an Arbiter of Information  
In contrast to philosophical conversation (which is premised on a “clash of ideas” 
discovered or brought to light in the to and fro of conversation), the public conversational 
dynamic is used to frame complicated, technical information in a simpler, brighter, and 
more appealing manner. The extent to which the dynamic is employed as an arbiter of 
information as opposed to a generator of ideas makes it more or less conversational in 
the traditional sense.  
Illustration: National Geographic Magazine  
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Anticipated Lack of Participation  
The public conversational dynamic invites engagement from people who will never 
actually enter into the discussion. However, some engagement is usually expected, and 
the conversation can change course as a result. The extent to which audiences do or do 
not participate or change the course of the discussion makes the dynamic more or less 
“conversational.”  
Illustration: Obergefell v Hodges (2015)  
 
ANALYSIS 1: 
“Dinner with Cupid” 
Understanding Verbal and Cultural Styles 
 
On July 26, 2019, the Boston Globe’s Sunday Magazine blind date column, 
“Dinner with Cupid,” ran an article entitled “Blind date: ‘I’m uncommonly ambitious for 
an academic.’” The premise of the popular column is simple, and the invitation for future 
readers to participate is included at the bottom of every column: “Go on a blind date. 
We’ll pick up the tab. Fill out in application at bostonglobe.com/cupid. Follow us on 
Twitter at @dinnerwithcupid.”434 Left unstated, but obvious to readers and participants, is 
the agreement to describe the details of the date, which are then published in the Globe’s 
Sunday Magazine. In the July 26 column, contributing editor Melissa Schorr compiled 
the details from a blind date between J.R. Scott, 23, a PhD student at MIT and Hannah 
McDonnell, 22, a rising law student at Northeastern. (Following the format of the 
column, in this analysis I refer to participants by their first name rather than last.) 
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Other than headings, which arrange and guide the flow of the column, the content 
consists entirely of J.R. and Hannah’s answers. Although written after the fact, these 
serve as direct quotes. Many of the answers only present the exchange in a loose form; 
some of categories are presented as unformatted bullet points (“Last thing he read: 
Churchill: Walking with Destiny”) (no italics in original) or consist of a smattering of 
ideas joined by an ellipsis (“He was dressed very professionally and he was tan…from 
California.”)435 In addition to a print version, the Globe Magazine column is published 
once a week in digital version of The Boston Globe. Like all Globe articles, the digital 
version accepts reader comments. At the time of this writing, “Blind date: ‘I’m 
uncommonly ambitious for an academic,” had 138 comments. I include all these features 
in my analysis that follows, which I use to ground my claim that the rhetorical tradition is 
the proper place to base a new theory of public conversation.  
“Dinner with Cupid” describes itself a “one part social experiment, one part 
schadenfreude for the smug married crowd, and one part journalistic attempt to document 
that fundamental aspect of the human condition—the quest for love—often left 
unexamined in the news section.”436 Embedded into this social experiment is a cultural 
assumption that places conversation in general and style in particular at its center. Here is 
how it happens. Both participants and readers look for what Erving Goffman describes as 
the “dramatic realization” that makes an individual’s activity (or “performance”) 
perceptible before others. “While in the presence of others, the individual typically 
infuses his activity with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory 																																								 																					
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facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual’s activity is 
to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express 
during the interaction what he wishes to convey.”437 In the example of the Boston 
Magazine column, a conversation over dinner between two relatively “equally-matched” 
strangers is believed to disclose enough information during the interaction that 
participants and readers are able to draw broader conclusions about a person’s character, 
compatibility, and even long-term romantic potential.438 Based on their date, J.R. deduced 
that Hannah “had an optimistic outlook on life” (which he appreciated), but that they 
“would be better suited as friends than romantic partners.” Hannah found J.R. “very 
intelligent” and “really enjoyed getting to know him;” however, she, too, thought they 
would be “just friends.”  
Although dinner participants have tone, expression, body language, and other 
non-verbal cues to go on, readers of the column are left to rely on strictly verbal cues 
(beyond a headshot) to judge the “performance of self” that Goffman famously theorizes. 
As Holcomb and Killingsworth, point out, one difference between performances in 
writing as opposed to in person is that they shift the burden of disclosure: “in written or 
printed text, where writers lack access to the communicative resources of oral delivery, 
style must shoulder much of the interactional load.”439 They seemed to have little trouble 
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with this limitation (or, more precisely, readers seemed to have little trouble crafting 
judgments based on verbal cues that were given to them.)  
Here are some conclusions, drawn from readers’ comments, about J.R.’s 
“dramatic realization” as described in “Blind date: ‘I’m uncommonly ambitious for an 
academic.”  
• “I wonder what his guy friends are like and if they razz him for his 
Brahmin 1700’s demeanor.” (yogasong44) 
• “It sounded more like a business meeting than a date.” (newsyoucanuse); 
• “I don’t think I’d have lasted five minutes listening to this guy.” 
(theblackprince1)  
• The poor kid. I feel bad for him. He thinks he has it all together.” 
(fordpem)  
•  “Someone swallowed a thesaurus…...run, Hannah, run….” (Not-My-
Dogs-Name)  
•  “He must be a real hoot at cocktail parties.” (OrrScores)  
•  “If he used that kind of language through the whole dinner, she is being 
exceptionally kind.” (Goldsky)  
• “I think he’s looking for an academic equal that he can have this banter 
with on the regular.” (babyinthecorner)  
• “I have a Ph.D. and never spoke like that.” (michaelrb)  
What struck readers so much about J.R.’s verbal style? More importantly, how, 
based on the few conversational snippets J.R. Scott and Hannah McDonnell volunteered 
about the date and each other, can Globe readers seem so sure about what this “data” 
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reveals? To answer these questions one must begin with a view of style that “lumps” 
rather than “splits” verbal forms with other cultural elements. Holcomb and  
Killingsworth explain one feature of this method in their chapter in The Centrality of 
Style. They identify verbal forms and cultural elements as two types of style “—one 
narrow, the other broad”—which, although arbitrarily divided in most of the current 
scholarship on style, were historically theorized together.440 “The narrow version,” write 
Holcomb and Killingsworth, “identifies style with verbal style and considers a writer’s 
choices at the level of word, phrase, and clause, although more recently it has come 
increasingly to include features beyond the sentence, including point of view, discourse 
structure, and genre.”441 The second view of style “defines style more broadly as ‘ways of 
doing’ and takes within its purview virtually any artifact or practice that has 
communicative potential: fashion, music, electronic and digital media, deportment, food, 
and so on.”442   
Even though these two versions “rarely overlap” in contemporary scholarship, in 
cultural practices (such as “Dinner with Cupid”) they are instinctively applied. For 
example, if the application of the “narrow version” of style means, as Holcomb and 
Killingsworth suggest, paying attention to J.R. and Hannah’s language independently of 
other considerations, then Globe readers, whether consciously or unconsciously, were 
keen to do so. Among the specific words and phrases they singled out their comments 
include: “prattle;” “anachronistic;” “We sat in the ‘plein air’ area of the restaurant;” “I 																																								 																					
440 Chris Holcomb and M. Jimmie Killingsworth, “Teaching Style as Cultural Performance,” in The 
Centrality of Style, ed. Mike Duncan and Star Medzerian Vanguri (Fort Collins: The WAC Clearinghouse 
and Parlor Press, 2013), 119.  
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now understand why statisticians use Poisson processes to model traffic flows;” “I 
mentioned the oft-quoted Joe Namath remark…” “We arranged for cars to pick us up;” “I 
have an anachronistic tendency toward formality;” and “I’m uncommonly ambitious for 
an academic, and looking for someone who will challenge me to achieve great things, yet 
support me unconditionally along the way.” 
Although according to both respondents the date went well (Hannah rated it an 
“A,” and J.R. gave it an “A-“), and although each said gracious things about the other 
(Hannah said, “He is very intelligent. He is at MIT, and knows a lot about finance and 
economics,” while J.R noted: “I appreciated that she had an optimistic outlook on life”), 
neither Hannah, nor J.R., nor Globe readers seemed to think the couple had any hope for 
a future together. What went “wrong” at the restaurant? Perhaps it was not so much J.R.’s 
“verbosity” (as one Globe commentator referred it) but rather his verbal style that created 
the impression of J.R. being so culturally out-of-sync.  
Sometimes what is signaled (or, to use Goffman’s phrase, “performed”) is 
deliberate. For example, when J.R. explains his initial interest in “Dinner with Cupid,” he 
gratuitously reveals some of his reading habits: “Cupid piqued my interest—to my 
knowledge, The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times don’t have comparable 
blind-dating columns.” While it is unclear what the original connection among The Wall 
Street Journal, the Financial Times and “Dinner with Cupid” was thought to be, the 
answer works as a “sign-vehicle”—something Goffman describes as a carrier for 
conveying information that permits others to know “in advance what he will expect of 
them and what they may expect of him.”443 In this case, the two newspapers, who have 
																																								 																					
443 Goffman, 1959, 1. 
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been called by news reporters as “the manliest of all” the periodicals, signal his view of 
himself as an aspiring financier and align with the expectation of how he wished to be 
approached.444 The most recent book he read (Churchill: Walking with Destiny) is long 
(1,105 pages), but also newly released (2018), suggesting his habits are active. Hannah, 
meanwhile, included a quirky hobby (juggling) in a description of herself, perhaps as a 
way to interject lightheartedness into her list of interests, which were led by politics and 
business. (Although juggling was never mentioned, readers revealingly noticed this detail 
and wished to bring it back in the comments, responding: “Why didn’t juggling come up 
in conversation? Opportunity lost.”)  
Other elements of stylistic material may be subtler, however, and may not be 
consciously selected at all. For instance, Jeanne Fahnestock outlines the numerous 
historical layers of the English language and their difference in word derivations—all of 
which, whether consciously selected or not, denote entirely different potentials for 
conveying social meanings. Contemporary English has a wealth of synonyms stemming 
from the combined contact and influence of Germanic, Greek, Latin, French, Celtic, 
Dutch, Spanish, African, Native American, and Scandinavian languages, among many 
others.445 As Fahnestock tells it, “English picked up words, as it picked up goods and 
knowledge, from virtually every culture on the globe.”446  
What is most relevant to the “Dinner with Cupid” column is not simply the 
number of variations and origins that are available to an English speaker (and writer), but 																																								 																					
444 Laura Hazard Owen, “ ‘If the Financial Times were a person, it would be a man.’ Here’s how the paper 
is trying to change that.” Neiman Lab, April 3, 2018.  
 
445 Fahnestock, 2011, 24-32.  
 
446 Fahnestock, 2011, 29. 
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rather their entrenched associations with levels of formality, sincerity, and modes of 
address. For instance, the three largest lexicons in the English language stem from Old 
English (OE), French, and Latin and Greek. These different groupings all signal 
distinctive levels of conceptual and relational distance. “The informal spoken language is 
filled with words derived from Germanic, Scandinavian, and sometimes French,” says 
Fahnestock; “the formal written language has proportionately more Latin and Greek 
words, a distribution that has marked consequences for the vocabulary of persuasion.”447  
OE, which is predominantly Germanic in its origin, comprises the majority of core words 
in the English language.448 As a result of being the simplest, the oldest, and the widest in 
use, passages that are dominated by words from the OE core are typically associated with 
familiarity and truthfulness.449 “This effect occurs because core words, the oldest in the 
language, are also the oldest in the experience of native speakers; they are the first heard, 
the first spoken, the first read, the first written. They are associated with simple messages, 
and often with immediate, familial, and physical contexts,” writes Fahnestock.450  
In contrast, Latin and Greek are associated with formal, written language. 
Although two-thirds of words in Modern English are borrowed “directly from Latin, of 
from other Latin-derived vernacular, especially French, Spanish, and Italian,” they are 
not the most frequently used.451  Instead, they can be found in the formal settings of 
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academic writing, medicine, and law. Similarly, whereas words derived from French (a 
vernacular offshoot of Latin) are sometimes used to elevate spoken language, they are 
above all associated with elegance and order (compare, for example, the French-derived 
privilege with the OE right). 452  
The difference in word origin and their frequency of use noticeably impacted the 
“Dinner with Cupid” participants’ persuasive power, if not with each other (all readers 
know is that the participants both decided to be “just be friends”), then certainly with 
their readers. Consider, for example, the difference in how Hannah and J.R. describe each 
other:  
• Hannah: “He is very intelligent. He is at MIT, and knows a lot about finance and 
economics.” 
• J.R. “Hannah is an ebullient and amiable person.”  
Hannah could have used the word “smart” (which has the more familiar, Old 
English/Germanic core) but instead chose the synonym “intelligent” (Latin in origin with 
more formal and learned connotations). Although the difference in formality is notable, 
her choice is also fitting. The Latin core “intelligent” is in keeping with J.R.’s signal of 
how he wishes to be approached, a dynamic Fahnestock (and others, including Kenneth 
Burke and Michel Foucault) theorize as “bids for alignment.” Highlighting the 
“fundamental interactive dimension of all language…attitudes and bids for alignment are 
encoded in every language choice, and the rhetor’s presence and relation with an 
audience are the unerasable ground of all discourse.”453 J.R. makes it clear that he wishes 
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to be approached, to use his language, as an “uncommonly ambitious academic.” What is 
particularly illustrative about the “Dinner with Cupid” column, however, is that the 
speaker—regardless of who the speaker is or what the speaker says— stands in relation to 
multiple audiences at the same time. What is worth paying attention to here is that it 
reveals one of the core differences between artful conversation and the public 
conversational dynamic: in the case of the public dynamic, the audience never consists of 
just the participants in the conversation.454 If we return to Hannah’s verbal style, it 
becomes clearer that the depiction of her date is appropriate not only for J.R., but also 
(and perhaps primarily) Globe readers. The use of the word “intelligent,” for example, 
takes J.R. into account, but it also fits into the broader context of what she is describing to 
readers of the column (his academic competency generally followed by details that 
supports this specifically (“He is at MIT, and knows a lot about finance and 
economics.”)). Not only that but, by referring to J.R. with the pronoun “he,” she distances 
herself from her date and further aligns herself with the audience of readers.455 Taken 
together, her description (which is built around colloquial language (i.e., “knows a lot 
about”)) invites readers in by sounding conversational.  
By contrast, J.R.’s combination of words, “ebullient” (Latin core) and “amiable” 
(French core) sound as if they belong on the written page (especially the word ebullient) 
																																								 																					
454 Samuel L. Becker discusses an example of such as scenario with President Eisenhower’s “key-hole 
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and, despite their friendly denotation, seem somewhat detached from what he is 
describing. Indeed, referring to Hannah by her first name here (“Hannah is an ebullient 
and amiable person”), J.R. actually stresses his impressions of her rather than the 
impressions that she gives off.456 The focus, in other words, remains on him and his 
descriptions rather than on Hannah or Globe readers. This is not to suggest, however, that 
referring to Hannah by a pronoun (she) or describing her with other adjectives (say, 
“sunny” and “friendly,” both OE core words) would have been an outright improvement. 
Because “there is no such thing as ‘raw’ subject matter,” there is also no such thing as an 
“absolute” improvement by change in style. 457  Citing the law of compensation, Holcomb 
and Killingsworth advise that “with every change something is lost and something is 
gained.”458 For example, the words “ebullient” and “amiable” are more precise in their 
descriptive power and, as such, have the potential to generate a more vivid picture in 
readers’ minds than the more common, perhaps bordering on generic, adjectives “sunny 
and friendly.” Indeed, the amount of responses J.R.’s verbal style provoked suggests his 
more erudite word choices are in fact what left the greatest impression. What is more, 
referring to Hannah by her first name could also be interpreted as a sign of respect, and a 
balance between an overly formal option (Ms. McDonnell) and a less formal, reader-
oriented “she.”  
This kind of stylistic analysis, though revealing, may seem disproportionately 
detailed for a dating column. We know, for example, that in 2018 Globe readers spent, on 
average, a total of two minutes visiting the site (this includes time engaged on all news 																																								 																					
456 For more on the difference in these two kinds of sign activity (gives vs. gives off) see Goffman, 1959, 2.  
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articles, not just the Boston Magazine feature).459 If for no other reason than practical 
constraints, we can safely assume from this that readers are not dissecting pronouns and 
word origins—at least not consciously. What happened, then, at the broader level of 
style? It may be impossible to pinpoint the moment in which Globe readers extended 
their analysis from the narrow or verbal style to the broad or cultural style, since the 
differences between the two versions are arbitrarily created. Verbal style is a type of 
cultural style and cultural style includes verbal style. 460  However, beyond the theory 
advanced by sociolinguist Penelope Eckert and described by Holcomb and Killingsworth 
in the pedagogical frame, what we have in “Dinner with Cupid” is evidence that 
participants and readers instinctively paid attention to both.  
Readers (who had no information other than the column to go on) pieced together 
a combination of word choice, word origin, deportment, facts, interpretations of 
expressed attitudes, and a single visual cue to make broader judgments about the 
participants’ upbringing, experiences, and views of the world. Without any specific 
encouragement or prompting to do so, readers judged J.R. as  “a sesquipedalian,” “a 
snooozzzzz,” “insufferable,” “pretentious,” “insecure,” “obnoxious,” “competitive,” 
“impressive,” “a real Black and Decker,” “pompous,” “rather full of himself,” “insecure,” 
“a riot,” “probably nice,” “perfectly decent,” “a sweet guy,” and someone who “must 
have been…challenging” and “precocious” as child. Hannah occupied much less 
attention in the readers’ comments. In contrast to J.R.’s culturally “transgressive” style, 
her speech followed cultural norms of informality and conversational commentary (He’s 																																								 																					
459 Digital News Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center, July 23, 2019 https://www.journalism.org/fact-
sheet/digital-news/ and accompanying State of the News Media Methodology Pew Research Center, July 
23, 2019, https://www.journalism.org/2019/07/23/state-of-the-news-media-methodology/ . 
460 See especially Holcomb and Killingworth, 2013, 120-124.  
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still a Patriots fan (thank God) although he’s from California); readers awarded it 
accordingly. They spoke of her as “wonderful,” “kind,” “gracious,” “wise,” “sensitive,” 
“a lovely person,” and someone who appeared to have “excellent manners.”  
If there was one overarching critique of J.R., it was that he sounded unnatural, 
which also acted as a data point for readers. Indeed, the idea that the greatest art conceals 
its art goes all the way back to the Greeks. Following his observation that propriety is “a 
matter of contraction or expansion,” Aristotle writes that, “authors should compose 
without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially, but naturally. (The latter 
is persuasive, the former the opposite; for if [artifice is obvious] people become resentful, 
as at someone plotting against them, just as they are at those adulterating wines.)461 
Comments from “Dinner with Cupid” (which cast J.R.’s verbal style as artificial) serve as 
an example of this resentful reaction to artifice, not least because J.R.’s verbal style was 
all readers had to go on:  
• “OK, JR, we get it, you have a good vocabulary—now get over yourself!” 
(user_1572434)  
• “Be wary of those who try to impress with faulty phrases like this: “We sat in the 
‘plein air’ area of the restaurant.””  (thot)  
• “I'm actually thinking of using this column with the interns I supervise, as a great 
example of verbosity vs. clean prose. J.R., you don't need two adjectives for 
something; settle on one. And you don't need to pile it on, i.e. your anachronistic 
tendency toward formality.” (BeeJayDee)  
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• “ ‘We arranged for cars to pick us up’= called an Uber for the rest of us  
plebeians.” (ramsen51)  
Feedback can turn into its own conversation and, as Susan Herbst describes 
contemporary public speech, “media now wreak havoc with the text.”462 In this way, the 
performance that Goffman describes as taking place “during the interaction” may not be 
contained as it once was. While the stakes are obviously much lower in a dating column 
than other modes of speech (presidential speech, for example, is now “endlessly” sliced 
into sound bites and reconstructed and recirculated in “ways that are beyond the control 
of the president”), the potential for disruptive, multi-vocal redirection is a constant 
feature of digital rhetoric, which—depending on how you view it—makes the medium 
more or less conversational.463  
In the July 2019 “Dinner with Cupid” column readers seemed just as willing to 
interact with others’ interpretations as they did with the original text, thereby starting 
their own “conversation” or perhaps merely changing the subject. Of course, the structure 
in digital forums is different from face-to-face conversations. In person conversations are 
conventionally organized around turn taking and what Stephen Levinson calls “adjacency 
pairs” (e.g. question/answer; greeting/greeting; joke/laughter).464 In digital contexts 
(which commonly function as a hybrid form of written and oral communication), this 
dynamic between timing and opportunity is more difficult to exploit, however. As Chris 
Holcomb points out in the context of humor, when everyone can talk at the same time but 																																								 																					
462 Cited in Jennifer Mercieca,“Barack Obama and the Postrhetorical Presidency” in Columns to 
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no one knows when a message will be read, the evaluative information conveyed by 
something such as laughter may only arrive in a piecemeal fashion, if at all. To offset 
what is lost in face-to-face interactions, participants enlist written features, such as 
typography and space, to “to mimic features of oral discourse.” 465 For example, in the 
“Dinner with Cupid” comments, SwishyTail728 wrote:  
• “LOL! Some of the comments are HILARIOUS! Just because he writes this way 
doesn’t mean he actually speaks that way during conversations. I will admit, the 
first thought that popped into my head was a sarcastic, “Aren’t you a romantic 
devil?”  
The use of all caps and exclamation points in “LOL!” and “HILARIOUS!” 
suggests vocal features of a rise in pitch and an increase in stress. However, it also 
indicates additional social and cultural information. Statistically, the person who wrote 
this is likely to be older, since, according to a 2015 Facebook data, only 1.9 percent of 
Facebook users still used the acronym LOL. The median age of people using LOL is also 
older than any of the three laughter types the social media platform identified (emoji, 
haha, and hehe).466   
Suggestive of style’s implication in the entirety of the rhetorical enterprise, 
readers anticipated cues of what snippets of J.R’s verbal style might mean for future, 
imagined scenarios:  
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• “I think JR should put pen to paper in the form of fiction with the main character 
being himself spouting on in his most entertaining fashion. I find him hilarious.” 
(work2live)  
• “This young man is a riot. Anachronistic, no doubt. He must have been a 
challenging, precocious child. With a proper 21st century mentor, he’ll overcome 
his bow-tied infatuation with words, so as not to expose the cognitive deficiencies 
of his dinner guests, and embrace the more whimsical modalities of colloquial 
banter…and perhaps get laid.” (Spacevegan1)  
Numerous Globe respondents used his conversational skills as a proxy for his 
amorous style and weighed in on subjects that are not typically made explicit in the 
column or its commentary. (“If he’s formal at dinner he’ll be formal in the bedroom” 
(Potlemac).) Others reveled in the comic potential for his affected style to contrast with 
erotic abandon. As one reader admitted, “I wish they hit it off and enjoyed wild sex—so 
we could read JR’s academic account” (telex108). Having invested so much in their 
detailed critiques of J.R.’s verbal style, commenters interestingly seemed more, not less, 
concerned with his overall romantic fortunes. 
Clearly, Globe readers had no trouble linking verbal style with broader social and 
cultural dynamics. As a cultural habit, that is what we do.467 In fact, the “Dinner with 
Cupid” example may be particularly illustrative precisely because it is not a polished 
piece of prose, but rather an abridged format that is structured around spontaneity (e.g., 
readers’ comments) and lack of foreknowledge (e.g., a blind date). Yet, despite the 
ubiquity of this practice the scholarship devoted to understanding the default mode of 																																								 																					
467 For an example of how this tendency plays out in politics see, W. Lance Bennett, “The Personalization 
of Politics,” 2012.  
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rhetorical conversation is remarkably scattershot. The consequence of this arbitrariness is 
that it creates not so much a gap in rhetorical studies as a giant blind spot. Despite 
championing style as the organizing factor for the twenty-first century, and despite 
identifying conversation—not oratory—as the model for all of rhetoric, scholars in 
rhetoric, composition, and communication studies have demonstrated a noticeable 
reluctance, if not outright aversion, in formally associating rhetoric and conversation.468 
This study joins a limited, but growing, number of scholars who have reintegrated the 
canon of style as a means for judging and understanding modern communication.  
 
ANALYSIS 2: 
National Geographic Magazine (Washington DC, 1888) 
 
How a scientific journal took on the role of “conversationalist” and evolved into an  
unofficial arbiter of science, foreign policy, and popular imagination. 
 
Founded in 1888 as a scholarly, scientific journal, National Geographic would 
eventually become a leading American source for popular knowledge about scientific 
research and the global exploration. Maps historian Susan Schulten deems it “one of the 
most ubiquitous sources of information and images about the world in American 
culture.”469 Phillip Pauly, a historian of science, refers to it as “the most widely read 
source of general scientific information in America.”470 And anthropologist Catherine 
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Lutz and sociologist Jane Collins call the magazine “one of the most culturally valued 
and potent media vehicles shaping American understandings of…the world outside the 
United States.”471 Exemplifying its broad reach and central place in twentieth-century 
popular imagination, academic articles about National Geographic are more often found 
under the rubric of American Studies and history rather than the more obvious suspects of 
geography, physical science, or even photography (for which the publication would 
become perhaps most famous). By the 1980s, six U.S. Presidents had contributed to the 
magazine: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, 
Dwight Eisenhower, and Lyndon Johnson.472 One of the most famous moments of the 
Cold War, the “Kitchen Debate,” is also recounted in the pages of National Geographic 
by then Vice President Richard Nixon. Here is an excerpt from the boisterous exchange 
in Moscow:  
Khrushchev: On politics, we will never agree with you. For instance, Mikoyan 
likes very peppery soup. I do not. But this does not mean that we do not get along.  
Nixon: You can learn from us, and we can learn from you. There must be a free 
exchange. Let the people choose the kind of house, the kind of soup, the kind of ideas 
that they want.  
Although at first glance this appears to be a relatively simple instance of cultural 
diplomacy (where the clash between Communism and Capitalism is somehow mediated 
through an analogous like or dislike of peppery soup), a closer look suggests it is heat and 
intensity that is actually driving the dialogue forward. While it is true that the impromptu 																																								 																					
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interchange between Vice President Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev took 
place in front of an American model kitchen at an American cultural exhibition at the 
U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it is also true that the interlocutors were leaders of the same 
two Super Powers at the center of what William Faulkner identified as the single question 
of the time: When will I be blown up?473  
National Geographic provides a window into the “masculine” elements—the 
heat, the competition, the intensity—that may course through conversation. Too often 
these dynamics have been excluded from discussions of twentieth century mass media, in 
part because of the dominance of the useful, if incomplete, framework of “cool” (i.e., 
feminine and intimate) and “hot” (i.e., masculine and concentrated) mediums. It is not 
necessary, however, to completely do away with a contrast in mediums in order to 
appreciate that conversation can flourish within both. Indeed, both Marshall McLuhan’s 
famously theorized “cool” medium of television and “hot” medium of radio were adapted 
to conversational style, despite being categorized as opposites. The “Kitchen Debate,” 
which appears in a 36-page story by Nixon published in the December 1959 issue of 
National Geographic, is one example of this crossover.  
“Cool” media, according to McLuhan, involves a “total situation” that is marked 
by high participation (e.g., leaving much for the audience to fill in or complete).474 
Television is the most obvious twentieth-century example. “Hot” media, in contrast, is 
noted for its intensity and thereby lower participation. It involves users with its high 
definition of a single human sense (for instance, radio/listening), yet it keeps them 																																								 																					
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“detached, as if at arms length.”475 In Eloquence in an Electronic Age, Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson incorporates this framework to explain the shift from the “flame of oratory” to 
“the fireside chat.” She writes, “where once we expected messages laced with 
impassioned appeals, now we respond positively to a cooler, more conversational art; 
where once audiences expected to be conquered by an art bent on battle, today’s 
television viewer expects instead an intimate rhetoric of conciliation.”476  
 
Intensifying Contemporary Views of Conversation  
In its fullest form, conversation is equipped to unite the heat of one medium with 
the intimacy of another.477 Indeed, it is not incidental that conversation was historically 
associated with sex, seduction, and play.478 In the context of National Geographic, this 
backdrop works to show how some of the (“masculine”) qualities that made the magazine 
and membership organization so successful are, while perhaps not typical of the 
twentieth-century, hardly unique to the genre of conversation. “Mass culture,” write Lutz 
and Collins, “is associated with the feminine because—in stereotype—it is 
sentimentalized, it is merely consumed, and it requires less intellect…and high culture 
with the masculine for the opposite reasons.” 479 By contrast, “the Geographic’s gender 
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associations are masculine, both because of its content (adventure, science) and its 
cultural power and position.” 480  
In his study on the legendary race toward the North Pole (for which the National 
Geographic Society was a major sponsor), historian of science Michael Robinson 
suggests, for instance, that constructions of “manliness” were central to explorers’ 
fundraising and media successes. “Different forms of rhetoric—scientific, manly, and 
moral—functioned as explorers’ most powerful tools because stories, more than 
specimens of scientific observations, constituted the real currency of Arctic 
exploration.”481 Frederick Cook (who claimed to have arrived at the North Pole in April 
1908) and Robert Peary (who claimed to have arrived at the North Pole in April 1909) 
“built their personas on a model of manliness that had little to do with science,” writes 
Robinson.482 How did this appeal to conversation and masculinity work within the 
broader context of the magazine? In the following section I will explain the role of both.  
 
Stylistic Value in National Geographic  
There are primarily two explanations for National Geographic’s launch to fame in 
the early twentieth century. One is geo-political. The other is rhetorical. Historians stress 
that the Spanish-American War (1898) vaulted America’s role in international politics, 
and, along with it, spurred Americans’ newfound interest in geography; however, as the 
magazine tells its own history, it is was also a hard-fought editorial decision advocating a 																																								 																					
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deliberate change in writing style that expanded the scope and reach of the magazine.483 
Writing for National Geographic, Beth Foster suggests that the first and most important 
step in its transformation was “the use of first-person narrative and straightforward, 
simple writing.”484 The swapping of stories and use of narratives is something on which 
“everyday conversation thrives,” says Neal Norrick.485  In the case of the Geographic, it 
was also a method by which to spur public interest in expeditions.486 The changes in style 
were not merely a dressing, however. Making the journal more conversational also meant 
redefining (and expanding) what “scientific research,” “geography,” and experiences of 
the world entailed.  As Pauly puts how the first term was framed in the Geographic, 
“scientific research…was not an esoteric activity that the public should appreciate but 
could never fully understand. It was romantic exploration of the unknown, and the 
adventure was at least as important as the information gathered.”487  
The editors sought to “diffuse” geographic research to a wider audience by 
focusing on geography as “description” and making the reading experience more “bright 
and interesting.”488 In the words of its long-time editor, Gilbert H. Grosvenor, the 
magazine and its accompanying membership society intended to “transform the Society’s 
																																								 																					
483 See also Pauly, 1979; Susan Schulten. “The Making of National Geographic-Science, Culture, and 
Expansionism.” American Studies 41:1 (Spring 2000): 5-29.  
 
484 Pauly, 1979; 517; Beth Foster, “Evolution of National Geographic,” National Geographic, 2014. The 
National Geographic Society currently emphasizes “storytelling” as a part of its self-definition. 
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/about-us/ . 
485 Neal Norrick. Conversational Joking: Humor in Everyday Talk. Bloomington: University of Indiana 
Press, 1993. 
486 See especially Robinson, 2008.  
 
487 Pauly, 1979, 518. 
 
488 Phillip Pauly quoting Alexander Graham Bell in “The World and All That is in It: The National 
Geographic Society, 1888-1918,” American Studies 31.4 (Autumn 1979): 520.  
 
	172	
Magazine from one of cold geographic fact…into a vehicle for carrying the living, 
breathing, human-interest truth about this great world of ours.”489 While this and other 
editorial choices diminished the society’s status among professionals, they also bolstered 
its reputation with the general public as “an arbiter of science.”490 
The National Geographic’s considered response to this role of arbiter was to 
embrace the role of a conversationalist under the theme “THE WORLD AND ALL 
THAT IS IN IT.” By this I mean not only that the magazine sought to present an 
informal, “bright” and “interesting” tone, although it did aim for that, but also that it 
deliberately widened its scope of available topics. Conversation, more than systematic 
argument, was suited to deliver a “direct” and “lively” equivalent to the cabinet of 
curiosities, a modern form of which the National Geographic aspired to embody.491 
“People wanted immediate experience of the world,” writes Philip Pauly in his early 
history of National Geographic, “not the systematic lessons professionals sought to 
provide.”492 As conversation manuals repeatedly stressed, the flexibility to flit from topic 
to topic (i.e., to follow where a conversation led rather than to drill down on a single 
topic) is central to conversation. This is in part because of its spontaneous nature. Since 
the need for “at least apparent” spontaneity in conversation is so fundamental to the 
genre, the need to avoid excessively focused, pedantic, or technical topics became a 
recurrent theme in polite conversation.493 In the case of National Geographic this 
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embrace of THE WORLD AND ALL THAT IS IN IT meant consciously moving in “the 
opposite direction” from the narrow scope in which it was founded.494 Where the Society 
was originally “part of the effort to develop an independent subject matter for 
geography,” Grosvenor and his staff sought to enlarge it. As Pauly describes it, “by 
including mammoth skulls, wild animals, and primitive tribes in addition to geography, 
Grosvenor was extending the life of the old rubric of natural history into a time when it 
was rapidly being parceled up among various specialties.”495  
What is more, although the conflict over editorial and membership policy caused 
a rift between those who welcomed its expansion and those seeking to enhance its status 
as a professional journal of geography (when asked to join the editorial board in 1901, for 
example, William Morris Davis responded with a note saying: “Declined: couldn’t 
approve general policy of popularization at the expense of science.”), what was not 
controversial at the time was the magazine’s close ties to governmental policy.496 As 
early as 1900, National Geographic was already functioning as an unofficial “organ of 
science and politics” by enlisting a combination of illustrations, maps, and text “to 
inform, to entertain, and to defend the nation’s new interventionist posture.”497  
Susan Schulten is one of many who would note the magazine’s remarkable 
achievement at being able to use “geographic knowledge as a tool for nationalism,” while 
at the same time also managing to “marry the imperatives of science with popular 
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interest.”498 Overt in its association to governmental interests, the 1900 editorial board 
included government officials from the Treasury Department, Department of State, 
Department of Agriculture, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, 
Bureau of American Ethnology, and U.S. Geological Survey. “During and after the war,” 
writes Schulten, “the community of scientists and government workers at the Society 
seamlessly joined their professional identities—whether as surveyors, hydrographers, 
statisticians, or diplomats—to the national interest,” writes Schulten. “There is no 
evidence that the conflicts at the Society in these years reflected dissent over the nation’s 
controversial mission abroad, and in fact the Geographic immediately became a place 
where the federal government’s goals could be safely articulated.”499 An excerpt from a 
January 1900 article entitled “The Phillipine Islands and their Environment” by American 
diplomat John Barrett is illustrative of these early moves away from “cold geographic 
fact” and toward geography as “description” openly paired with American commercial 
and international interests:  
“I contend that Manila occupies a position of immeasurable opportunity in 
comparison with the other great ports or cities of the Asian and Australian coast line. 
That you may obtain a concrete idea of what I mean, let me picture how Manila stands 
with reference to neighboring points. Let us draw a circle on a radius of two thousand 
miles, with Manila as the center. As we swing it around we find that this charmed circle 
takes in such distantly separated points as Yokohama, Vladivostok, and Tientsin on the 
north and Port Darwin, in Australia, and Batavia, in Java, on the south. It reaches east to 																																								 																					
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include Guam and the Carolines and west to include Bangkok, in Siam, and Rangoon, in 
Burma. A similar circle drawn around any other port does not include so many important 
points. I would not imply that Manila will ever take the place of Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
or Singapore, or even equal them in the race for commercial or political supremacy, 
because they already have a wonderful start: but there is abundant reason why Manila 
should become a great trade center to divide their business, and at least be the chief point 
through which American shall carry on her growing transactions with Asia’s millions.”500 
Unlike an example that will soon follow (Obergefell v. Hodges), here the purpose 
of this passage is not to reveal the inner thoughts and feelings of the diplomat’s 
acquaintance with Siam. However, it is meant to be personal in a different sense. The 
physical descriptions of distance (“a radius of two thousand miles with Manila as the 
center”) and place (“as we swing it around we find that this charmed circle…takes 
in…north…south…east…west”) are meant to give the audience an eyewitness account 
and an immediate sense of the world (“that you may obtain a concrete idea of what I 
mean”). By design, writes Pauly about the Geographic, “editorial stress was placed upon 
having ‘accurate eyewitness, firsthand accounts’ expressed in ‘writing that sought to 
make pictures in the reader’s mind.’”501 Subtle devices such as the use of the present 
tense (“let us draw”) and clear orientation of the landscape (“let me picture how Manila 
stands with reference to neighboring points…”) work to “set things ‘before the eyes’ with 
language (as Aristotle calls it) or to “make pictures in the reader’s mind” (as the editors 
put it).  																																								 																					
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However, this was not the only form of involvement the text (or the magazine) 
was meant to suggest. As both a membership club and a magazine, the Geographic’s 
contributions to research were meant to give readers and members a sense of 
“participation in science.”502 “However remote members might be from determining the 
policy, they could feel that they contributed to the advancement of knowledge while 
being educated and entertained.”503 One can see how readers might feel included in 
something important when reading the diplomat’s current recommendation on the 
Philippines—a place that, before planes were invented, very few people had actually 
visited and—until National Geographic photographers started coming back with pictures, 
few had ever seen. 
 In contrast to philosophical conversation (which is premised on a “clash of ideas” 
discovered or brought to light in the to and fro of conversation), the public conversational 
dynamic may be used to frame complicated, technical information in a simpler, brighter, 
and more appealing manner. In some instances, however, the dynamism may not happen 
between interlocutors (real or staged) but rather between material and audience. Even 
though National Geographic never took on a dialogic structure, its editors decided that 
they would appeal, as a matter of principle, to the conversational dynamic as a way to 
create a more intimate experience of the world.  
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ANALYSIS 3:  
Obergefell v Hodges (2015) 
On the structural foundations and influences of the conversational dynamic 
 
The public conversational dynamic is animated in part by an eighteenth-century 
Constitution that places a sovereign individual endowed with rights in tension with—and 
separate from—a public majority without settling on an answer of how this tension 
should be resolved. This dynamic, though part of the genius of the Constitution, still 
causes controversy today. What is more, although the spirit of laws designed to protect 
minorities from “the tyranny of the majority” (as Tocqueville famously put it in 
Democracy in America) is in principle understood, its implementation is notoriously 
complicated.  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a prime example of this; 
it is one of the most important and litigated sections of the Constitution. It states: “No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny any person with its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of laws.” Composed in 1868, soon after the Civil War, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was purposely designed to invite broad interpretation. “We know from its 
history that it was meant particularly to combat inequality toward blacks. We also know, 
however—and would rightly presume it even if we didn’t—that the decision to use 
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general language, not tied to race, was a conscious one,” writes John Hart Ely, one of the 
most-cited legal scholars in American history.504  
Ely argues that the Fourteenth Amendment “contains provisions that are difficult 
to read responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to import into the 
constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the language of 
the amendment of the debates that led up to it.”505 In other words, strict interpretivism is 
not only undesirable here, but impossible. To this complexity, an additional layer must be 
included here, since it sets up the problem of Ely’s seminal book on constitutional 
interpretation, as well as a key controversy in the conversational dynamic: Judicial 
review—which puts a “stop” to conversations about law—is inconsistent with democratic 
theory.506 Ely explains the dilemma in this way: “When a court invalidates an act of the 
political branches on constitutional grounds…it is overruling their judgment, and 
normally doing so in a way that is not subject to ‘correction’ by the ordinary lawmaking 
process. Thus, the central function, and at the same time the central problem, of judicial 
review: a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant 
way is telling the people’s elected representatives that they cannot govern as they like.”507   
This lack of democrat accountability, together with the Court’s final say on the 
Constitution, is why Justices habitually censure each other for “shutting down the 
conversation.” In Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the landmark 5-4 Supreme Court ruling 																																								 																					
504 Ely, 1980, 30 and Fred R. Shapiro, "The Most‐Cited Legal Scholars," The Journal of Legal Studies 
29.S1,  (January 2000): 409-426. Illustrating the point further, John Hart Ely is actually cited in Obergefell 
v Hodges.  
505 Ely, 1980, 14. 
 
506 Ely, 1980; Also see 576 U.S.___2015, Roberts dissenting, 26. 
 
507 Hart Ely, 1980, 5. 
 
	179	
that made same-sex marriage a constitutional right, Chief Justice Roberts writes in his 
dissent, for example, that the majority decision “seizes for itself a question the 
Constitution leaves to the people, at a time when people are engaged in a vibrant debate 
on that question.”508 By “closing debate,” argues Roberts, proponents of same-sex 
marriage have “lost” and “lost forever” the “opportunity to win the true acceptance that 
comes from persuading their fellow citizens of the justice of their cause. And they lose 
this just when the winds of change were freshening at their backs.”509  
The problem, however, is that this same recourse to constitutional law (i.e., this 
ability to end the conversation) is also how constitutional rights are protected—regardless 
of legislation. In Democracy in America, for instance, Tocqueville calls “the power 
granted to American courts to pronounce on the unconstitutionality of laws…one of the 
most powerful barriers ever erected against the tyranny of political assemblies.”510 
Justices still maintain this view. Indeed, the Opinion of the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges 
refers to this principle, saying, “An individual can invoke a right to constitutional 
protection when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the 
broader public refuses to act.”511  
Citing West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), a case having to do 
with the mandatory salute to the flag in public schools, the majority in Obergfell v 
Hodges held that “the idea of the Constitution ‘was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and 																																								 																					
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officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.’ This is why 
‘fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections.’”512 The controversy does not end with this, however, since fundamental rights, 
whatever they may be, are not “raw” materials (or even “self-evident” as the Declaration 
of Independence famously held).  
In effect, this means that fundamental rights may be just as likely to appear at the 
center of judicial clashes on “ending the conversation” as any other portion of judicial 
review. In cases where Justices are compelled to bridge the distance between eighteenth-
century ideals animating the Constitution and emerging twenty and twenty-first century 
challenges, this is more likely still. Right to Privacy, to give one example, did not become 
a part of Constitutional law until a late-nineteenth century Harvard Law Review article 
(1890) by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis when they defined it as “the right to be left 
alone.” Soon after, it began to play an active part of numerous twentieth century Supreme 
Court rulings, including Roe v. Wade (1972). In an era of increasing surveillance and 
digital decadence, privacy is again receiving attention, even though the Constitution that 
underwrites the “right to privacy” remains basically unchanged.513  
This inevitable distance between old and new amplifies the rhetorical challenges 
for Justices, since it draws more attention to judicial review at a time when, certainly on 
paper, the nation was becoming more democratic.514 Justice Jackson pointed to this 
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dilemma in 1943 when, writing for the 7-2 majority in West Virginia Board of Education 
v. Barnette, he held that “the task of translating majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, 
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth-century, into 
concrete restraints on officials dealing with problems of the twentieth-century, is one to 
disturb confidence.”515 The cultural transformations between the eighteenth and twentieth 
centuries were profound, argued Jackson. Constitutional “principles grew in soil which 
also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his liberty 
was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and that the government 
should be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over men’s 
affairs.”516  
By the 1940s, following the transformative influence of the Great Depression and 
at the height of the Second World War, the judicial landscape had changed dramatically. 
The government’s role had exponentially increased, making judicial precedent that much 
more difficult to uphold. “We must transport these rights to a soil in which the laissez-
faire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least to economic affairs, 
and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and 
through expanded and strengthened government controls. These changed conditions often 
deprive precedents of reliability and cast us more than we would choose upon our own 
judgment.”517 The decision, in other words, to overturn legislation as unconstitutional in 
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order to protect individual rights has the potential to be every bit as contentious as the 
more democratic process of drafting legislation through Congress or States.518  
When the Constitution and Bill of Rights were drafted, democratic decision-
making and individual rights were placed on parallel footing without a conclusive way to 
resolve the tension between them. This tension persists today and is vividly demonstrated 
in Obergefell v. Hodges, a landmark Supreme Court ruling for which conversation is 
neither an overt legal topic nor a deliberately chosen symbol. This is precisely why it is 
such a fitting illustration; highlighting just how varied and extensive the reach of the 
conversational dynamic has become, the conversational influences in Obergefell v. 
Hodges are multiple, contradictory, and, although central to the decision, almost always 
implicit.  
 
Audience: On the Choice to Amplify Interior Motivations   
In one variety of “conversation,” the emphasis on individual rights and personal 
experience drags the self—as a private self—into public spaces, thus encouraging a type 
of private, interior-focused style.519 Intentions, yearnings, personal experience, and 
individual expressions of identity are central to this dynamic. It is in this variation, for 
example, that we find language which steps outside of law and into the realm of inner 
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motivation and “the human condition.”520 This is where the Court states, “Marriage 
responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one 
there.” 521 The language is striking here, not only because it seems so out of step with a 
traditional legal brief, but also for the nonmaterial way in which it sets up a contrast 
between a married person and a “lonely person.” As Justice Thomas notes in his dissent, 
the Opinion also “suggests that marriage confers ‘nobility’ on individuals. I am unsure 
what this means. People may choose to marry or not to marry. The decision to do so does 
not make one person more ‘noble’ than another. And the suggestion that Americans who 
choose not to marry are inferior to those who decide to enter such relationships is 
specious.”522  
Of course, what Justice Thomas fails to mention is that the plaintiffs in Obergefell 
v. Hodges were actually not free to marry. That is precisely why their case was before the 
Court. Thus the controversy is two-fold: 1) on the one hand, the Opinion idealizes 
marriage, personal motives, and interior dynamics; 2) on the other hand, it does this even 
when it has stronger, more relevant legal arguments at its disposal. What the petitioners 
seek, and what the Court can (and indeed does) deliver, is legal standing: Petitioner 
James Obergefell wants to be shown as the surviving spouse on his husband’s death 
certificate. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse want to share equal parental rights with all 
three of their adopted children. And Ijipe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura want to move to a 
different state without having their lawful marriage stripped from them. 523 None of this 																																								 																					
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really has to do with “call[ing] out to find no one there.” Whether or not marriage confers 
“nobility” or responds (or does not respond) to existential loneliness is hardly the 
question.  
What matters (at least in principle) in Obergefell v Hodges is that there are more 
than one thousand provisions of federal law for which a valid marriage is a significant 
status.524 In a case revolving around due process and equal protection under the law, one 
would think this is where the analysis would logically fall.525 However, instead of 
concentrating on the clearest legal argument—that “States have contributed to the 
fundamental character of the marriage right by placing that institution at center of so 
many facets of the legal and social order”—the Opinion buries this argument in appeals 
to personal longings.526  
Because the Constitution itself “says nothing about marriage,” each of the 
Justices, regardless of where one fell on the issue, was confronted with the task of 
“translating majestic generalities” into “concrete restraints” and rights. 527 The majority 
responded to this by ratcheting up the emotional intensity of the case in order to illustrate 
the “urgency of the petitioners’ cause from their perspectives.”528 More tellingly, they 
identified the central purpose of marriage not as a social issue, or even legal one made 
more important by new provisions in state and federal law, but rather as a personal—even 
existential—one. Rather than focus on the denial of tangible benefits, the majority 																																								 																					
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opinion chose to situate the Court alongside expressions of personal identity and interior 
yearnings. Although an apt example of an intense preoccupation with the individual and 
dramatization through rhetorical style, the Opinion of the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges 
is perhaps best understood as a signal of this interest in a private self rather than a 
superior example of its performance.  
 
Conversational Writing Style as Legal Strategy  
A second variety of the conversation dynamic in Obergefell v. Hodges is 
expressed not in the idea of intimacy, but rather in the informal, unfiltered style we have 
come to associate with modern speech. This is especially noteworthy in the dissents of 
Obergefell v. Hodges given the style’s contrast to their formal, judicial positions. The 
legal theme of “judicial restraint” pervades the dissents in this ruling. Justice Roberts 
writes, for example, that “allowing unelected federal judges to select which 
unenumerated fundamental rights rank as ‘fundamental’—and to strike down state laws 
on the basis of that determination—raises obvious concerns about the judicial role.”529 He 
notes that in order to avoid the Court’s previous “error of converting personal preferences 
into constitutional mandates, our modern substantive due process cases have stressed the 
need for ‘judicial self-restraint.’”530 Justice Scalia goes even further in his dissent. He 
effectively questions whether this “error of converting personal preference into 
constitutional mandates” is so egregious as to undercut the very system of American 
government, writing that a system that “makes the People subordinate to a committee of 
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nine elected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.”531 However, the style in 
which Scalia writes his disagreement not only gratuitously draws attention to himself, but 
more often than not eschews restraint.  
Indeed, in the same way that presidential rhetoric has become more 
conversational over time, the language of the Court has also shifted, becoming, as Erwin 
Chemerinsky perceives it, less refined than before: “My impression—and I present it as 
just that, a subjective sense—is that language is less eloquent and more sarcastic than 
before.”532 In particular, Chemerinsky cites “a great change in that Justices are far more 
willing to use a ‘poison pen’ and be very sarcastic.”533 This is evidenced throughout the 
Obergefell v Hodges decision. For example, just after Justice Scalia complains about the 
“pretentious” style in which the Opinion of the Court is couched, he let loose on his own 
style for contrasting effect: “Rights, we are told, can ‘rise…from a better understanding 
of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.’ 
(Huh? How can a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives 
[whatever that means] define [whatever that means] and urgent liberty [never mind], give 
birth to a right?”534  
Although Scalia claims that he wants the Justices to refrain from inserting 
themselves into the ruling, he does this very thing—and to considerable rhetorical 
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effect—with his irreverent, parenthetical style. His repeated use of mocking interjections 
(“Huh?,” “whatever that means,” “never mind”) amplifies his position as an “unelected 
lawyer” and deliberately draws attention to his personal prejudices. Scalia breaks down 
the Court to illustrate how they are “hardly a cross-section of America.”535 The Court, 
says Scalia, “consists of only nine men and women, all of them successful lawyers who 
studied at Harvard or Yale. Four of the nine are natives of New York City. Eight of them 
grew up in east- and west-coast States.”536 Scalia’s use of energeia reduces the distance 
from an august Supreme Court in the abstract to a handful of knowable, if successful, 
judges. Mirroring the language of conversation, which frequently includes fragments and 
incomplete sentences, Scalia observes: “Not a single Southwesterner or even, to tell the 
truth, a genuine Westerner (California does not count.)”537 By playing with America’s 
quintessential regional disputes in the service of his own argument (that “the strikingly 
unrepresentative character of the body voting on today’s social upheaval would be 
irrelevant if they were functioning as judges”), Scalia bolsters his own position while 
simultaneously concealing this effort.  
Although portions of his dissent read as though they were written off-the-cuff, 
they are in fact a stylistic choice deliberately developed over time. Certainly, Scalia’s 
characteristic use of informal idioms (“I would hide my head in a bag.” “Ask the nearest 
hippie.” “What say?”) should not be confused with sloppiness or carelessness.538 Rather, 
they perform a central role in Scalia’s attitude toward legal writing, which he explains in 																																								 																					
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the collection of speeches and writings that were published after his death in 2016: “there 
is a writing genius…which consists primarily, I think, of the ability to place oneself in the 
shoe’s of one’s audience; to assume only what they assume; to anticipate what they 
anticipate; to explain what they need explained; to think what they must be thinking; to 
feel what they must be feeling.”539 The audience-centered principle that Scalia espouses 
here can of course be traced across the rhetorical tradition. What is noteworthy is not the 
idea that one should feel what audiences are feeling or thinking what audiences are 
thinking. Rather, it is that modern audiences—even the brightest legal minds, to whom 
the ruling is primarily addressed—increasingly expect the same thing: to be addressed, as 
Dale Carnegie would say, “just as directly as he would in a chat, and in the same general 
manner that he would employ in speaking to one of them in conversation.”540  
Legal scholar Laura Krugman Ray readily admits that “attorneys may enjoy, but 
do not need” the conversational style and vivid “imagery to understand judicial 
analyses.”541 However, she suspects (as, it seems to me, we all should) that there is the 
“hope” of engaging “interested amateurs as well as legal professionals among readers of 
the Court.”542 This may be why you find Justice Roberts referring to scenarios such as 
this one: “If you had asked a person on the street how marriage was defined, no one 
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would have ever said, ‘Marriage is the union of a man and a women, where the woman is 
subject to coverture.’”543  
Although the tone throughout Roberts and Scalia’s dissents are noticeably 
different (with Roberts’s being more respectful and Scalia’s more biting), the appeal to an 
audience’s individual reactions and thoughts is present throughout. For example, Roberts 
concludes his dissent by changing his orientation (or “footing”) to be even more closely 
aligned with the audience, saying, “If you are among the many Americans—of whatever 
sexual orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means celebrate 
today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal. Celebrate the opportunity 
for a new expression of commitment to a partner. Celebrate the availability of new 
benefits. But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it. I respectfully 
dissent.” 544 This use of “you” is a classic marker of the conversational style. As Jeanne 
Fahnestock notes, “the second person pronoun produces direct address when the rhetor 
deliberately acknowledges the presence of listeners or readers by calling on them or even 
making some demand on them. In conversation, such direct address can be immediately 
compelling; in writing, it is a less-pressing invitation, but it is still one of the markers of a 
more oral and often informal style.”545 In addition, the marked repetition of “celebrate,” 
straddles the uses of anaphora. As a standard feature of oratory the use of anaphora 
elevates the passage. However, the scheme of repetition also works in a second sense that 
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Holcomb and Killingsworth identify as being “at home in more colloquial or 
conversational writing,” as a way to “ratchet the emotional intensity up a notch.”546   
Roberts’s use of the second pronoun in if you are among follows this pattern of 
calling on readers and making some demand of them. However, it does so in a way that 
not only bolsters his own argument but also simultaneously attempts to build common 
ground with an audience who disagrees with him. (This style in Supreme Court briefs is 
distinctive enough to have caught the attention of legal scholars. For example, writing 
about Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, Krugman Ray describes her writing as 
“remarkably conversational. She employs a range of rhetorical strategies to speak directly 
to the reader, suggesting that her enterprise is less indoctrination than a more congenial 
mode of persuasion. Leavening her legal prose with colloquial diction, she engages the 
reader in something approaching an informational, if one-sided, chat.”547) For Roberts, 
the effect is not only to engage the reader (although it does that) but also to reinforce his 
judicial analyses. In the same move, the Chief Justice differentiates his capacity to feel 
what his audience is feeling without confusing it with or collapsing it into his legal 
position. Thus he ends with: But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do 
with it.  
Scalia, by contrast, underscores his personal disinterestedness in the topic not by 
seeking to build common ground, as Roberts attempts to do, but by insulating himself and 
further entrenching his own thoughts and feeling about the case. Rather than call on the 
audience, in other words, Scalia doubly interjects himself as first a judge (which informs 
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his ruling) and secondly as a disinterested citizen (which informs both his personal 
feelings about the topic and his indictment of the Court). Directly after providing a 
justification for writing his own dissent (he wants to “call attention to the Court’s threat 
to American democracy”), Scalia opens with an overview of himself in relation to the 
topic: “The substance of today’s decrees is not of immense personal importance to me. 
The law can recognize as marriage whatever sexual attachment and living arrangements it 
wishes, and can afford them favorable civil consequences, from tax treatment to rights of 
inheritance…So it is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage. It 
is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s decree says 
that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of 
nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.”548  
From here, Scalia goes on to idealize democratic discussion and debate much in 
the same way that the Opinion of the Court idealizes marriage. I will discuss this 
elevation of debate and the third controversy of the conversational dynamic next. 
However, before doing so it is important to remember that the conversational style—even 
when viewed explicitly as a style—signifies more than just a way of talking or a way of 
writing.  As Holcomb and Killingsworth point out, “every style of speaking has effects on 
matters other than language.”549 For example, style, as part of a larger social dynamic, 
becomes a vehicle of performance in which quintessential political questions of “power 
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and advantage are negotiated, distributed, and struggled over in society,” says 
Brummett.550  
Style is not limited to particular effects either, since “the purpose to which each 
style is put can vary;” in the same manner, audiences do not passively receive but 
actually “co-create” its meaning. 551 Accordingly, and despite their appeal, “rigid 
conventions” of stylistic performance are often only that: conventions “masquerade[ing] 
as rules.”552 As we have seen in the variety of conversational styles demonstrated by 
Scalia, Roberts, and Kagan, even though they all make use of the conversational style in 
their judicial analyses, and even though all of their opinions are informed by a 
Constitution that famously draws out the individual, their reasons for doing so are not 
identical and the “footing” they seek to establish with their audience is not the same.  
 
Conversation as the Connective Tissue of Liberal Decision 
In a third variety of the conversational dynamic, public discussion and rational 
debate are idealized. What makes this component of Obergefell v. Hodges controversial 
is not the objective of democratic debate as such—both the majority and the minority 
appeal to it—but rather a question that the Constitution introduces without settling on an 
answer: at what point individual rights are deemed fundamental, and thus removed from 
democratic decision. 553 In Obergefell v Hodges, the Opinion of the Court contends that 
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the right to marry, regardless of sexual orientation, is indeed fundamental. As such, “it is 
of no moment whether advocates of same-sex marriage now enjoy or lack momentum in 
the democratic process.” 554 The minority argues the opposite. They contend that where 
the public was in the process of democratic decision-making mattered very much, not just 
in regards to the ruling itself but for future implications about the public’s reception of 
same-sex marriage. Justice Roberts, for example, believed “there will be consequences to 
shutting down the political process on an issue of such profound public importance. 
Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice are less likely to accept the 
ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of thing courts usually 
decide.”555  
What is more, the minority argued that it was not just that the decision closed 
debate, but that it did so at an inopportune time. “Until the federal courts intervened,” 
writes Justice Alito, “the American people were engaged in a debate about whether their 
State should recognize same-sex marriage.”556 Justice Scalia concurred, saying, “Until 
the courts put a stop to it,” the “public debate over same-sex marriage” was in the process 
of displaying “American democracy at is best.”557 Unlike other forms of democracy, 
which can be rude, uncivil, petty, and shortsighted, here individuals “on both sides” of 
the argument were said to have “passionately but respectfully” persuaded their “fellow 
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citizens” through reasoned and respectful debate.558 Justice Roberts, meanwhile, held that 
“supporters of same-sex marriage” in particular had achieved “considerable success 
persuading their fellow citizens—through the democratic process—to adopt their 
view.”559 This process, according to Roberts, ended with the Court’s landmark decision, 
“stealing the issue from the people” at a time when “the winds of change were freshening 
at their backs.”560 In support of this claim, he cites “a carefully reasoned decision” from 
the Court of Appeals, which recognized the “democratic ‘momentum’ in favor of 
‘expand[ing] the definition of marriage to include gay couples.”561  
Regardless of how one views the Justices various interpretations on the relevance 
(or lack of relevance) of the “democratic momentum,” the Court’s general agreement on 
its presence is especially useful to our understanding of the conversational dynamic. This 
is because the question of how this momentum was accomplished ultimately sheds light 
on the relationship between the dynamic and the public sphere. In their introduction to 
Mediated Politics, W. Lance Bennett and Robert Entman argue for a broad definition of 
the public sphere. They argue that it “is comprised of any and all locations, physical or 
virtual, where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are transmitted and exchanged 
openly.”562 The ruling of Obergefell v Hodges helps to flesh out this view, particularly 
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given the Justices shared expectation that American democracy engages in open debates 
about the “content of law.”563  
How much of a role did “conversation” play in the “deep transformations” and 
“fundamental societal changes” that led shifts in thought about something as religiously 
and politically entrenched as same-sex marriage?564 Political theorists have pointed to the 
ideal of discussion and debate in public life for as long as democracy has been a political 
system. What makes the Obergefell v. Hodges case so useful and distinctive to this study 
is that it unofficially (and unwittingly) captures a “dynamic” that is fundamental and 
diffuse. In contrast to formal campaigns for conversation (e.g., President Bill Clinton’s 
late 1990s initiative to have a “national conversation about race”), Obergefell makes no 
mention of conversation as an end in itself.  Instead of envisioning conversation as an 
unmoving metaphor for understanding, the 2015 Supreme Court ruling accentuates the 
role conversation plays as a connective tissue among “any and all locations, physical or 
virtual, where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are transmitted and exchanged 
openly.”  
Between 1996, when Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
(which “defined marriage for all federal-law purposes as ‘only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife”) and 2003, when Massachusetts became the 
first state to legalize same-sex marriage, a combination of “private and public dialogue” 
contributed to shifting attitudes about same-sex marriage.565 Justice Kennedy, who wrote 
the majority opinion, cites “case law,” “District Court decisions,” “history and tradition,” 																																								 																					
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“new and widespread discussion,” “grassroots campaigns,” “studies and other writings,” 
“extensive discussion of the issue in both governmental and private sectors,” “years of 
litigation, legislation, referenda, and the discussion that attended these public acts,” 
changes in “societal understandings,” “substantial cultural and political developments,” 
“deep transformations,” “perspectives that began in please and protests,” and “ongoing 
dialogue” as some of the dynamics that contributed to this shift.566 Justice Thomas adds 
“newspaper editorials,” “journals,” “public speeches,” “sermons,” and “letters,” to the 
discussion, while Justice Roberts cites the “battlefields of the Civil War,” “Constitutional 
Amendments,” and a “dictionary” as materials in his argument.567 As a collective, the 
Court cites copious amounts of foundational theorists and documents, including Cicero, 
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Alexis de Tocqueville, the Magna Carta, 
and the Declaration of Independence, to name a few.  
The materials of the “discussion” in other words, come from all sides. Although 
on their own these elements might not appear to offer much in the way of disclosure, 
together they underscore how and why “the bullheaded belief that democracy is nothing 
more than the periodic election of government by majority rule is crumbling.”568 Indeed, 
as Montesquieu long suspected, the very work of the Court emphasizes how much the 
Constitution (as a founding idea) and law (as a force that has direct bearing on 
individuals) not only follow citizen attitudes but also drive them. A recent report of 
approximately one million respondents published in Psychological and Cognitive 
Sciences highlights this point. The 2019 study suggests that, while antigay bias has been 																																								 																					
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waning for some time, “following local same-sex marriage legalization antigay bias 
decreased at roughly double the rate.”569 Because of the staggered manner in which same-
sex marriage legislation in the United States was passed, the authors held they were better 
able to delineate how “government legislation can inform attitudes even on religiously 
and politically entrenched positions.”570 Justice Roberts, who was adamant in his belief 
that changes to the definition of marriage belonged in the hands of democratically elected 
legislators—not federally appointed judges—still recognized the deliberative processes 
taking place outside (and perhaps inside) the Court. The “democratic momentum” was 
truly shifting people’s perspectives “here and abroad” said Roberts: “This deliberative 
process is making people take seriously questions that they may not have ever regarded 
as questions before.”571  
 If Obergefell v Hodges can be read as an implicit controversy over the role of 
conversation in official governmental settings, then we may be left to wonder about how 
this dynamic might play out in unstructured ones. Although as far as I am aware there are 
no sustained studies (outside of this one) on the long-term logic animating the 
conversational turn, there are nevertheless numerous analyses and histories that document 
the unofficial relationship between the media, public life, and “conversation” in twentieth 
century United States. Rather than seeking to duplicate these scholars’ efforts or argue 
against them, this chapter has sought to build on them.  
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Conclusion  
The public conversational dynamic responds to different exigencies than earlier 
forms of rhetoric or artful conversation. Patterns that distinguish the modern, public 
conversational dynamic from earlier forms of rhetoric or artful conversation include its 
orientation (spectacle); it style (appealing to conversational markers, even when written 
or spoken in monologic form); and its expectations (in most scenarios, some will 
contribute, but not all).  In the case of spectacle, what is important is that interaction is 
expected to go beyond itself by disclosing things like character, expertise, inner 
motivations, or things “as they really are.” In the case of style, the dynamism may not 
happen between interlocutors (real or staged) but rather between material and audience. 
(Even when delivered in a monologic structure, writers and speakers may appeal to the 
conversational dynamic as a way to frame complicated, controversial, or technical 
information in an easier or more palatable manner.) Perhaps most important (and 
misunderstood) about the conversational dynamic is its expectation of lack. The public 
conversational dynamic invites engagement from people who will never actually enter 
into the discussion. However, some engagement is usually expected and achieved, and 
the conversation can change courses as a result. The extent to which audiences do or do 
not participate or change the course of the discussion makes the dynamic more or less 
“conversational.”   
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EPILOGUE 
Rhetoric “in general” will continue to adapt to the cultural, social, and political 
realities that organize people’s lives, whether it is achieved in ways that we recognize or 
not. Although this study was very much inspired by present conditions in the United 
States and does include modest contributions to rhetorical theory and criticism, I consider 
it above all to be a claim about the history of rhetoric and cultural survival. 
The conversational turn has been under-theorized. This has led not only to blind 
spots in our understanding of the past, but miscalculations of what the dynamic means to 
the present. The sociologist and historian Richard Sennett has aptly framed the problem 
this way: when critics speak of revolutions, they “often suggest to the imagination of 
their readers that beforehand there was one society, that during the revolution society 
stopped, and that afterward a new cycle began. This is a view of human history based on 
the lifecycle of a moth.”572 The result, according to Sennett, is not simply a disconnect 
between periods, but also a failure to identify current dilemmas. “The error,” he writes, 
“is more than that of failing to see how one condition of life blurs into another; it is a 
failure to understand both the reality of cultural survival and the problems this legacy, 
like any inheritance, creates in a new generation.”573 
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If the conversational style and metaphor are as revolutionary and pervasive as 
modern assessments of American rhetoric would have us believe, then our pedagogies 
and critiques of rhetoric should treat it as such. We can no longer be satisfied with 
catching someone in a performance that is not “pure” conversation or “pure” 
argumentation and calling it a day. Indeed, if my brief assessment of nineteenth-century 
American culture offers anything inventive, I hope it the suggestion that hybrid forms of 
public conversation were actively sought and encouraged for their perceived corrective 
qualities that “pure” conversation and “pure” argumentation were, for any number of 
reasons, unable to provide. In Chapter Four, I identified these attributes as compression, 
cultural mediation, cultural reform, and attempts at discovery that were so typical of the 
period.  
Although some of the dilemmas that animated these nineteenth-century goals 
have surely morphed or been replaced, one practical application from which university 
classrooms would surely benefit is a reintegration of the view that an ability to “speak as 
others” is considered important for rhetorical training.574 Much attention has been given 
to the uncomfortable emphasis on the self and interiority that contemporary discourse 
encourages—and in which conversationalism is indubitably associated. However, even 
this part of the dynamic has not been fully exhausted in its inventiveness or its persuasive 
power. (Just today, I encountered a piece of cultural criticism that referred to an author’s 
“conversational-voice” not as breezy, funny, or erudite, but as altogether “dam-
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breaking.”575)  Equally important, although the multivocality of public conversation will 
never reach full participation, the chaos it invites brings us into much closer alignment 
with typical rhetorical conditions than any unhindered oration or sequential argument 
(including this one) might suggest. There are still so many ways contemporary rhetoric 
could go. Whether or not conversation will soon be replaced as the ideal rhetorical frame 
remains an open question (and not one in which I have a particular investment). 
However, the plasticity of the conversational dynamic cannot be overstated.  
For instance, in this study, I have suggested that the Constitution animates some 
of the structural foundations and influences of the conversational dynamic by placing a 
sovereign individual with rights in tension with a public majority—without settling on an 
answer of how this tension should be resolved. This lack of resolution places a strain on 
American rhetorical culture, even today. However, it is just as much a site for opportunity 
and invention as it is for constrictions. Colene Lind, whose work on the Common Style 
served as part of the backdrop for this inquiry, is perceptive in her ability to bring this 
dilemma in American politics back to the individual, saying: “the ultimate sin of 
citizenship is cynicism, which closes its adherents to the possibilities of persuasive 
change.”576 The same can be said for conversation. Although the dynamic I outlined in 
the previous chapters is a cumulative rhetorical style and metaphor that, while borrowing 
oratory and conversation, is really neither, it still has much to draw from earlier arts—not 
least with respect to their trust in an open future. Both rhetoric and democracy require it.  																																								 																					
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Given his insight into the ways in which equality of conditions engenders and 
modifies everything that it does not produce, it should come as little surprise that it was 
Tocqueville who identified this belief in an open future as one of the fundamental 
challenges of democracy (and for the historians living in it). “[H]istorians living in 
democratic times not only deny certain citizens the power to act on the fate of the people 
but also deny peoples themselves the ability to shape their own destiny, thereby making 
them subject to either inflexible providence of blind fatality.”577 In their view, he writes, 
“the destiny of every nation is irrevocably fixed by its position, origin, antecedents, and 
nature, and nothing it does can change that.”578 The conversational dynamic rejects this 
doctrine of fatality. As rhetoricians, it is our duty to reject this ossification, too. “One 
should be careful not to obscure this idea,” Tocqueville writes, “because the goal is to 
exalt men’s souls, not to complete the task of laying them low.”579 
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